As we look for answers to the current financial crisis, it is clear that creative financing played a massive role in propelling the global financial system to hazy new heights—before it led the way into the depths of a systemic crisis. But how did financing get so creative? It did not happen within the confines of a regulated banking system, which submits to strict regulatory requirements in exchange for the safety of government backstopping. Instead, financing got so creative through the rise of a “shadow banking system,” which operated legally yet almost completely outside the realm of bank regulation. The rise of this system drove one of the biggest lending booms in history, and its collapse resulted in one of the most crushing financial crises we have ever seen.

Perhaps the most lucid framework for understanding this progression comes from the work of Hyman Minsky, the mid-20th-century U.S. economist whose theory on the nature of financial instability proved unnervingly prescient in explaining the rise and fall of shadow banking—and the dizzying journey of the global financial system over the past several years.

Nature and Origin of the Shadow Banking System

I coined the term “shadow banking system” in August 2007 at the U.S. Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) annual symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Unlike conventional regulated banks, unregulated shadow banks fund themselves with uninsured short-term funding, which may or may not be backstopped by liquidity lines from real banks. Because they fly below the radar of traditional bank regulation, these levered-up intermediaries operate in the shadows without backstopping from the Fed’s discount lending window or access to FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) deposit insurance.

The allure of shadow banking over the last decade or so is unambiguous: There is no better way for bankers to maximally leverage the inherent banking model (of borrowing cheap and lending rich) than by becoming nonbank bankers, or shadow bankers. And they did this in droves, running leveraged lending and investment institutions known as investment banks, conduits, structured investment vehicles,
and hedge funds. They did so by raising funding in the nondeposit markets, notably unsecured debt—such as interbank borrowing and commercial paper—and secured borrowing—such as reverse repurchase agreements (repo) and asset-backed commercial paper. And usually, but not always, such shadow banks maintained a reliance on conventional banks (those with access to the Fed’s window) by securing lines of credit with these latter banks.

**Shadow Banking’s Relationship with Regulators and Rating Agencies**

Because shadow banks do not have access to the same governmental safety nets that real banks do, they do not have to operate under meaningful regulatory constraints, notably regarding the amount of leverage they can use, the size of their liquidity buffers, and the types of lending and investing they can do. To be sure, shadow banking needed some seal of approval so that providers of short-dated funding could convince themselves that their claims were de facto “just as good” as deposits at banks with access to the government’s liquidity safety nets. Conveniently, the friendly faces at the credit rating agencies, paid by the shadow bankers, stood at the ready to provide such seals of approval. Moody’s and S&P would put an A-1/P-1 rating on the commercial paper, which, in turn, would be bought by money market funds. Of course, it is inherently an unstable structure. The rating agencies have a legitimate problem of putting ratings on innovative securities: The agencies have not had a chance to observe a historical track record on these securities—to see their performance over a full cycle.

The bottom line is that the shadow banking system created explosive growth in leverage and liquidity risk outside the purview of the Fed. And it was all grand while ever-larger application of leverage put upward pressure on asset prices. There is nothing like a bull market to make geniuses out of levered dunces.

**Shadow Banking vs. Conventional Banking**

Despite the extraordinary Keynesian public life-support system under way that was born out of the necessity to keep banks (and capitalism as a going concern) alive, capitalist economies usually want their banking systems owned by the private sector. As private companies, banks make loans and investments on commercial terms in the pursuit of profit, but also in the context of prudential regulation to minimize the downside to taxpayers of the moral hazard inherent in the two safety nets (FDIC deposit insurance and the Fed’s discount window). But, as is the wont of capitalists, they love leveraging the sovereign’s safety nets with minimal prudential regulation. This does not make them immoral, merely astute interpreters of the circumstances they face.

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1This list is representative, not exhaustive.
Over the last three decades or so, the growth of “banking” outside formal, sovereign-regulated banking has exploded, and it was a great gig as long as the public bought the notion that such funding instruments were “just as good” as bank deposits.

Keynes provides the essential—and existential—answer to why the shadow banking system became so large, the unraveling of which lies at the root of the current global financial system crisis. It was a belief in what appeared to be a historical truth, undergirded by the length of time that the supposed truth held: Shadow bank liabilities were viewed as “just as good” as conventional bank deposits because they had, in fact, been just as good over any historical period that a prospective investor could observe. (That such a liability could default, and very well might under foreseeable future circumstances, was not in the historical track record, although it could have been discerned from analysis of the prospects for the items on the shadow bank’s balance sheet.)

And the power of this conventional thinking was aided and abetted by both the sovereign and the sovereign-blessed rating agencies—until, of course, convention was turned on its head starting with a run on the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in August 2007, the near death of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the de facto nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July 2008, and the actual death of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Maybe, just maybe, there was and is something special about a real bank, as opposed to a shadow bank! And indeed that is unambiguously the case, as evidenced by the ongoing partial re-intermediation of the shadow banking system back into the sovereign-supported conventional banking system, as well as by the mad scramble by remaining shadow banks to convert themselves into conventional banks so as to eat at the same sovereign-subsidized capital and liquidity cafeteria as their former stodgy brethren.

**Minsky and the Shadow Banking System**

The shadow banking system, from its explosive growth to its calamitous collapse, followed a path that might have looked quite familiar to the economist Hyman Minsky. He passed away in 1996, but his teachings and writings echo today. Building from the work of many economists before him, most notably Keynes, Minsky articulated a theory on financial instability that describes in almost lurid detail what recently happened in the shadow banking system, the housing market, and the broader economy that brought us to the depths of financial crisis—and he published this theory in 1986. So, the first thing we do when we discuss Minsky is show reverence. He studied at Harvard and taught at Brown, Berkeley, and Washington University in St. Louis. After his retirement in 1990, he continued writing and lecturing with the Levy Institute, which now hosts an annual symposium in his honor.

Minsky may well have considered himself a Keynesian economist (he published his analysis and interpretation of Keynes in 1975), but Minsky’s own theories headed off in a new direction. Keynes is arguably a solid place to start any adventure
in economic theory. Remember that Keynes effectively invented the field of macroeconomics, which is founded on the proposition that what holds for the individual does not necessarily hold for a collection of individuals operating as an economic system. This principle is sometimes called the “fallacy of composition” and sometimes called the “paradox of aggregation.” But we need not resort to fancy labels to define the common sense of macroeconomics. Anybody who has ever been a spectator at a crowded ball game has witnessed the difference between microeconomics and macroeconomics: From a micro perspective, it is rational for each individual to stand up to get a better view; but from a macro perspective, each individual acting rationally will produce the irrational outcome of everybody standing up but nobody having a better view.

The Financial Instability Hypothesis

Minsky took Keynes to the next level, and his huge contribution to macroeconomics comes under the label of the “financial instability hypothesis.” Minsky openly declared that his hypothesis was “an interpretation of the substance of Keynes’s General Theory.” Minsky’s key addendum to Keynes’ work was really quite simple: provide a framework for distinguishing between stabilizing and destabilizing capitalist debt structures. Minsky summarized the hypothesis beautifully in 1992:

Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified.

Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principal out of income cash flows. Such units need to “roll over” their liabilities (e.g., issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing debt)....

For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principal or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stock lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes....

It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium-seeking and -containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation-amplifying system. The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.
In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values. (Minsky 1992, pp. 6–8)

Those three categories of debt units—hedge (note: no relation to hedge funds), speculative, and Ponzi—are the straws that stir the drink in Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. The essence of the hypothesis is that stability is destabilizing because capitalists, observing stability in the present, have a herding tendency to extrapolate the expectation of stability out into the indefinite future, putting in place ever-more risky debt structures, up to and including Ponzi units, that cause stability to be undermined.

The longer people make money by taking risk, the more imprudent they become in risk taking. While they are doing that, the expectation of a reward to risk taking is self-fulfilling on the way up. If everybody is simultaneously becoming more risk seeking, risk premiums shrink, the value of collateral goes up, the ability to lever increases, and the game keeps going. Human nature is inherently procyclical, and that is essentially what the Minsky thesis is all about. He says:

From time to time, capitalist economies exhibit inflations and debt deflations which seem to have the potential to spin out of control. In such processes the economic system’s reactions to a movement of the economy amplify the movement— inflation feeds upon inflation and debt-deflation feeds upon debt-deflation. (Minsky 1992, p. 1)

This procyclical tendency applies to central banks and policymakers as well; I believe that having too much success in stabilizing goods and services inflation, while conducting an asymmetric reaction function to asset price inflation and deflation, can be dangerous. Yes, it can work for a time. But precisely because it can work for a time, it sows the seeds of its own demise. Or, as Minsky declared, stability is ultimately destabilizing because of the asset price and credit excesses that stability begets. Put differently, stability can never be a destination, only a journey to instability.

Minsky’s hypothesis richly explains the endemic boom–bust cycles of capitalism, including the bursting of the bubbles in property prices, mortgage finance, and shadow banking that characterize the current bust. You may ask, why all these endemic boom–bust cycles? Is capitalism not driven by Adam Smith’s invisible hand, where markets are efficient and always find just the right prices for things through what people like me call a “discovery process?” Well, much of the time that is right—but not all the time. Indeed, the most interesting, and profitable, times to
be involved in investment management are when Smith’s invisible hand is visibly
broken. What Minsky’s hypothesis did was to provide a framework for how and
when Smith’s hand would break.

**Minsky’s Economic Journey: Forward and Reverse**

In Minsky’s theory, economic cycles can be described by a progression—I like to
call it a journey, in forward or reverse—through those three debt units: “hedge”
financing units, in which the buyer’s cash flows cover interest and principal
payments; “speculative” finance units, in which cash flows cover only interest
payments; and “Ponzi” units, in which cash flows cover neither and depend on rising
asset prices to keep the buyer afloat.

The forward Minsky journey, this time anyway, was the progression of risk
taking in the financial markets represented by the excess of subprime loans,
structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and other shady characters inhabiting the
shadow banking system. Their apparent stability begat ever-riskier debt arrange-
ments, which begat asset price bubbles. And then the bubbles burst, in something
I dubbed (years ago, in fact, when looking back on the Asian credit crisis) a “Minsky
moment.” We can quibble about the precise month of the moment in our present
Minsky journey. I pick August 2007 but would not argue strenuously about three
months on either side of that date.

Whatever moment you pick for the moment, since then, we have been traveling
the reverse Minsky journey—moving backward through the three-part progression,
with asset prices falling, risk premiums moving higher, leverage getting scaled back,
and economic growth turning into economic contraction. Minsky’s “Ponzi” debt
units are only viable as long as the levered assets appreciate in price. But when the
prices of the assets decline, as we have seen in the U.S. housing market, Minsky
tells us we must go through the process of increasing risk taking in reverse—with
all its consequences.

The recent Minsky moment encompassed three bubbles bursting: in property
valuation in the United States; in mortgage creation, again, principally in the United
States; and in the shadow banking system, not just in the United States but around
the world. The blowing up of these three bubbles demanded a systemic repricing
of all risk, which was deflationary for all risk asset prices. These developments are,
as Minsky declared, a prescription for an unstable system—to wit, a system in which
the purging of capitalist excesses is not a self-correcting therapeutic process but a
self-feeding contagion: debt deflation.

**The U.S. Housing Market’s Minsky Journey**

The bubble in the U.S. housing market provides a plain illustration of the forward
Minsky journey in action: People bet that prices would stably rise forever and
financed that bet with excessive debt. Indeed, the mortgage debt market followed
Minsky’s three-step path almost precisely. The first type of debt, the hedge unit, is actually quite stable; the borrower’s cash flow is sufficient to both fully service and amortize the debt. In the mortgage arena, this is known as an old-fashioned loan, like my parents had, as well as the one I used to have. Every month, you write a check that pays the interest plus nibbles away at the principal, and voila, when the last payment is made many years down the road, usually 30, the mortgage simply goes away and you own the house free and clear. You may even throw a little party and ritually burn the mortgage note.

The next, more risky, unit of debt (the speculative unit) comes about when people are so confident in stably rising house prices that they find the hedge unit to be, let us say, boring. Technically, Minsky defined the speculative unit as a loan where the borrower’s cash flow is sufficient to fully service the debt but not amortize the principal. Thus, when the loan matures, it must be refinanced. In the mortgage arena, this type of loan is called an interest only, or IO, with a balloon payment at maturity equal to the original principal amount. Thus, these types of borrowers are speculating on at least three things at the time of refinancing: the interest rate has not risen; terms and conditions, notably the down payment, have not tightened; and, perhaps most importantly, the value of the house has not declined.

Minsky taught that when credit is evolving from hedge units to speculative units, there is no fear; the journey increases demand for the underlying assets that are being levered and drives up their prices. Think about it this way: Most people do not mentally take out a mortgage for X dollars, even though they literally do, but rather take out a mortgage that requires Y dollars for a monthly payment. In the mortgage arena, that means that a speculative borrower can take on a larger mortgage than a hedge borrower can because the monthly payment is lower for the speculative borrower—who is paying only interest, not that extra amount every month to pay off the principal over time. Thus, the speculative borrower can pay a higher price for a house than a hedge borrower with the same income. Accordingly, as the marginal mortgage is taken out by a speculative borrower, it drives up home prices, lessening the risk that the value of the house will fall before the balloon payment comes due.

Of course, speculative financing makes sense only so long as there is an infinite pool of speculative borrowers driving up the price, de facto collectively validating the speculative risk they took. Sounds like a recipe for a bubble, no? Demographics assure us that the pool of homebuyers is finite. In this case, expectations of stably rising home prices ultimately run into the reality of affordability—but that does not in and of itself stop the game.

There is a final leg to a forward Minsky journey, thanks to the reality that humans are not inherently value investors but momentum investors. Human beings are not wired to buy low and sell high; rather, they are wired to buy that which is going up in price. This seems to make no sense, particularly when there is a known
limit to size and affordability constraints: Why would rational people buy a house for a higher price than other folks in the same financial circumstances could afford to pay? But we are not talking about rationality here but human nature; they are not the same. Humans are not only momentum investors, rather than value investors, but also inherently greedy and suffering from hubris about their own smarts. It is sometimes called a “bigger fool” game, with each individual fool thinking he is slightly less foolish than all the other fools. And yes, a bigger fool game is also sometimes called a Ponzi scheme.

Fittingly, the last debt unit on the forward Minsky journey is called a Ponzi unit, defined as a borrower who has insufficient cash flow to even pay the full interest on a loan, much less pay down the principal over time. How (and why) would such a borrower ever find a lender to make her a loan? Simple: As long as home prices are universally expected to continue rising indefinitely, lenders come out of the woodwork offering loans with what is called “negative amortization,” meaning that if you cannot pay the full interest charge, that is okay; they will just tack the unpaid amount onto your principal. At the maturity of the loan, of course, the balloon payment will be bigger than the original loan.

As long as lenders made loans available on virtually nonexistent terms, the price did not matter all that much to borrowers; housing prices were going up so fast that a point or two either way on the mortgage rate did not really matter. The availability of credit trumped the price of credit. Such is always the case in manias. It is also the case that once a speculative bubble bursts, reduced availability of credit will dominate the price of credit, even if markets and policymakers cut the price. (Under such conditions, even good loans will not get made.) The supply side of Ponzi credit is what matters, not the interest elasticity of demand.

Clearly, the exotic mortgages (subprime; interest only; pay-option, with negative amortization, etc.) that have exploded into existence in recent years have been textbook examples of Minsky’s speculative and Ponzi units. But they seem okay as long as expectations of stably rising home prices are realized. Except, of course, they cannot forever be realized. At some point, valuation does matter! How could lenders ignore this obvious truth? Because while it was going on, they were making tons of money. Tons of money do serious damage to the eyesight, and our industry’s moral equivalent of optometrists, the regulators and the rating agencies, are humans too. As long as the forward Minsky journey was unfolding, rising house prices covered all shameful underwriting sins. Essentially, the mortgage arena began lending against only asset value, rather than asset value plus the borrowers’ income. The mortgage originators, who were operating on the originate-to-distribute model, had no stake in the game—no incentive to make only loans they could collect—because they simply originated the loans and then repackaged them.
But who they distributed these packages to, interestingly enough, were the shadow banks. So, we had an originate-to-distribute model and no stake in the game for the originator, and the guy in the middle was being asked to create product for the shadow banking system. The system was demanding product. Well, if you have got to feed the beast that wants product, how do you do it? You have a systematic degradation in underwriting standards so that you can originate more. But as you originate more, you bid up the price of property and, therefore, you say, “These junk borrowers really are not junk borrowers. They are not defaulting.” So, you drop your standards once again and you take prices up. And you still do not get a high default rate. The reason this system worked is that you, as the guy in the middle, had somebody bless it: the credit rating agencies. A key part of keeping the three bubbles (property valuation, mortgage finance, and the shadow banking system) going was that the rating agencies thought the default rates would be low because they had been low. But they had been low because the degradation of underwriting standards was driving up asset prices.

Both regulators and rating agencies were beguiled into believing that the very low default rates during the period of soaring home prices were the normalized default rates for low-quality borrowers, particularly ones with no down payment stake in the game. The rating agencies’ blind-man act was particularly egregious because the lofty ratings they put on securities backed by these dud loans were the fuel for explosive growth in the shadow banking system, which issued tons of similarly highly rated commercial paper to fund purchases of the securities.2

It all went swimmingly, dampening volatility in a self-reinforcing way, until the bubbles created by financial alchemy hit the fundamental wall of housing affordability. Ultimately, fundamentals do matter. We have a day of reckoning—the day the balloon comes due, the margin call, the Minsky moment. If the value of the house has not gone up, then Ponzi units, particularly those with negatively amortizing loans, are toast. And if the price of the house has fallen, speculative units are toast still in the toaster. Ponzi borrowers are forced to “make position by selling out position,” as Minsky phrased it (see earlier), frequently by stopping (or not even beginning) monthly mortgage payments, the prelude to eventual default or jingle mail.3 Ponzi lenders dramatically tighten underwriting standards, at least back to Minsky’s speculative units—loans that may not be self-amortizing but at least are underwritten on evidence that borrowers can pay the required interest, not just the teaser rate but the fully indexed rate on ARMs (adjustable-rate mortgages).

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2To describe the full circularity of this process would require an endlessly circular sentence. Let me start: The issuance of this additional commercial paper created yet more demand for the services of the ratings agencies, which, remember, are paid by the issuer….

3Jingle mail (because of the sound made by house keys) is the return of collateral to the lender.
From a microeconomic point of view, such a tightening of underwriting standards is a good thing, albeit belated. But from a macroeconomic point of view, it is a deflationary turn of events, as serial refinancers, riding the back of presumed perpetual home price appreciation, are trapped long and wrong. And in this cycle, it is not just the first-time homebuyer—God bless him and her—who is trapped but also the speculative Ponzi long: borrowers who were not covering a natural short—remember, you are born short a roof over your head and must cover, either by renting or buying—but rather betting on a bigger fool to take them out (“make book” in Minsky’s words). The property bubble stops bubbling, and when it does, both the property market and the shadow banking system go bust.

When the conventional basis of valuation for the originate-to-distribute (to the shadow banking system) business model for subprime mortgages was undermined, the asset class imploded “violently.” And the implosion was not, as both Wall Street and Washington, DC, beltway mavens predicted, contained. Rather, it became contagious, first on Wall Street with all “risk assets” repricing to higher risk premiums, frequently in violent fashion, and next on Main Street with debt-deflation accelerating in the wake of a mushrooming mortgage credit crunch, notably in the subprime sector but also up the quality ladder.

Yes, we are now experiencing a reverse Minsky journey, where instability will, in the fullness of time, restore stability as Ponzi debt units evaporate, speculative debt units morph after the fact into Ponzi units and are severely disciplined if not destroyed, and even hedge units take a beating. The shadow banking system contracts implosively as a run on its assets forces it to delever, driving down asset prices, eroding equity, and forcing it to delever again. The shadow banking system is particularly vulnerable to runs—commercial paper investors refusing to re-up when their paper matures, leaving the shadow banks with a liquidity crisis. A shadow bank then needs to tap its back-up lines of credit with real banks or to liquidate assets at fire-sale prices. Real banks are in a risk-averse state of mind when it comes to lending to shadow banks. They lend when required by back-up lines but do not seek to proactively increase their exposure to the shadow banking system but, if anything, reduce it. Thus, there is a mighty gulf between the Fed’s liquidity cup and the shadow banking system’s parched liquidity lips.

The entire progression self-feeds on the way down, just like it self-feeds on the way up. It is incredibly procyclical. The regulatory response is also incredibly procyclical. You have a rush to laxity on the way up, and you have a rush to stringency on the way back down. And essentially, on the way down, you have the equivalent of Keynes’s paradox of thrift—the paradox of delevering. It can make sense for each individual institution, for a shadow bank or even a real bank, to delever, but collectively, they cannot all delever at the same time.
Policy Reactions to the Reverse Minsky Journey

Along the way, policymakers have slowly recognized the Minsky moment followed by the unfolding reverse Minsky journey. But I want to emphasize “slowly” because policymakers, collectively, tend to suffer from more than a small amount of denial. Part of the reason is human nature: To acknowledge a reverse Minsky journey, it is first necessary to acknowledge a preceding forward Minsky journey—such as the bubble in asset and debt prices—as the marginal unit of debt creation morphed from hedge to speculative to Ponzi. That is difficult for policymakers to do, especially ones who claim an inability to recognize bubbles while they are forming and, therefore, do not believe that prophylactic action against them is appropriate.

But framing policies to mitigate the damage of a reverse Minsky journey requires that policymakers openly acknowledge that we are where we are because they let the invisible, if not crooked, hand of financial capitalism go precisely where Minsky said it would go unless checked by the visible fist of countercyclical, rather than procyclical, regulatory policy.

That is not to say that Minsky had confidence that regulators could stay out in front of short-term profit-driven innovation in financial arrangements. Indeed, he believed precisely the opposite:

In a world of businessmen and financial intermediaries who aggressively seek profit, innovators will always outpace regulators; the authorities cannot prevent changes in the structure of portfolios from occurring. What they can do is keep the asset-equity ratio of banks within bounds by setting equity-absorption ratios for various types of assets. If the authorities constrain banks and are aware of the activities of fringe banks and other financial institutions, they are in a better position to attenuate the disruptive expansionary tendencies of our economy. (Minsky 2008, p. 281)

Minsky originally wrote those words in 1986—more than 20 years ago! Today, we can only bemoan the fact that his sensible counsel was ignored and that the economy experienced the explosive growth of the shadow banking system, or what Minsky cleverly called “fringe banks and other financial institutions.”

Minsky’s insight that financial capitalism is inherently and endogenously given to bubbles and busts is not just right but spectacularly right. We have much to learn and relearn from the great man as we collectively restore prudential common sense to bank regulation—both for conventional banks and shadow banks.

In the meantime, we have a problem: We are on a reverse Minsky journey. The private sector wants to shrink and de-risk its balance sheet, so someone has to take the other side of the trade to avoid a depression—the sovereign. We pretend that the Fed’s balance sheet and the U.S. government’s balance sheet are in entirely separate orbits because of the whole notion of the political independence of the central bank in making monetary policy. But when you think about it, not from the standpoint of making monetary policy but of providing balance sheet support to
buffer a reverse Minsky journey, there is no difference between the government’s balance sheet and the Fed’s balance sheet. Economically speaking, they are one and the same.

I think we are pretty well advanced along this reverse Minsky journey, and it is a lot quicker than the forward journey for a very simple reason. The forward journey is essentially momentum driven; there is a systematic relaxation of underwriting standards and all that sort of thing, but it does not create any pain for anybody. The reverse journey, however, does create pain, otherwise known as one giant margin call. The reverse journey comes to an end when the full faith and credit of the sovereign’s balance sheet is brought into play to effectively take the other side of the trade. No, I am not a socialist; I am just a practical person. You have got to have somebody on the other side of the trade. The government not only steps up to the risk taking and spending that the private sector is shirking but goes further, stepping up with even more vigor, providing a meaningful reflationary thrust to both private sector risk assets and aggregate demand for goods and services.

Thus, policymakers have a tricky balancing act: Let the deflationary pain unfold, because it is the only way to find the bottom of undervalued asset prices from presently overvalued asset prices, while providing sufficient monetary and fiscal policy safety nets to keep the deflationary process from spinning out of control. Debt deflation is a burden that capitalism cannot bear alone. It is not rich enough; it is not tough enough. Capitalism’s prosperity is hostage to the hope that policymakers are not simply too blind to see.

As long as we have reasonably deregulated markets and a complex and innovative financial system, we will have Minsky journeys, forward and reverse, punctuated by Minsky moments. That is reality. You cannot eliminate them. It is a matter of having the good sense to have in place a countercyclical regulatory policy to help modulate human nature.

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