

Canadian Tire Corporation (TSX:CTC.A)
University of Waterloo
All figures in C\$ unless otherwise noted

## Recommendation - Buy

TSX: CTC.A

| Market Data |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Market Capitalization | \$10.0bn |
| P / E (Non-voting; Diluted) | 15.4 x |


${ }^{1}$ Total return is calculated based on the share price appreciation (13.1\%) and forecasted annual dividend (1.7\%). Sources: Capital IQ


## Business Overview

Canadian Tire Corporation
University of Waterloo

## Business Overview: Company History



## Business Overview: Company History



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CAMADIRN TIRE
FINANCIALSERVICES


## Business Overview: Company History



## GAS ${ }^{+}$

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## Mark's



## Business Overview: Company History

## Mark's



## Business Overview: Company History



## Business Overview: Operating Segments



## Business Overview: Operating Segments



## Business Overview: Operating Segments



## Business Overview: Operating Segments




Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail
Canadian Tire Corporation University of Waterloo

## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail

| Competitive Positioning |
| :---: |
| Associate Dealer Structure |
| Pricing \& Price Match Guarantee |
| Physical Footprint |
| Valuation |



Product Categories


Sources: Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 080-0020)

## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail

Competitive Positioning
Associate Dealer Structure
Pricing \& Price Match Guarantee
Physidal Footpint


Sales per Square Feet: CTC versus Canadian Retail Subsector Averages


| Business Foundation | Growth | Profitability | Valuation |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Overview |  | Investment <br> Risks |  |

## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail



General Merchandise Subsector Sales


## Associate Dealer Structure Overview

(1)

Aligns Economic Interests of Dealers to Drive Sales Volume


Capitalizes on Dealer's Understanding of Local Trends
3 Differentiated Position in Competitive Landscape

Store Ownership Model

## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail



General Merchandise Subsector Sales


Price-weighted Price Basket Analysis

\#1 Ranked Retailer in Affordability (Price-weighted)


## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail



General Merchandise Subsector Sales


Equal-weighted Price Basket Analysis

\#1 Ranked Retailer in Affordability (Price-weighted)
\#2 Ranked Brick-and-Mortar Retailer in Affordability (Equal-weighted)


## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail



General Merchandise Subsector Sales


\#1 Ranked Retailer in Affordability (Price-weighted)
\#2 Ranked Brick-and-Mortar Retailer in Affordability (Equal-weighted)

Price Match Guarantee
CTR is the leading general merchandise retailer in convenience and affordability

## Foundation: Canadian Tire Retail



General Merchandise Subsector Sales


|  | Valuation | Terminal Year | Cost of Equity |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Methodology | Unlevered <br> DCF | Terminal Growth <br> $2.0 \%$ | CAPM (Comparable <br> Companies) |
| Financial Analysis | '10A - '15A | '15A - '20F |  |
| Revenue CAGR | $2.5 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |  |
| Gross Margin (Avg) | n.a. | $31.5 \%$ |  |
| EBITDA Margin (Avg) | n.a. | $7.5 \%$ |  |
| Net Stores Opened | 13 | 10 |  |



Sources: Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 080-0020; Financial Performance Data), Company filings


## Growth: FGL Sports

Canadian Tire Corporation
University of Waterloo

## Growth: FGL Sports

Competitive Positioning
Selection \& Pricing
General and Specialty Stores
Fragmented Industry

## Sporting Goods Subsector Sales



Growth

## Growth: FGL Sports



## Growth: FGL Sports



Through its national banners and economies of scale, FGL is well-positioned to gain further market share


Sources: Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 080-0020; Canadian Industry Statistics)

## Growth: FGL Sports




Profitability: Mark's, CTFS, CT REIT
Canadian Tire Corporation
University of Waterloo

## Profitability: Mark's





## Profitability: Mark's




Employment by Industry (in millions)


## Profitability: Mark's

## Common Superstore Floor Plan

| Home <br> and Toys | Sporting <br> Goods | Electronics | Foot- <br> wear |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  <br> Personal <br> Care | Kitchen | Food <br> and <br> Grocery | Apparel |

## Common Hardware Retailer Floor Plan

Common Clothing Retailer Floor Plan

| Men's Formal | Sale | Fitting Rooms | Women's Formal Wear |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wear | Accessories |  |  |
| Men's Casualwear | Men's Casualwear | Women's Casual wear | Women's Casualwear |
|  | Administration |  |  |


| Garden Center | Flooring | Plumbing, Kitchen, Bath | Lumber and Build'g Mat. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Electrical | Doors and Windows |  |
|  | ork Wear |  |  |
|  | Seasonal | dministration |  |


| Men's Work Wear |  | Fitting Rooms |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Work Footwear | Women's <br> Work <br> Wear |
| Men's <br> Casual- <br> wear | Men's <br> Casual- <br> wear | Women's <br> Casual- <br> wear |
| Wdministration |  | Women's <br> Casual- <br> wear |

[^0]
## Profitability: Mark's

## Common Superstore Floor Plan



Common Clothing Retailer Floor Plan


## Common Hardware Retailer Floor Plan



Mark's is a rare retailer providing an unparalleled selection of Work Wear

Foundation
Growth
Profitability
Valuation
Investment
Conclusion
Overview
Sources: Primary research

## Profitability: Mark's




Retail Subsector Gross Margin \%


## Profitability: Mark's



Clothing and Accessories Subsector Sales


|  | Valuation | Terminal Year | Cost of Equity |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Methodology | Unlevered <br> DCF | Terminal Growth <br> $2.0 \%$ | CAPM (Comparable <br> Companies) |
| Financial Analysis | '10A - '15A | '15A - '20F |  |
| Revenue CAGR | $4.6 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |  |
| Gross Margin (Avg) | n.a. | $43.6 \%$ |  |
| EBITDA Margin (Avg) | n.a. | $10.4 \%$ |  |
| Net Stores Opened | $(3)$ | 5 |  |
| Stores Rebranded | $>271$ | n.a. |  |

Foundation
Growth
Profitability
Valuation
Overview
Sources: Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 080-0020; Financial Performance Data), Company filings

## Profitability: Canadian Tire Financial Services

## Strategic Advantage of CTFS

CANADIAR TIRE
FINANCIALSERVICES
Reinforces CTR and Gas+ through the integration of the credit card portfolio and customer loyalty programs

Margin contribution, driving (i) higher corporate-level profits, and (ii) margin expansion

| $\begin{aligned} & \$ 960 \\ & 9.2 \% \end{aligned}$ | Revenue (\$ mm) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \$ 1,101 \\ 9.0 \% \end{gathered}$ | Earnings before Taxes (\$ mm) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 982 \\ & 8.6 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 1,026 \\ 8.7 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 1,076 \\ 8.6 \% \end{gathered}$ |  | Corporate-level Margin $\longrightarrow 8.2 \%$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 6.1\%- |  | \$320 | $\begin{gathered} \$ 345 \\ 39.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 374 \\ 37.4 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \$ 9,427 \\ & 90.8 \% \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 10,445 \\ 91.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 10,760 \\ 91.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 11,387 \\ 91.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 11,178 \\ 91.0 \% \end{gathered}$ | 34.8\% | 40.9\% | 40.8\% |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \$465 | \$533 | \$627 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 65.2\% | 59.1\% | 59.2\% | 60.7\% | 62.6\% |
| 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |

## Profitability: Canadian Tire Financial Services

## Strategic Advantage of CTFS

CAMADIAM TIRE
FINANCIALSERVICES

14.5\% Net Income Margin (2015)


CTFS is a highly complementary business and an important contributor to profitability

## Profitability: Canadian Tire Financial Services

Strategic Advantage of CTFS
Reinforces CTR and Gas+ through the integration of the credit card portfolio and customer loyalty programs

Margin contribution, driving (i) higher corporate-level profits, and (ii) margin expansion


|  | Valuation | Other Considerations |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Methodology | (Scotiabank's) <br> Acquisition Multiple | Does not include the value of CTC's <br> majority equity stake |


|  | Ann. Date of <br> Acquisition | Purchase Price | Transaction <br> Multiple |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Transaction <br> Terms | May 2014 | $\$ 500 \mathrm{~mm}$ for $20 \%$ | $10.9 \times \mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ |



Sources: Company filings

## Profitability: CT Real Estate Investment Trust

## Strategic Advantage of CT REIT

(1) Benefit to shareholders through reliable and tax-efficient distributions

Unlocks the value of the real estate portfolio, enabling a lower cost of debt

Debt Security Analysis: CT REIT versus CTC (\$ mm)


CTC's most recent debt issuance, excl. CT REIT (Oct-2007)

CT REIT's first non-intercompany debt issuance (Jun-2015)

CT REIT enables CTC to optimize its capital structure


Sources: Company filings

## Profitability: CT Real Estate Investment Trust

## Strategic Advantage of CT REIT

Benefit to shareholders through reliable and tax-efficient distributions

Unlocks the value of the real estate portfolio, enabling a lower cost of debt


Canadian Retail REITs: P I LTM FFO


Business
Overview
Sources: Company filings, Capital IQ


## Valuation

Canadian Tire Corporation University of Waterloo

## Sum-of-the-Parts

## Profitability



## Foundation

Growth

## Sum-of-the-Parts



## Sum-of-the-Parts



## Sum-of-the-Parts



Investment Risks

## Sum-of-the-Parts



## Monte Carlo Simulation

## Target Price: \$150




## Investment Risks

Canadian Tire Corporation
University of Waterloo

## Investment Risks



## Investment Risks



## Investment Risks

Scenario Analysis
O\&G Industry

USD / CAD
CTFS: Increase Net Write-off Rate to 7.6\% from 6.2\%
CT REIT: Decrease P / FFO to 12.3 x from 14.8 x on AB Properties

| Retail: Alberta Revenue | '18F | '15A - '18F | '18F - '20F |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mark's | $(30 \%)$ | $(11.2 \%)$ | $2 \%$ |
| CTR | $(20 \%)$ | $(7.2 \%)$ | $2 \%$ |
| FGL | $(10 \%)$ | $(3.5 \%)$ | $2 \%$ |
| CTR + FGL + Mark's |  | $\mathbf{( 7 . 0 \% )}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ |

USD / CAD
Lowe's / RONA
Acquisition

## Scenario Analysis

O\&G Industry

USD / CAD

## Assumptions

(1) No FX hedges in place and $\sim 40 \%$ of inventory is sourced in USD

2 CTC does not pass on the cost increases to consumers through CTR, Mark's, and FGL
(3) FX does not improve from the current rate (contrary to Big 5 Bank forecasts)

Target Price: Scenario Analysis


## Recently Announced Acquisition

O\&G Industry
Transaction Rationale


Provide Lowe's entry into Quebec, where RONA is headquartered and has major operations


Expand customer reach and serve a new portion of the market through Lowe's expertise and private label capabilities

USD / CAD
3 At an opportune time for Lowe's, given (i) relative strength of USD, and (ii) RONA's weakening financials and depressed share price

Lowe's / RONA Acquisition


## Conclusion



## Conclusion

Kam
Brent
Adnan
Rudder
Daniel

## Appendices

|  | Company History | Legal Structure | Strategic Imperatives | Supply Chain | Stock Ownership |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Corporate | Executive Management | Board of Directors | Executive Comp. | Geographical Breakdown of Stores | Corporate vs. Non-corp. Stores. Benefits \& Peers |
| Equity Research <br> Views + Target Prices | Weighted Average Cost of Capital | Cost of Equity (Comps + CAPM) | SOTP Summary | Cap. Structure \& Enterprise Value | Debt Schedule, Yield, \& Credit Ratings |
| Football Field | CTFS <br> Acq. Multiple Method | CT REIT <br> Trading Multiples Analysis | Treasury Stock Method / Options | Retail Operational Analysis | Retail Trading Multiples |
| Valuation | Detailed Revenue Models | Depreciation Schedule | Conglomerate Discount + Market Concerns | Monte Carlo Statistics | Dividend Distr. \& Share Repurchase |
| Range of Trading Multiples | DuPont Analysis | CTFS Intrinsic + CT REIT NAV Models | Historical Income Statement \& FCF | Historical Balance Sheet | Historical Ratio + NWC Analysis |
| Sensitivity Analysis | Current Market Multiples CTC | DCF Summary \& Methodology | DCF Gross Margin Assumptions | Detailed DCF Breakdown | DCF Common Size Analysis |
| Risks \& Economics | Real GDP <br> Analyses | Employment, Household Income | Inflation Historical and Forecast | WTI Projections \& Correlations | CAD:USD Correlations |
|  | Trans-Pacific Partnership | Economic Indicators | Housing Starts | General Correlations | 1-Year Market Forecasts |

## Appendices

| Canadian Retail Competitive Landscape | Associate Dealer Agreement Model | Loyalty Program | Onmichannel \& Ecommerce | Website Analytics Branding Analysis | Price Basket Analysis |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CTR Market Penetration Analysis | CTR Store Distribution \& Format | Competitor Store Distribution | Precedent <br> Transaction Lowes/RONA | CTC Debt Covenants |
| $\stackrel{\mathrm{FGL}}{\mathrm{FPORTS}}$ | FGL <br> Description \& Store Count | Price Basket Analysis | Digital Era \& Strategy | FGL Canadian Retail Landscape | Market Share Estimate, Acquisition, and Potential Target |
| Mark's | Mark's Product Offerings | Strategic Imperatives | Relationship with INA | 2002 Acquisition | Sq. Footage Analysis |
| CRNADIAN TIRE <br> FINANCIAL SERVICES | Credit Risk Management | GCCT Debt Covenants | Business Developments | CTFS Credit Card Offerings |  |
| $G \text { REIT }$ | Competitor Profiles | Debt Covenants | Capital Structure + Cap Structure Optimization | Tenant Profile | US vs. Canadian REIT Structures |
| Additional | Glossary of Terms | SWOT | Porter's | Why Non-voting vs. Voting Shares \& Control Premium | Share Performance |

## History of Canadian Tire Corporation



[^1]
## CTC Legal Entities



Note: Ownership of subsidiaries is $100 \%$, unless otherwise noted.

## CTC Entities - Legal Structure

- Legal entities operate with a unique mix of corporate-owned and franchise locations.


## Canadian Tire

- Operated by independent third party "Dealers", as provisioned under the Associate Dealer Agreement
- CTC supports dealers through marketing, SCM, financial, and IS
- All 498 stores are dealer-owned


## Mark's

- $90 \%$ corporate-run and $10 \%$ franchised
- 383 Stores, 348 corporate and 35 franchise


## Petroleum

- Independent retailers
- "The independence of running your own business and the support and infrastructure of a major retailer"
- Network of 297 retailer-operated stations, 293 convenience stores and 83 car washes


## FGL

- $55 \%$ corporate-run and $45 \%$ franchised
- 436 Stores, 246 corporate and 190 franchise


## CTC Strategic Imperatives

## Initiative

Strengthen brands and
1 enhance customer experiences (connections

Transition to omni-retail
2 where digital
complements the physical

Drive growth and productivity in core businesses

Description

- Continue to keep the Company's brands relevant through innovative marketing campaigns and through opportunities to highlight innovation and digital capabilities to its target customers
- Continue to build customer connections across all banners by offering unparalleled shopping experiences both in-store and online
- Activate sports and community partnerships to keep the Company's brand in the minds of Canadians
- Grow customer-loyalty program through in-store acquisition and through mobile app and other digital channels
- Continue to create and offer high-quality, innovative private-label assortments across the Company's retail banners that will drive customer loyalty and increase brand awareness
- Create world-class digital experiences through digital marketing, in-store technology, eCommerce, and integrated loyalty programs that complement physical retail stores
- Utilize customer data and shopping insights to personalize and enhance offers, communication and content, and to achieve efficiencies
- Continue to drive sales and revenue across all banners through on-going category management, innovative marketing campaigns, new assortments, and enhanced in-store and digital experiences
- Achieve sustainable and profitable growth through productivity initiatives that target the operating expense structure and gross margins
- Continue to increase the retail footprint by adding flagship stores at FGL and building new or expanding stores at Canadian Tire and Mark's
- Pursue selective acquisitions that strengthen and grow our existing portfolio of brands and bring new world capabilities
- Allocate capital through a balanced approach to maximize growth and long-term shareholder returns
- Re-invigorate GAAR growth by investing in in-store financing programs that drive sales at Canadian Tire
- Attract and develop talent to ensure required capabilities and expertise to bring Company into the new world of retail
- Engage employees to stimulate innovation and growth
- Deepen connections in communities across the country
- Develop and share capabilities by collaborating across the business


## Supply Chain

CTC's retail operations require an intricate supply chain process consisting of both Canadian and International suppliers, a "Preferred Supplier" identification program, 16 nation-wide distribution centers (DC) \& transportation facilities, carrier truck/ship/rail partnerships, and third party logistics managers.

## Mark's

- Mark's engages a third party logistics company to transport its product shipments from its two DCs to stores and to transport most of its product shipments from domestic suppliers directly to its stores. Third party logistics companies operate both Mark's DCs in Calgary, Alberta and Brampton, Ontario pursuant to an outsourcing arrangement. Both DC facilities are leased to Mark's by third party lessors.
- Offshore suppliers managed by CT's third party consolidator, Century Distribution Services ("Century"). Approximately $50 \%$ of Mark's suppliers are sources outside of North America, primarily in Asia-Pacific.


## FGL

- 4 DCs (including one joint with Mark's), with the primary DC in Mississauga, Ontario. All DCs are operated by a thirdparty logistics provider.
- In late 2014, the Company completed the construction of a new Calgary DC (455,000 square feet) that will service both Mark's and FGL Sports' supply chain starting in 2015. This DC will replace Mark's current third party operated DC in Calgary and will provide FGL Sports with new distribution capacity in western Canada.
- Approximately 7\% of FGL's suppliers are sources outside of North America, primarily in Asia-Pacific.


## Supply Chain

## CT Retail and PartSource

- 4 retail-exclusive DCs. Two DCs in Brampton, Ontario ("A.J. Billes" and "Brampton") are operated by CTR. DCs in Calgary, Alberta and Montreal, Quebec are operated by GENCO, a third-party logistics company. In 2013, land in Bolton, Ontario was acquired to replace the Brampton DC due to aging of the old facility; construction for the new DC began in 2014. The Bolton DC is expected to open in 2016. 3 PartSource DCs, located in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec.
- CTR's supply chain uses internal resources and third party logistics providers to manage supply chain technology and the movement of foreign-sourced goods from suppliers to its DCs and to Canadian Tire and PartSource stores.
- Offshore suppliers managed by CTR's third party consolidator, Century Distribution Services. Approximately 43\% of CTR's inventory purchases are form sources outside of North America, primarily in Asia-Pacific.


## Canadian Tire Supplier Code of Conduct

## Map of Distribution Centres

- Supplier payment for shipping until contact with CT's DC
- Protection provisions against time delays, over/under shipment, spoilage \& defective product above predetermined standard
- Quality inspection fees paid by suppliers (initial inspection performed and paid for by CTC) - all engineering facilities must be ISO9001 compliant
- Damages and returns policy negotiated with supplier such that defective products may be sold "as-is" or returned for full refund


[^2]
## Stock Ownership Summary

## Ownership Breakdown

## Top 10 Shareholders



| Top 10 Holders | Class A Non-voting Shares | \% of Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Manulife Asset Management | $1,607,229$ | $2.1 \%$ |
| Beutel Goodman \& Company Ltd. | $1,478,873$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| Albikin Management Inc | $1,441,559$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Ctc Dealer Holdings Ltd | $1,407,568$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Tire N Me Pty. Ltd | $1,400,767$ | $1.9 \%$ |
| Canadian Tire Corporation, Ltd. Profit-Sharing Plan | $1,198,168$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| BlackRock, Inc. (NYSE:BLK) | $1,026,754$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| The Vanguard Group, Inc. | 915,364 | $1.2 \%$ |
| Dimensional Fund Advisors LP | 739,500 | $1.0 \%$ |
| Mackenzie Financial Corporation | 707,434 | $0.9 \%$ |
| Manulife Asset Management | $1,607,229$ | $2.1 \%$ |

## Ownership Breakdown



## Shareholders

| Holders | Shares Held | \% of Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Martha G. Billes | $1,400,767$ | $40.9 \%$ |
| Owen G. Billes | 700,383 | $20.5 \%$ |
| CTC Dealer Holdings Limited | 702,084 | $20.5 \%$ |
| CTC's Deferred Profit Sharing Plan | 419,280 | $12.2 \%$ |

## Management Team



## Management Team (cont'd)

## Profile



## Michael Medline

President and Chief Executive Officer
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited
Mr. Medline has held a number of positions over the course of his 14-year career with CTC, including President of FGL Sports Ltd. and Mark's Work Wearhouse Ltd. (Mark's), President of Canadian Tire Automotive and Dealer Relations, and Chief Corporate Officer. He was involved in the acquisition of Mark's in 2002, the acquisition and subsequent Canada integration of The Forzani Group Ltd. in 2011, and the Company's partnership with The Bank of Nova Scotia in 2014.

## Experience



ABITIBI CONSOLIDATED macarthy
tetrault

## Education



[^3]
## Management Team (cont'd)

## Profile



## Dean McCann

Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited
Dean McCann was appointed Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of Canadian Tire Corporation in March 2012.Prior to his current position, Dean was a member of management at Canadian Tire Financial Services (CTFS) and Canadian Tire Bank for twelve years, serving as President of CTFS and CEO of Canadian Tire Bank for three years. Dean joined Canadian Tire Corporation in 1996 and has held a number of roles, including Corporate Controller, Canadian Tire Corporation.

## Experience



McMaster University

## Management Team (cont'd)

## Profile



## Jim Christie

Executive Vice-President
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited
Jim has worked with Canadian Tire over the past several years on a variety of matters, including the negotiation and settlement of the 2013 Dealer Contract. He provides strategic input on critical enterprise projects and issues, including the implementation and operation of the Dealer Contract, and has executive responsibility for Dealer Relations and Store Support. In addition, he is the Chairman of the Board of Directors for Canadian Tire Bank.

## Experience

## Education



[^4]
## Management Team (cont'd)

## Profile



## Eugene Roman

Senior Vice-President, Information Technology and Chief Technology Officer
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited
Eugene Roman was appointed Chief Technology Officer of Canadian Tire Corporation and its Family of Companies back in 2012. He has prime responsibility for the evolution and operational support of all digital and interactive technologies of the corporation. His mission is to accelerate the deployment and use of next-generation digital platforms to grow corporate revenue and evolve key platforms to support the growing needs of the Company.

## NeTRTEL NETWORKS ${ }^{\text {w }}$ <br>  OPENTEXT

[^5]
## Management Team (cont'd)

## Profile

## Mahes S. Wickramasinghe

Chief Strategy Officer
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited
Mahes Wickramasinghe joined Canadian Tire Corporation (CTC) in March 2015 as the Chief Strategy Officer. In this role, Mahes leads the Corporate Strategy \& Development team as they drive development and execution of CTC's strategic plans and assess new business opportunities.

## Experience

## Education



## Board Committee Positions

| Management Resources \& Compensation Committee | Title | Tenure | Independent? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| James L. Goodfellow | Chairman | 5 Years | Yes |
| Owen G. Billes | Member | 11 Years | No |
| John A. Furlong | Member | 4 Years | Yes |
| Jonathan Lampe | Member | 3 Years | Yes |
| Pierre Boivin | Member | 2 Yeas | Yes |


| Audit Committee | Title |  | Tenure | Independent? |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Timothy Robert Price | Chairman |  | 8 Years | Yes |
| Ronald L. Goldsberry | Deputy <br> Member | Chairman, | 1 Year | Yes |
| Owen G. Billes | Member |  | 11 Years | No |
| John A. Furlong | Member |  | 4 Years | Yes |
| Stephen G. Wetmore | Member |  | 12 Years | No |
| George A. Vallance | Member |  | 4 Years | No |
| Claude L'Heureux | Member |  | 4 Years | No |
| Martha G. Billes | Member |  | 11 Years | No |

Source: Company Website

## Board Committee Positions (cont'd)

| Governance Committee | Title | Tenure | Independent? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Maureen Joanne Sabia | Chairman | 30 Years | Yes |
| Timothy Robert Price | Member | 8 Years | Yes |
| Jonathan Lampe | Member | 3 Years | Yes |
| James L. Goodfellow | Member | 5 Years | Yes |
| Martha G. Billes | Member | 11 Years | No |
| Dlana L. Chant | Member | n/a | Yes |


| Brand and Community Committee | Title | Tenure | Independent? |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Timothy Robert Price | Chairman | 8 Years | Yes |
| Ronald L. Goldsberry | Deputy Chairman | 1 Year | Yes |
| Owen G. Billes | Member | 11 Years | No |
| John A. Furlong | Member | 4 Years | Yes |
| Stephen G. Wetmore | Member | 12 Years | No |
| George A. Vallance | Member | 4 Years | No |
| Claude L'Heureux | Member | 4 Years | No |
| Martha G. Billes | Member | 11 Years |  |

## Executive Compensation

| Name | Title | 2014 Salary/Director Compensation | 2014 Stock \& Option Awards | 2014 Total Compensation Received |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Christie, James R. | Executive Vice President | 1,145,156 | 708,686 | 1,853,842 |
| Emerson, H. Garfield | Corporate Director and Member of Audit Committee | 204,750 | - | 204,750 |
| Furlong, John A. F. | Corporate Director, Member of Brand \& Community Committee and Member of Management Resources \& Compensation Committee | 211,242 | - | 211,242 |
| Goldsberry, Ronald L. | Corporate Director, Member of Audit Committee and Member of Brand \& Community Committee | 145,728 | - | 145,728 |
| Goodfellow, James L. | Corporate Director, Chairman of Management Resources \& Compensation Committee, Member of Audit Committee and Member of Governance Committee | 241,250 | - | 241,250 |
| Lampe, Jonathan | Independent Director | 213,637 | - | 213,637 |
| L'Heureux, Claude | Director and Member of Brand \& Community Committee | 192,000 | - | 192,000 |
| MacDonald, Allan Angus | Chief Operating Officer of Canadian Tire Retail | 991,923 | 591,094 | 1,583,017 |
| McCann, Dean Charles | Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President | 1,128,469 | 969,574 | 2,098,043 |
| Medline, Michael B. | Chief Executive Officer, President and Director | 1,948,365 | 1,593,429 | 3,541,794 |
| Price, Timothy Robert | Independent Director, Member of Audit Committee, Member of Governance Committee and Member of Brand \& Community Committee | 215,000 | - | 215,000 |
| Sabia, Maureen Joanne | Non Executive Chairman and Chairman of Governance Committee | 454,400 | - | 454,400 |
| Turner, Mary Louise | Chief Executive Officer of Canadian Tire Bank, President of Canadian Tire Bank and Chief Operating Officer of Canadian Tire Financial Services Limited | 891,370 | 612,500 | 1,503,870 |
| Vallance, George A. | Independent Director and Member of Brand \& Community Committee | 205,500 | - | 205,500 |
| Wetmore, Stephen G. | Non Executive Deputy Chairman and Chairman of Brand \& Community Committee | 3,521,634 | 5,361,297 | 8,882,931 |

## All figures in \$CAD

Source: Company Website, Company Filings, Capital IQ

## Retail Network Across Canada



## Geographical (Provincial) Breakdown of Stores

As at December 31, 2014

| Province | Number of Stores |  |  |  | Percentage Distribution |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CTR | FGL | Mark's | $\begin{gathered} \text { CTR + FGL } \\ \text { + Mark's } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | CTR | FGL | Mark's | CTR + FGL + Mark's |
| Ontario | 202 | 124 | 146 | 472 | 41\% | 28\% | 38\% | 36\% |
| Quebec | 99 | 167 | 45 | 311 | 20\% | 38\% | 12\% | 24\% |
| Alberta | 55 | 53 | 63 | 171 | 11\% | 12\% | 16\% | 13\% |
| BC | 52 | 43 | 58 | 153 | 11\% | 10\% | 15\% | 12\% |
| Nova Scotia | 21 | 11 | 17 | 49 | 4\% | 3\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Saskatchewan | 14 | 11 | 16 | 41 | 3\% | 3\% | 4\% | 3\% |
| New Brunswick | 19 | 8 | 13 | 40 | 4\% | 2\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Manitoba | 14 | 10 | 13 | 37 | 3\% | 2\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| Newf \& Labr | 13 | 6 | 3 | 22 | 3\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% |
| PEI | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 0\% | 0\% | 2\% | 1\% |
| Northern Can. | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0\% | 0\% | 1\% | 0\% |
| Total | 493 | 436 | 383 | 1,312 | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |

## Corporate versus Non-corporate Stores

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Q3 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Store Count at Period End |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTR | 485 | 488 | 490 | 491 | 493 | 495 |
| Franchise | 485 | 488 | 490 | 491 | 493 | 495 |
| Dealer \% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| PartSource | 87 | 87 | 87 | 90 | 91 | 91 |
| Corporate | 61 | 62 | 63 | 90 | 91 | 91 |
| Corporate \% | 70\% | 71\% | 72\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Franchise | 26 | 25 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Franchise \% | 23\% | 22\% | 22\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Mark's | 383 | 385 | 386 | 385 | 383 | 379 |
| Corporate | 339 | 343 | 347 | 348 | 348 | 354 |
| Corporate \% | 89\% | 89\% | 90\% | 90\% | 91\% | 93\% |
| Franchise | 44 | 42 | 39 | 37 | 35 | 25 |
| Franchise \% | 11\% | 11\% | 10\% | 10\% | 9\% | 7\% |
| FGL | n.a. | 534 | 495 | 421 | 436 | 428 |
| Corporate | n.a. | 321 | 283 | 237 | 246 | 246 |
| Corporate \% | n.a. | 60\% | 57\% | 56\% | 56\% | 57\% |
| Franchise | n.a. | 213 | 212 | 184 | 190 | 182 |
| Franchise \% | n.a. | 40\% | 43\% | 44\% | 44\% | 43\% |
| Petroleum | 287 | 289 | 299 | 300 | 297 | 297 |
| Agent | 287 | 289 | 299 | 300 | 297 | 297 |
| Agent \% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |

## Corporate vs. Non-Corporate Benefits

## Corporate-Owned

- Better flexibility with respect to making company-wide marketing and product mix decisions
- No need to make amendments to franchise agreements in order to enact change
- Uniform vision and value proposition delivered across all stores
- Easier to sell-off individual stores, and corporation as a whole, when no 3rd party owners are involved
- Notable theme - American companies tend to prefer corporate-owned stores.


## Franchise

- More liquidity and solvency
- Use franchisees' money to expand
- Risk is borne by the franchisee, especially with regards to staffing and expenses
- Ability to leverage the local expertise of franchisees when opening new stores (they know their communities best)
- More complicated to sell individual stores, and corporation as a whole
- Notable theme - most peer companies which follow franchise structures tend to be Canadian.


[^6]
## Equity Research Views

"At current share price, we estimate CTC's retail-only EV/EBITDA currently at 4.1x 2016 earnings well below:

- North American home improvement peer average of $10.4 x$ (ex-CTC), and
- General merchandise peers average of $7.4 x$..."
- RBC Capital Markets, Feb-2016
"We current view the Retail operations as trading at $3.4 x$ our revised 2016 forecast EBITDA. Every one multiple turn represents approximately $\mathbf{\$ 1 0 . 7 5}$ to the share price."
- TD Securities, Feb-2016
"Multiple expansion may be elusive if retail ROIC gains are limited. Continued strength in retail sales growth, in particular at FGL and potential for improving operational leverage is being met by an elevated capex and SG\&A spend and softening at Mark's and CTFS. Furthermore, we believe REIT-hybrid assets may be mispriced in the market."
- Credit Suisse, Feb-2016


## Equity Research Valuation \& Target Price



## Weighted Average Cost of Capital: Summary

1. CAPM and comparable companies method
for the retail subsectors of CTR, FGL, Mark's, and Petroleum

- Steps included un-levering of betas for individual companies, and re-levering the median unlevered comparable companies beta for the Retail division's capital structure for each of the following industries:
- Diversified retail which includes: general retail, home improvement, home furnishing, and auto parts (applicable to CTR)
- Apparel and workwear (applicable to Mark's)
- Sporting goods (applicable to FGL)
- Fuel and convenience (applicable to Petroleum)

Used in WACC for discounting in the Unlevered DCF
2. CAPM for CTC, used to calculate the 12-month target price based on the implied share price
3. Fama French model
for CTC as an alternative to the CAPM

Not used in the valuation

## Weighted Average Cost of Capital: Assumptions

1. Risk-free rate is assumed to be the 10-year Government of Canada benchmark bond yield
2. Beta is calculated on a weekly, five-year historical basis
3. Market return is calculated as the 40-year CAGR of the S\&P TSX Composite Index
4. Size premium is calculated using a ten-decile analysis of the S\&P 600 Index versus the S\&P 500 Index (applicable to Method 1 only)
5. Statutory tax rate of $26.5 \%$ for companies headquartered in Canada and $40.0 \%$ for companies headquartered in the United States
6. Cost of debt based on the 2015 financial results and note disclosures

## Risk-free Rate: Historical 10Y BoC Bond Yield



## WACC: Size Premium Calculation

| S\&P 500 (US\$ in millions, ex Industry | pt number of c Number of Companies | mpanies) <br> Market Cap. | Median Market Cap. | S\&P 600 (US\$ in millions, exce Industry | pt number of Number of Companies | ompanies) <br> Market Cap. | Median Market Cap. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Consumer Discretionary | 88 | \$2,421,341 | \$11,124 | Consumer Discretionary | 93 | \$92,198 | \$898 |
| Consumer Staples | 37 | \$1,786,418 | \$27,738 | Consumer Staples | 17 | \$18,693 | \$1,247 |
| Energy | 40 | \$1,335,229 | \$15,369 | Energy | 34 | \$19,028 | \$362 |
| Financials | 88 | \$3,015,467 | \$19,325 | Financials | 121 | \$158,273 | \$1,216 |
| Healthcare | 55 | \$2,722,664 | \$26,775 | Healthcare | 73 | \$81,962 | \$1,108 |
| Industrials | 66 | \$1,889,563 | \$15,448 | Industrials | 99 | \$113,181 | \$1,128 |
| Information Technology | 70 | \$3,858,983 | \$18,524 | Information Technology | 106 | \$110,346 | \$998 |
| Materials | 28 | \$543,333 | \$12,939 | Materials | 38 | \$31,270 | \$821 |
| Telecommunication Services | 5 | \$433,967 | \$18,539 | Telecommunication Services | 8 | \$5,733 | \$813 |
| Utilities | 29 | \$538,708 | \$16,163 | Utilities | 12 | \$28,669 | \$2,485 |
| Total | 506 | \$18,545,674 |  | Total | 601 | \$659,352 |  |
| S\&P 500 Median Market Cap ConsumerDiscretionary |  |  | \$11,124 | S\&P600Median Market Cap ConsumerDiscretionary |  |  | \$898 |
| Size Premium Calculation (US\$ in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Decile | Size Premium | Lower Bound | Upper Bound |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | 0.0\% | \$11,124 | + | Median Market Cap of S\&P 500 Cons | sumer Discretion | ary |  |
| 2 | 0.3\% | \$9,846 | \$11,123 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 0.6\% | \$8,568 | \$9,845 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 0.9\% | \$7,289 | \$8,567 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 1.2\% | \$6,011 | \$7,288 |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | 1.5\% | \$4,733 | \$6,010 |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 1.9\% | \$3,455 | \$4,732 | Estimated Retail Equity Value | \$3,600 | (US\$ in millions) |  |
| 8 | 2.2\% | \$2,176 | \$3,454 |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | 2.5\% | \$899 | \$2,175 |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | 2.8\% | \$0 | \$898 | Median Market Cap of S\&P 600 Cons | sumer Discretion | ary |  |

Financial and market data above shown in US\$ millions
Source: Capital IQ

## WACC and Cost of Equity Calculations Summary

| Cost of Equity - Capital Asset Pricing Model | General Merch. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Home } \\ & \text { Improv. } \end{aligned}$ | Home Furn. | Auto. Parts | Div. Retail | Apparel \& Workw'r | Sporting Goods | Fuel \& Conven. | CTC |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5Y Beta | 2Y Beta |
| Risk-free Rate 1.1\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market Return | 6.4\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market Risk Premium | 5.3\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Size Premium | 1.9\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Beta (Unlevered, Median) | 0.51 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.69 | 0.72 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.50 |  |  |
| Debt / Equity (excl. CT REIT, CTFS) | 29.8\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Statutory Tax Rate | 26.5\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Beta (Levered) | 0.62 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 0.84 | 0.87 | 1.09 | 1.07 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.68 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Weighted Average Cost of Capital Calculation | General Merch. | Home Improv. | Home Furn. | Auto. Parts | Div. Retail | Apparel \& Workw'r | Sporting Goods | Fuel \& Conven. |  |  |
| Equity / Capitalization (excl. CT REIT, CTFS) Cost of Equity | $\begin{gathered} \hline 77.0 \% \\ 6.3 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 61.3\% |  |
|  |  | 8.4\% | 8.2\% | 7.4\% | 7.6\% | 8.7\% | 8.6\% | 6.2\% | 4.3\% | 4.7\% |
| Debt / Capitalization (excl. CT REIT, CTFS) Statutory Tax Rate Cost of Debt (excl. CT REIT, CTFS) | $\begin{aligned} & 23.0 \% \\ & 26.5 \% \end{aligned}$ | $6.0 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ | 6.0\% |  | $6.0 \%$ | 38.7\% |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6.0\% |  |  |  |  | 6.0\% |  | 6.0\% | 3.3\% | 3.3\% |
| Weighted Average Cost of Capital | 5.9\% | 7.5\% | 7.3\% 6.7\% |  | 6.9\% | 7.8\%-1 | 7.7\% |  |  | 3.8\%] |
|  |  |  |  |  | Method 3 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | Coefficient |  |  | Premium |  |  |
|  | Market Risk |  |  |  |  | 0.51 |  | 5.9\% |  |  |
|  | Size Risk |  |  |  |  | (0.17) |  | 1.6 |  |  |
|  | Value Risk |  |  |  |  | (0.11) |  | 4.9\% |  |  |
|  | CTC Cost of Equity |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3.9\% |  |  |
|  | Adjusted R ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.13 |  |  |

## Cost of Equity: Method (1) Comparable Companies

| Company Name | Market Cap | Net Debt | Enterprise <br> Value | Statutory <br> Tax Rate | Beta | Debt I <br> Equity | Unlevered $\qquad$ <br> Beta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wal-Mart Stores Inc. | \$211,677 | \$50,034 | \$260,870 | 40.0\% | 0.47 | 23.6\% | 0.41 |
| Costco Wholesale Corporation | \$66,367 | \$6,126 | \$66,442 | 40.0\% | 0.59 | 9.2\% | 0.56 |
| Target Corp. | \$44,417 | \$12,788 | \$55,209 | 40.0\% | 0.54 | 28.8\% | 0.46 |
| Tractor Supply Company | \$11,554 | \$168 | \$11,658 | 40.0\% | 1.00 | 1.5\% | 0.99 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.61 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.51 |
| Home Improvement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The Home Depot, Inc. | \$153,680 | \$20,862 | \$171,502 | 40.0\% | 0.93 | 13.6\% | 0.86 |
| Lowe's Companies, Inc. | \$62,227 | \$12,599 | \$73,441 | 40.0\% | 0.93 | 20.2\% | 0.83 |
| Rona Inc. | \$1,834 | \$238 | \$2,162 | 26.5\% | 0.54 | 13.0\% | 0.50 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.73 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.83 |
| Home Furnishing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bed Bath \& Beyond Inc. | \$7,481 | \$1,500 | \$8,490 | 40.0\% | 0.85 | 20.1\% | 0.76 |
| Williams-Sonoma Inc. | \$5,180 | \$200 | \$5,308 | 40.0\% | 1.13 | 3.9\% | 1.10 |
| Restoration Hardware Holdings, Inc. | \$2,198 | \$746 | \$2,556 | 40.0\% | 1.02 | 33.9\% | 0.84 |
| Aaron's, Inc. | \$1,702 | \$610 | \$2,129 | 40.0\% | 0.87 | 35.9\% | 0.72 |
| Leon's Furniture Ltd. | \$714 | \$314 | \$1,005 | 26.5\% | 0.26 | 43.9\% | 0.20 |
| Pier 1 Imports, Inc. | \$391 | \$240 | \$582 | 40.0\% | 1.57 | 61.6\% | 1.15 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.79 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | ¢ |
| Automotive Parts |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AutoZone, Inc. | \$22,783 | \$4,754 | \$27,361 | 40.0\% | 0.54 | 20.9\% | 0.48 |
| O'Reilly Automotive Inc. | \$24,886 | \$1,390 | \$26,160 | 40.0\% | 0.70 | 5.6\% | 0.68 |
| Advance Auto Parts Inc. | \$10,503 | \$1,214 | \$11,626 | 40.0\% | 0.81 | 11.6\% | 0.76 |
| AutoNation, Inc. | \$5,325 | \$6,094 | \$11,344 | 40.0\% | 1.17 | 114.4\% | 0.69 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.65 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.69 ${ }^{\text {¢ }}$ |
| Diversified Retail Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.71 |
| Diversified Retail Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.72 |

Financial and market data above shown in US\$ millions
Source: Capital IQ

## Cost of Equity: Method (1) Comparable Companies

| Company Name | Market Cap | Net Debt | Enterprise <br> Value | Statutory Tax Rate | Beta | Debt I <br> Equity | Unlevered Beta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Apparel and Workwear Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| V.F. Corporation | \$26,094 | \$2,710 | \$28,238 | 40.0\% | 0.95 | 10.4\% | 0.89 |
| The Gap, Inc. | \$10,228 | \$1,752 | \$10,938 | 40.0\% | 1.07 | 17.1\% | 0.97 |
| Wolverine World Wide Inc. | \$1,812 | \$826 | \$2,444 | 40.0\% | 0.92 | 45.6\% | 0.72 |
| Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. | \$239 | \$233 | \$454 | 40.0\% | 1.67 | 97.3\% | 1.05 |
| Superior Uniform Group Inc. | \$235 | \$24 | \$257 | 40.0\% | 0.39 | 10.3\% | 0.37 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.80 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | ---0.89 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sporting Goods and Apparel Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Foot Locker, Inc. | \$9,287 | \$131 | \$8,540 | 40.0\% | 1.01 | 1.4\% | 1.00 |
| Cabela's Incorporated | \$3,051 | \$4,755 | \$7,308 | 40.0\% | 1.33 | 155.8\% | 0.69 |
| Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. | \$4,579 | \$348 | \$4,853 | 40.0\% | 0.92 | 7.6\% | 0.88 |
| Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings, Inc. | \$515 | \$228 | \$740 | 40.0\% | 0.32 | 44.2\% | 0.25 |
| Hibbett Sports, Inc. | \$794 | \$3 | \$752 | 40.0\% | 0.99 | 0.4\% | 0.99 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | ---- 0.76 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | ---0.80 |
| Fuel \& Convenience Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. | \$24,527 | \$2,448 | \$26,394 | 26.5\% | 0.34 | 10.0\% | 0.32 |
| Casey's General Stores, Inc. | \$4,096 | \$846 | \$4,877 | 40.0\% | 0.59 | 20.7\% | 0.52 |
| CST Brands, Inc. | \$2,542 | \$1,418 | \$4,201 | 40.0\% | 0.67 | 55.8\% | 0.50 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.45 |
| Median |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.50 |

Financial and market data above shown in US\$ millions
Source: Capital IQ

## Cost of Equity: Method (2) Traditional CAPM

Weekly Returns (L5Y)


## SOTP Summary



## Capital Structure and (Book) Enterprise Value

| CTC |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Market Capitalization of CTC | \$10,037 |
| Less: Value of Ownership Interest of CT REIT | $(\$ 2,318)$ |
| Less: Value of Ownership Interest of CTFS | $(\$ 2,390)$ |
| Estimated Retail Equity Value | \$5,329! |
| Short-term Borrowings | \$89 |
| Loans Payable | \$656 |
| Deposits | \$881 |
| Long-term Deposits | \$1,372 |
| Long-term Debt, Current Portion | \$24 |
| Long-term Debt, Noncurrent Portion | \$2,971 |
| Total Debt | \$5,993 |
| Less: CTFS Debt | $(\$ 4,152)$ |
| Less: CT REIT Debt | (\$410) |
| Total Retail Debt | \$1,430 |
| Retail Equity I Capitalization | 78.8\% |
| Retail Debt I Capitalization | 21.2\% |
| CTC Enterprise Value Schedule |  |
| Market Capitalization | \$10,037 |
| Add: Total Debt | \$5,993 |
| Add: Minority Interest (Book Value) | \$796 |
| Add: Pension Obligations | \$141 |
| Less: Cash and Cash Equivalents | (\$901) |
| Enterprise Value | \$16,066 |

## Debt Schedule (by Division)

| Debt Schedule Summary (\$ millions) |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
|  | W. Avg Coupon | Total |
| Total CTFS Debt | $2.5 \%$ | $\$ 4,152$ |
| Total CT REIT Debt | $3.2 \%$ | 410 |
| Total Other / Retail Debt | $6.0 \%$ | 1,430 |
| Total Debt | $\mathbf{3 . 3} \%$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 , 9 9 3}$ |

Debt Schedule (\$ in millions)

|  | Coupon Rate | Due | Face |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Financial Services (Glacier Credit Card Trust) |  |  |  | Other / Retail |  |  |  |
| Senior Notes (GCCT) |  |  |  | Medium-term Notes |  |  |  |
| Series 2012-1 | 2.8\% | May-2017 | 200 |  | 6.3\% | Apr-2028 | 150 |
| Series 2012-2 | 2.4\% | Oct-2017 | 400 |  | 6.3\% | Feb-2034 | 200 |
| Series 2013-1 | 2.8\% | Nov-2018 | 250 |  | 5.6\% | Sep-2035 | 200 |
| Series 2014-1 | 2.6\% | Sep-2019 | 473 |  |  |  |  |
| Series 2015-1 | 2.2\% | Sep-2020 | 465 | Loans Payable |  |  | 656 |
|  |  |  |  | Short-term Borrowings |  |  | 89 |
| Subordinated Notes (GCCT) |  |  |  | Finance Lease Obligations |  |  | 146 |
| Series 2012-1 | 3.8\% | May-2017 | 12 | Carrying Value Adjustments |  |  | (10) |
| Series 2012-2 | 3.2\% | Oct-2017 | 23 |  |  |  |  |
| Series 2013-1 | 3.3\% | Nov-2018 | 15 | Total Other / Retail Debt | 6.0\% |  | 1,430 |
| Series 2014-1 | 3.1\% | Sep-2019 | 28 |  |  |  |  |
| Series 2015-1 | 3.2\% | Sep-2020 | 35 | CT Real Estate Investment |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Mortgages |  |  | 60 |
| Deposits |  |  | 881 |  |  |  |  |
| Long-term Deposits |  |  | 1,372 | Senior unsecured debentures |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Series A | 2.9\% | Jun-2022 | 150 |
|  |  |  |  | Series B | 3.5\% | Jun-2025 | 200 |
| Total CTFS Debt | 2.5\% |  | 4,152 | Total CT REIT Debt | 3.2\% |  | 410 |

[^7]
## Debt (Yield)



## Credit Rating

| Credit Rating Summary | DBRS | S\&P |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| CTC Issuer Rating | BBB (high) | BBB+ |
| CTC Trend / Outlook | Stable | Stable |
| CT REIT Issuer Rating | BBB (high) | BBB+ |
| CT REIT Trend / Outlook | Stable | Stable |
| Unsecured Debt \& Medium Term Notes | BBB (high) | BBB+ |
| GCCT Asset-backed <br> Senior Notes <br> GCCT Asset-backed Subordinated Notes | AAA (sf) | AAA (sf) |

## CTFS: Acquisition Multiple



## CTFS Relative Valuation

| Company Name | Market Cap (US\$ mm) | P/E |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 2014A | LTM |
| Select Financial Services |  |  |  |
| American Express Company | 58,554.9 | 11.0x | 12.1x |
| Capital One Financial Corporation | 36,750.2 | 9.3x | 10.1x |
| Synchrony Financial | 24,456.2 | 10.6x | 11.1x |
| Discover Financial Services | 21,286.0 | 10.5x | 10.0x |
| Median |  | 10.5x | 10.6x |
| Average |  | 10.3x | 10.8x |
| Canadian Financial Institutions |  |  |  |
| Royal Bank of Canada | 85,437.0 | 11.6x | 12.2x |
| Bank of Montreal | 38,817.2 | 12.2x | 12.7x |
| The Bank of Nova Scotia | 57,695.7 | 10.7x | 11.8x |
| The Toronto-Dominion Bank | 79,463.7 | 13.1x | 14.1x |
| Canadian Imperial Bank of Commeı | 29,445.8 | 13.1x | 11.7x |
| National Bank of Canada | 10,997.4 | 9.6x | 11.4x |
| Laurentian Bank of Canada | 1,103.1 | 10.3x | 15.0x |
| Median |  | 11.6x | 12.2x |
| Average |  | 11.5x | 12.7x |
| Global Median |  | 10.7x | 11.8x |
| Global Average |  | 11.1x | 12.0x |

## CT REIT: Trading Multiples / Comparable Companies

| CT REIT | $83.8 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| CTC Ownership \% | $\$ 195$ |
| FFO (2015) | 14.8 x |
| Median Trading Multiple | $\$ 2,877$ |
| Implied Equity Value | $\$ 2,412$ |
| Value of Ownership Interest of CT REIT | $\$ 2,765$ |
| Market Capitalization of CT REIT | $\$ 2,318$ |
| Market Value of Ownership Interest of CT REIT | $\$ 94$ |
| Implied versus Market Value Difference | $\$ 1.24$ |
| Per Share Valuation (CTC) |  |


| CT REIT Ownership Schedule (as at Q4'15) |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| CT REIT Shares Outstanding Schedule |  |
| Total Units Outstanding | $90,337,358$ |
| Total Class B LP Units Outstanding | $99,263,329$ |
| Total Units \& Class B LP Units | $\mathbf{1 8 9 , 6 0 0 , 6 8 7}$ |
| CTC Units Owned | $59,711,094$ |
| CTC Class B LP Units Owned | $99,263,329$ |
| CTC Ownership | $\mathbf{8 3 . 8 \%}$ |


|  |  |  |  | EV/EBITDA | P / FFO | Debt I |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | Enterprise Value | LTM | LTM | Equity |
| TSX:REI.UN | Riocan REIT | \$8,722 | \$15,116 | 19.4x | 16.5x | 0.77 |
| TSX:CHP.UN | Choice Properties REIT | \$5,063 | \$12,650 | 23.9x | 13.0x | 1.51 |
| TSX:SRU.UN | Smart REIT | \$5,200 | \$9,767 | 22.3x | 17.5x | 0.73 |
| TSX:CRR.UN | Crombie REIT | \$1,859 | \$4,028 | 16.7x | $12.4 x$ | 1.14 |
| Median |  |  |  | 20.8x | 14.8x | 0.95 |
| TSX:CRT.UN | CT Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) | \$2,765 | \$4,835 | 17.2x | 14.2x | 0.76 |

## CT REIT: Expanded Trading Multiples Analysis (US\$ mm)

|  |  |  |  | P/ |  | PI |  | Dividend |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | Enterprise Value | 2014A | LTM | 2014A | LTM | Yield |
| TSX:REI.UN | Riocan REIT | \$6,626 | \$11,483 | 15.1x | 14.8x | 16.9x | 22.6x | 5.2\% |
| TSX:CHP.UN | Choice Properties REIT | \$3,846 | \$9,610 | 15.0x | 13.7x | 20.9x | nmf | 5.4\% |
| TSX:SRU.UN | Smart REIT | \$3,951 | \$7,420 | 18.3x | 18.4x | 17.9x | 20.4x | 4.9\% |
| TSX:CRR.UN | Crombie REIT | \$1,412 | \$3,060 | 11.5x | 13.1x | 22.2x | 29.7x | 6.3\% |
| NYSE:REG | Regency Centers Corporation | \$7,501 | \$9,711 | 27.9x | 27.1x | 41.5 x | 54.8x | 2.7\% |
| NYSE:NNN | National Retail Properties, Inc. | \$6,600 | \$9,137 | 25.3x | 22.8x | 37.3x | 38.6x | 3.8\% |
| NYSE:WRI | Weingarten Realty Investors | \$4,618 | \$6,863 | 18.1x | 17.9x | 19.7x | 28.8x | 3.9\% |
| NYSE:TCO | Taubman Centers, Inc. | \$4,186 | \$6,637 | 14.9x | 14.3x | 5.2 x | 39.5x | 3.4\% |
| NYSE:RPAI | Retail Properties of America, Inc. | \$3,766 | \$5,881 | 14.7x | 16.5x | nmf | 32.7x | 4.2\% |
| NYSE:EQY | Equity One Inc. | \$4,012 | \$5,565 | 27.1x | 24.9x | nmf | nmf | 3.1\% |
| NYSE:SKT | Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc. | \$3,430 | \$5,003 | 19.1x | 15.4x | nmf | 16.4x | 3.2\% |
| NYSE:AKR | Acadia Realty Trust | \$2,441 | \$4,153 | 30.9x | 21.9x | 29.0x | 36.3x | 3.7\% |
| NYSE:KRG | Kite Realty Group Trust | \$2,283 | \$4,081 | 24.3x | 12.7x | nmf | nmf | 4.2\% |
| NYSE:UE | Urban Edge Properties | \$2,512 | \$3,611 | 21.1x | 25.6x | 38.3x | nmf | 3.2\% |
| NYSE:PEI | Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust | \$1,512 | \$3,438 | 11.7x | 11.1x | nmf | nmf | 3.8\% |
| NYSE:SRG | Seritage Growth Properties | \$1,640 | \$3,400 | na | 22.7x | na | na | 2.0\% |
| NYSE:ALX | Alexander's Inc. | \$1,936 | \$2,730 | 20.0x | 18.0x | 28.8x | 25.2x | 4.2\% |
| NasdaqGS:ROIC | Retail Opportunity Investments Corp. | \$1,975 | \$3,086 | 26.7x | 20.8x | nmf | nmf | 3.6\% |
| NYSE:RSE | Rouse Properties, Inc. | \$1,059 | \$2,916 | 16.6x | 12.1x | nmf | 26.1x | 3.9\% |
| NYSE:RPT | Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust | \$1,417 | \$2,612 | 20.2x | 11.9x | nmf | 24.6x | 4.7\% |
| NYSE:BFS | Saul Centers Inc. | \$1,100 | \$2,198 | 14.0x | 13.1x | 33.9x | 36.7x | 3.6\% |
| Global Retail REIT Median <br> Global Retail REIT Average |  |  |  | 18.7x | 16.5x | 25.5x | 29.3x | 3.8\% |
|  |  | 19.6x |  | 17.6x | 26.0x | 30.9x | 4.0\% |

Please note: Selected REIT Comp Set multiples do not agree with the presentation, due to the currency difference. This slide is presented in US\$, versus the main presentation in C\$

## Treasury Stock Method



## Retail Operational Analysis (1 of 2; US\$ mm)

| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | EnterpriseValue | Debt I Equity | Gross Margin |  | EBITDA Margin |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2014A | LTM | 2014A | LTM | 2016E |
| Diversified Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:WMT | Wal-Mart Stores Inc. | 192,100.0 | 240,631.0 | 0.26 | 24.8\% | 25.1\% | 7.5\% | 7.0\% | 6.6\% |
| NasdaqGS:COST | Costco Wholesale Corporation | 69,499.5 | 69,749.5 | 0.09 | 12.6\% | 13.1\% | 3.8\% | 4.1\% | 4.1\% |
| NYSE:TGT | Target Corp. | 45,818.8 | 55,791.8 | 0.28 | 29.4\% | 29.7\% | 9.3\% | 10.0\% | 10.4\% |
| NASDAQGS:TSCO | Tractor Supply Company | 11,572.9 | 11,722.8 | 0.01 | 34.1\% | 34.4\% | 12.3\% | 12.4\% | 12.7\% |
| TSX:CTC.A | Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. | 7,108.3 | 11,699.6 | 0.84 | 38.5\% | 47.7\% | 11.2\% | 12.1\% | 16.4\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 29.4\% | 29.7\% | 9.3\% | 10.0\% | 10.4\% |
| Home Improvement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:HD | The Home Depot, Inc. | 162,028.2 | 179,850.2 | 0.13 | 34.8\% | 34.9\% | 14.7\% | 15.2\% | 16.0\% |
| NYSE:LOW | Lowe's Companies, Inc. | 67,403.2 | 77,673.2 | 0.19 | 34.8\% | 34.8\% | 11.4\% | 11.9\% | 12.6\% |
| TSX:RON | Rona Inc. | 1,029.4 | 1,366.7 | 0.41 | 30.2\% | 37.3\% | 4.7\% | 5.3\% | 8.8\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 34.8\% | 34.9\% | 11.4\% | 11.9\% | 12.6\% |
| Home Furnishing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NasdaqGS:BBBY | Bed Bath \& Beyond Inc. | 8,856.9 | 9,660.5 | 0.17 | 39.1\% | 38.5\% | 15.2\% | 14.2\% | 13.1\% |
| NYSE:WSM | Williams-Sonoma Inc. | 5,919.2 | 5,949.4 | 0.03 | 38.3\% | 37.6\% | 14.0\% | 13.4\% | 13.8\% |
| NYSE:RH | Restoration Hardware Holdings, Inc. | 3,606.8 | 3,870.8 | 0.21 | 37.0\% | 37.1\% | 11.1\% | 12.0\% | 13.2\% |
| NYSE:AAN | Aaron's, Inc. | 1,712.5 | 2,139.7 | 0.36 | 52.9\% | 50.2\% | 12.5\% | 9.9\% | 10.6\% |
| TSX:LNF | Leon's Furniture Ltd. | 793.0 | 1,092.0 | 0.53 | 50.3\% | 57.9\% | 8.1\% | 8.0\% | 11.5\% |
| NYSE:PIR | Pier 1 Imports, Inc. | 566.2 | 791.0 | 0.42 | 52.9\% | 37.7\% | 10.5\% | 8.2\% | 6.5\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 44.7\% | 38.1\% | 11.8\% | 11.0\% | 12.3\% |
| Automotive Parts Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:AZO | AutoZone, Inc. | 23,565.1 | 28,046.4 | 0.20 | 52.1\% | 52.4\% | 21.9\% | 21.9\% | 22.1\% |
| NasdaqGS:ORLY | O'Reilly Automotive Inc. | 26,307.3 | 27,427.4 | 0.05 | 51.4\% | 52.3\% | 20.4\% | 21.6\% | 22.5\% |
| NYSE:AAP | Advance Auto Parts Inc. | 12,014.2 | 13,202.5 | 0.10 | 45.2\% | 45.4\% | 12.6\% | 12.6\% | 13.9\% |
| NYSE:AN | AutoNation, Inc. | 6,929.6 | 12,274.6 | 0.88 | 16.4\% | 16.4\% | 5.0\% | 5.0\% | 4.8\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 48.3\% | 48.8\% | 16.5\% | 17.1\% | 18.0\% |
| Global Average |  |  |  |  | 37.5\% | 37.9\% | 11.5\% | 11.4\% | 12.2\% |
| Global Median |  |  |  |  | 45.2\% | 45.4\% | 12.6\% | 12.6\% | 13.9\% |

Note: Debt / Equity is measured on a market basis (with respect to the equity)
Source: Capital IQ

## Retail Operational Analysis (2 of 2; US\$ mm)

| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | Enterprise Value | Debt I <br> Equity | Gross Margin |  | EBITDA Margin |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 2014A | LTM | 2014A | LTM | 2016E |
| Apparel and Workwear Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:VFC | V.F. Corporation | 26,409.8 | 28,553.3 | 0.07 | 48.8\% | 48.3\% | 17.2\% | 16.8\% | na |
| NYSE:GPS | The Gap, Inc. | 10,189.0 | 10,494.0 | 0.17 | 38.3\% | 37.0\% | 16.0\% | 14.7\% | 13.4\% |
| NYSE:WWW | Wolverine World Wide Inc. | 1,788.2 | 2,420.7 | 0.46 | 39.4\% | 39.3\% | 11.8\% | 10.8\% | 10.7\% |
| NYSE:BOOT | Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. | 245.1 | 509.6 | 0.95 | 33.7\% | 31.6\% | 11.8\% | 8.9\% | 10.0\% |
| NasdaqGM:SGC | Superior Uniform Group Inc. | 244.4 | 265.7 | 0.10 | 35.0\% | 34.2\% | 11.1\% | 11.2\% | na |
| NasdaqGM:LAKE | Lakeland Industries Inc. | 90.9 | 98.2 | 0.13 | 33.8\% | 37.8\% | 7.5\% | 14.0\% | 12.3\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 36.6\% | 37.4\% | 11.8\% | 12.6\% | 11.5\% |
| Sporting Goods and Apparel Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:FL | Foot Locker, Inc. | 8,293.2 | 7,455.2 | 0.02 | 42.1\% | 42.3\% | 13.3\% | 14.4\% | 15.2\% |
| NYSE:CAB | Cabela's Incorporated | 2,857.3 | 7,113.6 | 1.66 | 49.6\% | 49.1\% | 14.0\% | 13.2\% | 12.0\% |
| NYSE:DKS | Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. | 4,382.2 | 4,656.8 | 0.08 | 30.7\% | 30.6\% | 11.1\% | 10.7\% | 10.1\% |
| NasdaqGS:SPWH | Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings, In | 463.2 | 690.8 | 0.49 | 32.6\% | 32.6\% | 8.2\% | 8.0\% | 10.6\% |
| NasdaqGS:HIBB | Hibbett Sports, Inc. | 687.7 | 605.7 | 0.00 | 35.8\% | 35.5\% | 14.7\% | 14.0\% | 13.4\% |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 35.8\% | 35.5\% | 13.3\% | 13.2\% | 12.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fuel \& Convenience |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TSX:ATD.B | Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. | 25,161.8 | 27,501.3 | 0.10 | 14.4\% | 16.7\% | 4.9\% | 5.9\% | 5.7\% |
| NASDAQGS:CASY | Casey's General Stores, Inc. | 4,444.7 | 5,251.6 | 0.19 | 18.6\% | 23.6\% | 5.9\% | 8.4\% | 7.5\% |
| NYSE:CST | CST Brands, Inc. | 2,749.3 | 4,408.3 | 0.53 | 10.0\% | 12.1\% | 3.5\% | 4.2\% | na |
| Median |  |  |  |  | 14.4\% | 16.7\% | 4.9\% | 5.9\% | 6.6\% |

Note: Debt / Equity is measured on a market basis (with respect to the equity)
Source: Capital IQ

## Retail Trading Multiples Analysis (1 of 2; US\$ mm)

| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | Enterprise <br> Value | EV / Revenue |  |  | EV / EBITDA |  |  | P/E |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 2014A | LTM | 2016E | 2014A | LTM | 2016E | 2014A | LTM | 2016E |
| Diversified Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:WMT | Wal-Mart Stores Inc. | 192,100.0 | 240,631.0 | 0.5x | 0.5x | 0.5x | 6.6x | 7.2x | 7.6x | 12.1x | 13.1x | 14.5x |
| NasdaqGS:COST | Costco Wholesale Corporation | 69,499.5 | 69,749.5 | 0.6x | 0.6x | 0.6x | 15.9x | 14.6x | 13.6x | 33.0x | 29.8x | 28.3 x |
| NYSE:TGT | Target Corp. | 45,818.8 | 55,791.8 | 0.8x | $0.8 x$ | 0.8x | $8.3 x$ | 7.5x | 7.4x | 19.0x | 16.2x | 14.1x |
| NASDAQGS:TSCO | Tractor Supply Company | 11,572.9 | 11,722.8 | 2.1x | $1.9 x$ | $1.7 x$ | 16.6x | 15.1x | 13.3x | 32.4x | 28.7x | 24.9x |
| TSX:CTC.A | Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. | 7,108.3 | 11,699.6 | 1.2x | $1.4 x$ | $1.3 x$ | 10.7x | 12.0x | 7.7x | 14.2x | 14.8x | 10.5x |
| Median |  |  |  | 0.8x | 0.8x | 0.8x | 10.7x | 12.0x | 7.7x | 19.0x | 16.2x | 14.5x |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Home Improvement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:HD | The Home Depot, Inc. | 162,028.2 | 179,850.2 | 2.2x | 2.1x | 1.9 x | 14.7x | 13.7x | 12.1x | 26.8x | 23.7x | 20.5x |
| NYSE:LOW | Lowe's Companies, Inc. | 67,403.2 | 77,673.2 | $1.4 x$ | $1.3 x$ | $1.3 x$ | 12.1x | 11.2x | 9.9 x | 26.9x | 23.1x | 18.3x |
| TSX:RON | Rona Inc. | 1,029.4 | 1,366.7 | 0.4x | 0.4x | 0.4x | 8.3x | 8.4x | 4.8 x | 20.3x | 24.6x | 9.2x |
| Median |  |  |  | 1.4x | 1.3x | 1.3x | 12.1x | 11.2x | 9.9x | 26.8x | 23.7x | 18.3x |


| Home Furnishing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NasdaqGS:BBBY | Bed Bath \& Beyond Inc. | 8,856.9 | 9,660.5 | 0.8x | 0.8x | 0.8x | $5.4 x$ | 5.7x | 6.0x | 10.7x | 10.5x | 10.5x |
| NYSE:WSM | Williams-Sonoma Inc. | 5,919.2 | 5,949.4 | 1.3x | 1.2x | 1.1x | 9.1x | 9.0x | $8.2 x$ | 20.1x | 19.2x | 17.3x |
| NYSE:RH | Restoration Hardware Holdings, Inc. | 3,606.8 | 3,870.8 | 2.1x | $1.9 x$ | $1.5 x$ | 18.6x | 15.7x | 11.5x | 40.8x | 37.8x | 23.3x |
| NYSE:AAN | Aaron's, Inc. | 1,712.5 | 2,139.7 | 0.8x | 0.7x | 0.6x | $6.3 x$ | $6.8 x$ | $6.0 x$ | 21.8x | 12.7x | 10.2 x |
| TSX:LNF | Leon's Furniture Ltd. | 793.0 | 1,092.0 | 0.6x | 0.7x | 0.7x | 7.9x | 9.2 x | $6.4 x$ | 13.4x | 15.4x | 10.5x |
| NYSE:PIR | Pier 1 Imports, Inc. | 566.2 | 791.0 | 0.4x | 0.4x | 0.4x | 4.1x | 5.1x | $6.6 x$ | 7.5x | 10.5x | 14.6x |
| Median |  |  |  | 0.8x | 0.8x | 0.8x | 7.1x | 7.9x | 6.5x | 16.8x | 14.0x | 12.5x |

Automotive Parts Retailers

| NYSE:AZO | AutoZone, Inc. | 23,565.1 | 28,046.4 | $2.9 x$ | 2.7 x | 2.6 x | 13.3x | 12.4x | 11.7x | 23.7x | 20.8x | 18.5x |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NasdaqGS:ORLY | O'Reilly Automotive Inc. | 26,307.3 | 27,427.4 | $3.8 x$ | 3.4x | $3.2 x$ | 18.7x | 15.9x | 14.3x | 36.3x | 29.1x | 25.1x |
| NYSE:AAP | Advance Auto Parts Inc. | 12,014.2 | 13,202.5 | $1.3 x$ | 1.4 x | $1.3 x$ | 10.6x | 10.8x | 9.7x | 24.5x | 25.6x | 18.3x |
| NYSE:AN | AutoNation, Inc. | 6,929.6 | 12,274.6 | 0.7x | 0.6x | 0.5x | 13.5x | 12.3x | 11.4x | 17.7x | 16.1x | 14.6x |
| Median |  |  |  | 2.1x | 2.0x | 2.0x | 13.4x | 12.4x | 11.5x | 24.1x | 23.2x | 18.4x |
| Global Average |  |  |  | 1.3x | 1.3x | 1.2x | 11.2x | 10.7x | 9.3x | 22.3x | 20.6x | 16.8x |
| Global Median |  |  |  | 1.0x | 1.4x | 1.3x | 13.4x | 12.3x | 11.4x | 24.1x | 23.2x | 18.3x |

## Retail Trading Multiples Analysis (2 of 2; US\$ mm)

| Ticker | Company Name | Market Cap | Enterprise Value | EV / Revenue |  |  | EV / EBITDA |  |  | P/E |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 2014A | LTM | 2016E | 2014A | LTM | 2016E | 2014A | LTM | 2016E |
| Apparel and Workwear Companies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:VFC | V.F. Corporation | 26,409.8 | 28,553.3 | 2.3x | 2.3 x | na | 13.5x | 13.7x | na | 26.0x | 21.7x | na |
| NYSE:GPS | The Gap, Inc. | 10,189.0 | 10,494.0 | 0.6x | 0.7x | $0.7 x$ | 4.0x | $4.4 x$ | 4.9x | 8.7x | 10.2x | 10.3x |
| NYSE:WWW | Wolverine World Wide Inc. | 1,788.2 | 2,420.7 | 0.9x | 0.9x | 0.9x | 7.4x | 8.2x | $8.3 x$ | 13.3x | 14.7x | 12.0x |
| NYSE:BOOT | Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. | 245.1 | 509.6 | 1.3 x | 1.0x | 0.8x | 11.1x | 10.9x | $8.1 x$ | 17.0x | 21.7x | 12.4x |
| NasdaqGM:SGC | Superior Uniform Group Inc. | 244.4 | 265.7 | 1.4 x | 1.3 x | na | 12.2x | 11.5x | na | 21.5x | 20.3 x | na |
| NasdaqGM:LAKE | Lakeland Industries Inc. | 90.9 | 98.2 | 1.0x | 0.9x | 0.9x | 13.1x | 6.3 x | 7.5x | 9.4 x | 5.4x | 12.7x |
| Median |  |  |  | 1.1x | 0.9x | 0.9x | 11.6x | 9.5x | 7.8x | 15.2x | 17.5x | 12.2x |
| Sporting Goods and Apparel Retailers |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NYSE:FL | Foot Locker, Inc. | 8,293.2 | 7,455.2 | 1.0x | 1.0x | 1.0x | 7.8x | 7.1x | $6.3 x$ | 16.7x | 16.0x | 12.5x |
| NYSE:CAB | Cabela's Incorporated | 2,857.3 | 7,113.6 | 2.2x | 2.0x | 1.7x | 15.8x | 15.4x | 14.0x | 14.7x | 15.4x | 13.0x |
| NYSE:DKS | Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. | 4,382.2 | 4,656.8 | 0.7x | 0.6x | 0.6x | 6.2 x | 6.0x | 5.8 x | 13.0x | 12.2x | 11.4x |
| NasdaqGS:SPWH | Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings, In | 463.2 | 690.8 | 1.0x | 1.0x | 0.8x | 12.8x | 12.3x | 7.8x | 28.2x | 20.8x | 12.9x |
| NasdaqGS:HIBB | Hibbett Sports, Inc. | 687.7 | 605.7 | 0.7x | 0.6x | 0.6x | 4.5x | 4.6x | $4.5 x$ | 10.1x | 9.7 x | 9.4 x |
| Median |  |  |  | 1.0x | 1.0x | 0.8x | 7.8x | 7.1x | 6.3 x | 14.7x | 15.4x | 12.5x |
| Fuel \& Convenience |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TSX:ATD.B | Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. | 25,161.8 | 27,501.3 | 0.8x | 0.8x | 0.7x | 15.5x | 13.8x | 12.0x | 26.3x | 23.1x | 20.1x |
| NASDAQGS:CASY | Casey's General Stores, Inc. | 4,444.7 | 5,251.6 | 0.7x | 0.8x | $0.7 x$ | 12.0x | 9.5 x | 9.0x | 27.8x | 20.2x | 20.0x |
| NYSE:CST | CST Brands, Inc. | 2,749.3 | 4,408.3 | 0.3x | $0.4 x$ | na | 9.9x | 9.3 x | na | 13.8x | 18.6x | na |
| Median |  |  |  | 0.7x | 0.8x | 0.7x | 12.0x | 9.5 x | 10.5x | 26.3x | 20.2x | 20.0x |

## Revenue Model (CTR)

2013A
2014A
2015A
2016F
2017F
2018F
2019F
2020F


## Revenue Model (Mark's)

2013A
2014A
2015A
2016F
2017F
2018F
2019F
2020F

| Mark's Revenue Model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Store Economics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Stores 385 | 383 | 380 | 381 | 382 | 383 | 384 | 385 |
| Total Store Square Footage 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail Sales / Square Feet \$315 | \$328 | \$335 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Store Square Footage 9,091 | 9,138 | 9,211 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue from Stores Opened 2014 and Prior \$1,060.8 | \$1,121.6 | \$1,092.6 | \$1,106.4 | \$1,123.9 | \$1,146.4 | \$1,169.3 | \$1,192.7 |
| Base Business Same Store Sales Growth 4.6\% | 3.1\% | -0.5\% | 1.3\% | 1.6\% | 2.0\% | 2.0\% | 2.0\% |
| Revenue from New Stores ('15E - '20E) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of Stores Opened |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue from Stores Opened in 2016 Revenue |  |  | \$1.2 | \$2.8 | \$3.1 | \$3.2 | \$3.2 |
| Revenue from Stores Opened in 2017 Revenue |  |  |  | \$1.2 | \$2.8 | \$3.1 | \$3.2 |
| Revenue from Stores Opened in 2018 Revenue |  |  |  |  | \$1.2 | \$2.8 | \$3.1 |
| Revenue from Stores Opened in 2019 Revenue |  |  |  |  |  | \$1.2 | \$2.8 |
| Revenue from Stores Opened in 2020 Revenue |  |  |  |  |  |  | \$1.2 |
| Revenue from New Stores ('15E - '20E) |  |  | \$1.2 | \$4.0 | \$7.1 | \$10.3 | \$13.5 |
| Total Revenue \$1,060.8 | \$1,121.6 | \$1,092.6 | \$1,107.6 | \$1,127.9 | \$1,153.5 | \$1,179.6 | \$1,206.2 |
| Total Revenue Growth 4.3\% | 5.7\% | -2.6\% | 1.4\% | 1.8\% | 2.3\% | 2.3\% | 2.3\% |
| New Store Assumptions (on an individual store basis) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| New Store Square Footage |  | 9,211 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mature Store Retail Sales / Square Feet |  | \$335 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mature Store Retail Sales / Store |  | \$3.1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| New Store Revenue Ramp (\% of Mature Store Revenue) |  |  | 80\% | 90\% | 100\% | 102\% | 105\% |

## Revenue Model (FGL)



## Revenue Model (Petroleum; 1 of 3)



## Revenue Model (Petroleum; 2 of 3)

Canadian Consumer Price Oil Index versus WTI


## Revenue Model (Petroleum; 3 of 3)

WTI Forecasts


## Depreciation Schedule



## SUPPORT

| CTC Operating Capital Expenditures | $\$ 340$ | $\$ 365$ | $\$ 335$ | $\$ 433$ | $\$ 476$ | $\$ 529$ | Included Information Technology Capex |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Information Technology | $\$ 57$ | $\$ 75$ | $\$ 77$ | $\$ 147$ | $\$ 154$ | $\$ 212$ |  |
| Information Technology as a \% of Capex | $16.8 \%$ | $20.5 \%$ | $23.0 \%$ | $33.8 \%$ | $32.3 \%$ | $40.1 \%$ |  |

## Market Concerns

- HoldCo Discount
- We, respectfully, disagree - CTC is a family of complementary consumer businesses, shown through its margin ranking among Canadian retailers
- Ironically, defeats the purpose of the IPO
- Cost synergies from shared distribution and logistics (e.g. DCs)
- Revenue synergies from Gas+, Mark's, and CTR
- Oil and Gas / Weakness in Alberta
- Alberta represents $\sim 10-15 \%$ of stores for the Retail division
- Biggest impact on Mark's
- Weakness in the C\$


## Conglomerate Discount (1 of 3)

- Definition: "tendency of the stock market to undervalue the stocks of conglomerate businesses. Conglomerate discount is calculated by adding an estimation of the intrinsic value of each of the subsidiary companies in a conglomerate and subtracting the conglomerate's market capitalization from that value"
- "Top-performing conglomerates all share two distinctive characteristics:
- They have financial rather than strategic or operating visions, and adopt uncompromising, valuefocused approaches to portfolio management
- They use reward systems to create and maintain entrepreneurial cultures controlled by the center through simple, rigorously policed rules and targets"
- "Case against conglomerates:
- Diversification per se offers no advantage to investors;
- That the conglomerate structure is inherently inefficient and unfocused; and
- That the lower-rated businesses in diversified portfolios prevent the value of higher-rated businesses from being fully reflected in the share price"
- "Our study shows that, far from being an anachronism, the diversified holding model can be forged into a highly effective value creator. And the best of today's conglomerates can even teach more fashionably focused companies a thing or two."


## Conglomerate Discount (2 of 3)

- "Top-performing conglomerates all share two distinctive characteristics:
- They have financial rather than strategic or operating visions, and adopt uncompromising, valuefocused approaches to portfolio management"
- Management's focus on Profitability
- "They use reward systems to create and maintain entrepreneurial cultures controlled by the center through simple, rigorously policed rules and targets"
- Associate Dealer CTR Store Model


## Conglomerate Discount (3 of 3)

- "Case against conglomerates:
- Diversification per se offers no advantage to investors;"
- Diversification is logical Mark's \& Clothing $\rightarrow$ highest gross margin subsector FGL \& Sporting Goods $\rightarrow$ stable industry sales, industry tailwinds CTR \& General Merch. $\rightarrow$ high gross margin, high industry growth
- "That the conglomerate structure is inherently inefficient and unfocused; and" Complementary business $\rightarrow$ Retail and CTFS
- "That the lower-rated businesses in diversified portfolios prevent the value of higher-rated businesses from being fully reflected in the share price"
- Unlocking the value of its real estate portfolio $\rightarrow$ IPO of CT REIT


## Football Field (Valuation Summary)



## CTFS Intrinsic Model

|  | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A | 2015A | 2016F | 2017F | 2018F | 2019F | 2020F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | \$960 | \$982 | \$1,026 | \$1,076 | \$1,101 | \$1,114 | \$1,126 | \$1,139 | \$1,154 | \$1,172 |
| Gross average accounts receivable | \$4,036 | \$4,096 | \$4,374 | \$4,685 | \$4,839 | \$4,926 | \$4,980 | \$5,039 | \$5,105 | \$5,185 |
| Earnings before Taxes | \$220 | \$277 | \$320 | \$345 | \$374 | \$335 | \$299 | \$300 | \$302 | \$305 |
| Income Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | \$92 | \$79 | \$80 | \$80 | \$81 |
| Net Income |  |  |  |  |  | \$243 | \$220 | \$221 | \$222 | \$224 |
| D\&A | \$11 | \$10 | \$10 | \$9 | \$7 | \$10 | \$10 | \$10 | \$11 | \$11 |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  | \$253 | \$230 | \$231 | \$233 | \$235 |
| Terminal Value |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \$8,068 |
| Discount Factor (Mid-year Convention) |  |  |  |  |  | 95.3\% | 90.8\% | 86.5\% | 82.4\% | 78.5\% |
| PV of Unlevered Free Cash Flow |  |  |  |  |  | \$241.4 | \$208.7 | \$200.0 | \$191.9 | \$6,520.2 |
| Implied Enterprise Value | \$7,362 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTFS Debt | \$4,152 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Implied Equity Value | \$3,210 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTC Ownership | 80\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTC Attributable Equity Value | \$2,568 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| WACC | 5.0\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terminal Growth Rate | 2.0\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operating Model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. num. of accounts with a balance | 1,717 | 1,724 | 1,772 | 1,837 | 1,840 | 1,842 | 1,844 | 1,847 | 1,853 | 1,864 |
| Average account balance | 2,340 | 2,370 | 2,464 | 2,547 | 2,627 | 2,674 | 2,700 | 2,727 | 2,755 | 2,782 |
| Financial Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue growth | 0.7\% | 2.2\% | 4.5\% | 4.9\% | 2.4\% | 1.1\% | 1.1\% | 1.2\% | 1.3\% | 1.6\% |
| Gross average accounts receivable growth | -0.1\% | 1.5\% | 6.8\% | 7.1\% | 3.3\% | 1.8\% | 1.1\% | 1.2\% | 1.3\% | 1.6\% |
| Avg. num. of accounts with a balance growth | -0.2\% | 0.4\% | 2.8\% | 3.7\% | 0.2\% | 0.1\% | 0.1\% | 0.2\% | 0.3\% | 0.6\% |
| Average account balance growth | 0.3\% | 1.3\% | 4.0\% | 3.4\% | 3.1\% | 1.8\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% |
| Revenue Yield on Receivables | 23.8\% | 24.0\% | 23.5\% | 23.0\% | 22.8\% | 22.6\% | 22.6\% | 22.6\% | 22.6\% | 22.6\% |
| Return on Receivables | 5.5\% | 6.8\% | 7.3\% | 7.4\% | 7.7\% | 6.8\% | 6.0\% | 6.0\% | 5.9\% | 5.9\% |
| D\&A (\% of Revenue) | 1.1\% | 1.0\% | 1.0\% | 0.8\% | 0.6\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% | 0.9\% |

## CT REIT NAV Model

|  | 2015 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Value of Income-generating Properties |  |
| Net Operating Income | $\$ 265,350$ |
| Add: Straight-line Rent | $\$ 26,131$ |
| Deduct: Straight-line Expenses | $\$ 291,324$ |
| Pro Forma Net Operating Income | $6.00 \%$ |
| Capitalization Rate | $\$ 4,855,400$ |
| Value of Income-generating Properties |  |
|  |  |
| Value of Non-income-generating Properties | $\$ 25,983$ |
| $\quad$ Developments | $\$ 8,767$ |
| Development Land | $\$ 34,750$ |
| Value of Non-income-generating Properties | $\$ 36,860$ |
| Value of Other Assets | $\$ 4,927,010$ |
|  | $\$ 2,137,540$ |
| Value of Assets | $\$ 2,789,470$ |
| Book Value of Liabilities | $83,8 \%$ |
| Value of Equity | $\$ 2,338,886$ |

## Dividend Distribution \& Share Repurchases

On November 12, 2015, the Board of Directors approved an increase in the quarterly dividend per share (on each Common and Class A Non-Voting Share) from $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 5 2 5}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 0 . 5 7 5}$ per quarter effective commencing with the dividend to be paid on March 1, 2016.

Quarterly Dividends Per Share


## Share Buy-Back Program

CTC continues to employ a share buy-back program for Class A non-voting shares (in excess of the amount necessary for antidilution) to return value to shareholders. As of December 31, 2015, approximately 6.9 mm shares have been re-purchased since 2010. The company's policy for share repurchase reporting charge share capital at the weighted average cost per share outstanding, with any excess being allocated to contributed surplus.

On November 11, 2015, the Board of Directors approved the 2016 goal of a $\$ 550 \mathrm{~mm}$ repurchase of Class A non-voting shares.

## Dividend Yield (10Y)


—TSX:CTC.A —TSX:CRT.UN

Note: Dividend yield is shown on a historical basis.
Source: Capital IQ

## DuPont Analysis

## Monte Carlo Inputs

Model Inputs and Distributions


## Monte Carlo Summary Statistics

| Monte Carlo Summary Statistics (Implied Price) |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Number of Iterations | 100,000 |
| Minimum | $\$ 95.88$ |
| Maximum | $\$ 199.89$ |
| Mean | $\$ 137.22$ |
| Skewness | 0.20 |
| Kurtosis | 2.83 |
| Median | $\$ 136.79$ |
| $5 \%$ CI | $\$ 116.08$ |
| $95 \%$ CI | $\$ 159.76$ |
| \% of Simulations Above \$129 | $71.9 \%$ |
| \% of Simulations Below \$129 | $28.1 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Std. Dev. | $\$ 13.29$ |
| Mean - 2 Std. Dev. | $\$ 110.64$ |
| Mean - 1 Std. Dev. | $\$ 123.93$ |
| Mean + 1 Std. Dev. | $\$ 150.51$ |
| Mean + 2 Std. Dev. | $\$ 163.80$ |


| Monte Carlo Summary Statistics (1 Yr Target) |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Number of Iterations | 100,000 |
| Minimum | $\$ 101.00$ |
| Maximum | $\$ 208.14$ |
| Mean | $\$ 143.71$ |
| Skewness | 0.19 |
| Kurtosis | 2.80 |
| Median | $\$ 143.31$ |
| 5\% CI | $\$ 121.83$ |
| 95\% Cl | $\$ 166.89$ |
| \% of Simulations Above \$129 | $85.4 \%$ |
| \% of Simulations Below \$129 | $14.6 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Std. Dev. | $\$ 13.72$ |
| Mean - 2 Std. Dev. | $\$ 116.27$ |
| Mean - 1 Std. Dev. | $\$ 129.99$ |
| Mean + 1 Std. Dev. | $\$ 157.43$ |
| Mean + 2 Std. Dev. | $\$ 171.15$ |

## Monte Carlo Sensitivities (1 of 2)

| Change in Output Statistics for Target Share Price |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rank Name | Lower | Upper |  |
| 1 | SG\&A Margin | $\$ 124.82$ | $\$ 162.60$ |
| 2 | Market Return | $\$ 136.15$ | $\$ 153.55$ |
| 3 | FGL Revenue Growth | $\$ 138.60$ | $\$ 148.13$ |
| 4 | Petroleum Revenue Growth | $\$ 139.21$ | $\$ 147.65$ |
| 5 | Terminal Growth | $\$ 140.07$ | $\$ 147.57$ |
| 6 | Terminal Multiple | $\$ 140.23$ | $\$ 147.53$ |
| 7 | CTR Revenue Growth | $\$ 140.19$ | $\$ 147.22$ |
| 8 | CTFS Multiple | $\$ 140.98$ | $\$ 146.63$ |
| 9 | CTR COGS Margin | $\$ 141.22$ | $\$ 146.55$ |
| 10 | Capex | $\$ 141.46$ | $\$ 146.04$ |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | Revenue Growth | $\$ 131.39$ | $\$ 156.38$ |

## Monte Carlo Sensitivities (2 of 2)



## Range of Terminal Multiple (FGL)

Trading Multiples Analysis: Evolution of Sporting Goods Retailers


## Range of Acquisition Multiple (CTFS)

Trading Multiples Analysis: Evolution of Financial Institutions


## Range of Trading Multiple (CT REIT)

Trading Multiples Analysis: Evolution of Canadian Retail REITs


## Sensitivity Analysis - DCF Key Assumptions

| Retail Equity Value (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Terminal Multiple / Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 7.1x | 8.1x | 9.1x | 10.1x | 11.1x |
|  |  | 1.0\% | 1.5\% | 2.0\% | 2.5\% | 3.0\% |
|  | 4.3\% | \$4,551 | \$5,288 | \$6,141 | \$7,164 | \$8,443 |
| Market | 4.8\% | \$4,206 | \$4,872 | \$5,630 | \$6,522 | \$7,608 |
| Risk | 5.3\% | \$3,899 | \$4,505 | \$5,186 | \$5,973 | \$6,912 |
| Premium | 5.8\% | \$3,623 | \$4,179 | \$4,796 | \$5,499 | \$6,322 |
|  | 6.3\% | \$3,374 | \$3,887 | \$4,451 | \$5,084 | \$5,815 |


| Retail Equity Value (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Terminal Multiple / Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 7.1x | 8.1x | 9.1x | 10.1x | 11.1x |
|  |  | 1.0\% | 1.5\% | 2.0\% | 2.5\% | 3.0\% |
|  | 4.3\% | (12.3\%) | 2.0\% | 18.4\% | 38.1\% | 62.8\% |
| Market | 4.8\% | (18.9\%) | (6.1\%) | 8.6\% | 25.8\% | 46.7\% |
| Risk | 5.3\% | (24.8\%) | (13.1\%) | 0.0\% | 15.2\% | 33.3\% |
| Premium | 5.8\% | (30.1\%) | (19.4\%) | (7.5\%) | 6.0\% | 21.9\% |
|  | 6.3\% | (34.9\%) | (25.0\%) | (14.2\%) | (2.0\%) | 12.1\% |


| Target Price (\$) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Terminal Multiple / Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 7.1 x | 8.1 x | 9.1 x | 10.1 x | 11.1 x |  |
|  |  | $1.0 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |  |
|  | $4.3 \%$ | $\$ 140$ | $\$ 150$ | $\$ 162$ | $\$ 176$ | $\$ 193$ |  |
| Market | $4.8 \%$ | $\$ 136$ | $\$ 145$ | $\$ 156$ | $\$ 168$ | $\$ 183$ |  |
| Risk | $5.3 \%$ | $\$ 132$ | $\$ 140$ | $\$ 150$ | $\$ 160$ | $\$ 174$ |  |
| Premium | $5.8 \%$ | $\$ 129$ | $\$ 137$ | $\$ 145$ | $\$ 154$ | $\$ 166$ |  |
|  | $6.3 \%$ | $\$ 125$ | $\$ 133$ | $\$ 140$ | $\$ 150$ | $\$ 159$ |  |

Target Price (\%)

| Terminal Multiple / Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  | $7.1 x$ | $8.1 x$ | $9.1 x$ | $10.1 x$ | $11.1 x$ |
|  |  | $1.0 \%$ | $1.5 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ |
|  | $4.3 \%$ | $(6.7 \%)$ | $0.0 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ | $17.3 \%$ | $28.7 \%$ |
| Market | $4.8 \%$ | $(9.3 \%)$ | $(3.3 \%)$ | $4.0 \%$ | $12.0 \%$ | $22.0 \%$ |
| Risk | $5.3 \%$ | $(12.0 \%)$ | $(6.7 \%)$ | $0.0 \%$ | $6.7 \%$ | $16.0 \%$ |
| Premium | $5.8 \%$ | $(14.0 \%)$ | $(8.7 \%)$ | $(3.3 \%)$ | $2.7 \%$ | $10.7 \%$ |
|  | $6.3 \%$ | $(16.7 \%)$ | $(11.3 \%)$ | $(6.7 \%)$ | $0.0 \%$ | $6.0 \%$ |

## Sensitivity Analysis - DCF Equity Value



## Sensitivity Analysis - DCF (on Target Price)



## Historical Income Statement (Segmented; CAD \$MMs)

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 3Y CAGR | 5Y CAGR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | 9,213 | 10,387 | 11,427 | 11,786 | 12,463 | 12,280 | 2.4\% | 5.9\% |
| COGS | $(6,422)$ | $(7,326)$ | $(7,929)$ | $(8,063)$ | $(8,417)$ | $(8,144)$ | 0.9\% | 4.9\% |
| Gross Profit | 2,791 | 3,061 | 3,498 | 3,722 | 4,046 | 4,135 | 5.7\% | 8.2\% |
| Gross Margin | 30.3\% | 29.5\% | 30.6\% | 31.6\% | 32.5\% | 33.7\% |  |  |
| Selling, General and Administrative Expenses | $(2,070)$ | $(2,317)$ | $(2,701)$ | $(2,829)$ | $(3,053)$ | $(3,096)$ | 4.7\% | 8.4\% |
| Other Income (Expense) | 1 | 18 | 6 | (3) | 11 | 55 |  |  |
| Change in Fair Value of Redeemable Fin. Instr. | - | - | - | - | (17) | - |  |  |
| Total Operating Expenses | $(2,069)$ | $(2,299)$ | $(2,695)$ | $(2,832)$ | $(3,059)$ | $(3,041)$ | 4.1\% | 8.0\% |
| Earnings before Interest, Taxes | 723 | 762 | 803 | 890 | 987 | 1,094 | 10.9\% | 8.7\% |
| Net Finance Costs | (136) | (132) | (126) | (106) | (109) | (93) | -9.7\% | -7.3\% |
| Earnings before Taxes | 587 | 630 | 677 | 785 | 878 | 1,001 | 13.9\% | 11.3\% |
| Provision for Income Tax | (143) | (163) | (178) | (220) | (239) | (265) | 14.3\% | 13.2\% |
| Net Income | 444 | 467 | 499 | 564 | 639 | 736 | 13.8\% | 10.6\% |
| Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Equity Holders | 444 | 467 | 499 | 561 | 604 | 659 | 9.7\% | 8.2\% |
| Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Minority Interest |  |  |  | 3 | 35 | 77 |  |  |
| Effective Tax Rate | 24.3\% | 25.9\% | 26.3\% | 28.1\% | 27.2\% | 26.5\% |  |  |
| EBITDA | 997 | 1,058 | 1,138 | 1,236 | 1,376 | 1,519 | 10.1\% | 8.8\% |
| EBITDA Growth | 13.8\% | 6.2\% | 7.6\% | 8.6\% | 11.4\% | 10.3\% |  |  |
| EBITDA Margin | 10.8\% | 10.2\% | 10.0\% | 10.5\% | 11.0\% | 12.4\% |  |  |

[^8]
## Historical Income Statement (Segmented; Com. Size)

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| COGS | -70\% | -71\% | -69\% | -68\% | -68\% | -66\% |
| Gross Profit | 30\% | 29\% | 31\% | 32\% | 32\% | 34\% |
| Selling, General and Administrative Expenses | -22\% | -22\% | -24\% | -24\% | -24\% | -25\% |
| Other Income (Expense) | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Change in Fair Value of Redeemable Fin. Instr. | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Total Operating Expenses | -22\% | -22\% | -24\% | -24\% | -25\% | -25\% |
| Earnings before Interest, Taxes | 8\% | 7\% | 7\% | 8\% | 8\% | 9\% |
| Net Finance Costs | -1\% | -1\% | -1\% | -1\% | -1\% | -1\% |
| Earnings before Taxes | 6\% | 6\% | 6\% | 7\% | 7\% | 8\% |
| Provision for Income Tax | -2\% | -2\% | -2\% | -2\% | -2\% | -2\% |
| Net Income | 5\% | 4\% | 4\% | 5\% | 5\% | 6\% |
| Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Equity Holders | 5\% | 4\% | 4\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% |

## Historical Income Statement (Segmented)

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 3Y CAGR | 5Y CAGR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Segmented Income Statement (\$ in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | \$8,179 | \$9,364 | \$10,381 | \$10,692 | \$11,305 | \$11,075 | 2.2\% | 6.3\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | \$63 | \$345 | \$378 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Financial Services | \$954 | \$960 | \$982 | \$1,026 | \$1,076 | \$1,101 | 3.9\% | 2.9\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments | \$81 | \$63 | \$64 | \$5 | (\$262) | (\$275) | nmf | nmf |
| Consolidated Revenue | \$9,213 | \$10,387 | \$11,427 | \$11,786 | \$12,463 | \$12,280 | 2.4\% | 5.9\% |
| Gross Profit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | \$2,163 | \$2,447 | \$2,835 | \$3,012 | \$3,271 | \$3,328 | 5.5\% | 9.0\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | \$63 | \$345 | \$378 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Financial Services | \$548 | \$482 | \$537 | \$595 | \$641 | \$649 | 6.6\% | 3.5\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments | \$81 | \$132 | \$126 | \$52 | (\$210) | (\$220) | nmf | nmf |
| Consolidated Gross Profit | \$2,791 | \$3,061 | \$3,498 | \$3,722 | \$4,046 | \$4,135 | 5.7\% | 8.2\% |
| Depreciation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | \$265 | \$285 | \$325 | \$324 | \$304 | \$351 | 1.5\% | 5.7\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Financial Services | \$9 | \$11 | \$10 | \$10 | \$9 | \$7 | -6.7\% | -4.7\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$12 | \$76 | \$67 | n.m.f. | n.m.f. |
| Consolidated Depreciation | \$274 | \$296 | \$335 | \$345 | \$389 | \$425 | 4.9\% | 9.2\% |
| EBITDA |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | \$723 | \$769 | \$799 | \$841 | \$824 | \$913 | 2.7\% | 4.8\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | \$47 | \$260 | \$180 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Financial Services | \$274 | \$228 | \$286 | \$328 | \$347 | \$380 | 5.8\% | 6.7\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments | \$0 | \$62 | \$54 | \$20 | (\$54) | \$46 | n.m.f. | n.m.f. |
| Consolidated EBITDA | \$997 | \$1,058 | \$1,138 | \$1,236 | \$1,376 | \$1,519 | 5.9\% | 8.8\% |
| EBIT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | \$458 | \$484 | \$474 | \$518 | \$520 | \$562 | 3.5\% | 4.2\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | \$46 | \$401 | \$322 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Financial Services | \$265 | \$217 | \$276 | \$317 | \$338 | \$373 | 6.2\% | 7.1\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments | \$0 | \$62 | \$54 | \$9 | (\$272) | (\$162) | n.m.f. | n.m.f. |
| Consolidated EBIT | \$723 | \$762 | \$803 | \$890 | \$987 | \$1,094 | 6.4\% | 8.7\% |

## Historical Income Statement (Segmented)

| Segmented Income Statement (\$ in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Financial Services | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consolidated Revenue | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Gross Profit |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | 26\% | 26\% | 27\% | 28\% | 29\% | 30\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 100\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| Financial Services | 57\% | 50\% | 55\% | 58\% | 60\% | 59\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consolidated Gross Profit | 30\% | 29\% | 31\% | 32\% | 32\% | 34\% |
| Depreciation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Financial Services | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consolidated Depreciation | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| EBITDA |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | 9\% | 8\% | 8\% | 8\% | 7\% | 8\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 74\% | 75\% | 48\% |
| Financial Services | 29\% | 24\% | 29\% | 32\% | 32\% | 34\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consolidated EBITDA | 11\% | 10\% | 10\% | 10\% | 11\% | 12\% |
| EBIT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | 6\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| CT REIT | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 74\% | 116\% | 85\% |
| Financial Services | 28\% | 23\% | 28\% | 31\% | 31\% | 34\% |
| Eliminations and Adjustments |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Consolidated EBIT | 8\% | 7\% | 7\% | 8\% | 8\% | 9\% |

## Historical Free Cash Flow Profile



## (1) 2011 Change in NWC

Change in NWC due to transformational acquisition of FGL and material increase in inventory ( $\$ 455.9 \mathrm{~mm}$ associated with the acquisition).

## (2) 2014 Change in NWC

Increase in inventory levels by $\$ 142.8 \mathrm{~mm}$ were higher with respect to the Canadian Tire retail platform to mitigate supply chain disruption risk and to take advantage of early purchase opportunities prior to duty and tariff increases.
Also, there was higher inventory at FGL Sports was to support new stores in the network and sales growth while increases at Mark's were driven by efforts to keep a higher level of inventory to accommodate rebranding initiatives.

## Historical Balance Sheet (Assets)

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Balance Sheet (\$ in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current Assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash and Cash Equivalents | 569 | 326 | 1,016 | 643 | 662 | 901 |
| Short-term Investments | 197 | 196 | 169 | 417 | 289 | 96 |
| Trade and Other Receivables | 674 | 829 | 751 | 759 | 880 | 915 |
| Income Taxes Recoverable | 99 | - | 48 | 32 | 32 | 42 |
| Merchandise Inventories | 901 | 1,449 | 1,503 | 1,481 | 1,624 | 1,765 |
| Prepaid Expenses and Deposit | 38 | 44 | 39 | 68 | 105 | 96 |
| Loans Receivable | 4,051 | 4,082 | 4,266 | 4,570 | 4,906 | 4,876 |
| Assets Classified as Held for Sale | 21 | 31 | 6 | 9 | 13 | 2 |
| Total Current Assets | 6,549 | 6,957 | 7,796 | 7,978 | 8,510 | 8,692 |
| Non Current Assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tangible Assets | 3,232 | 3,366 | 3,344 | 3,516 | 3,743 | 3,978 |
| Long-term Investments | 76 | 128 | 183 | 135 | 176 | 153 |
| Deferred Income Taxes | 35 | 37 | 40 | 36 | 39 | 48 |
| Goodwill and Intangible Assets | 361 | 1,110 | 1,090 | 1,186 | 1,252 | 1,247 |
| Long-term Receivables and Other Assets | 727 | 669 | 681 | 686 | 684 | 731 |
| Investment Property | 69 | 72 | 95 | 94 | 149 | 138 |
| Total Assets | 11,049 | 12,339 | 13,229 | 13,630 | 14,553 | 14,988 |

## Historical Balance Sheet (Liabilities)

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Balance Sheet (\$ in millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current Liabilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade and Other Payables | 1,180 | 1,641 | 1,631 | 1,817 | 1,961 | 1,957 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 101 | 353 | 119 | 120 | 200 | 89 |
| Loan Payable | 687 | 629 | 624 | 611 | 604 | 656 |
| Bank Indebtedness | 118 | 125 | 86 | 69 | 14 | - |
| Current Portion of Long-term Debt | 354 | 28 | 662 | 272 | 588 | 24 |
| Income Taxes Payable | - | 4 | 53 | 58 | 55 | 62 |
| Deposits | 616 | 1,182 | 1,311 | 1,178 | 951 | 881 |
| Provisions | 196 | 192 | 186 | 196 | 206 | 216 |
| Total Current Liabilities | 3,252 | 4,153 | 4,672 | 4,322 | 4,579 | 3,884 |
| Non Current Liabilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-term Debt | 2,365 | 2,348 | 2,336 | 2,339 | 2,132 | 2,971 |
| Deferred Income Taxes | - | 66 | 78 | 100 | 94 | 111 |
| Other Long-term Liabilities | 137 | 206 | 212 | 228 | 788 | 814 |
| Long-term Deposits | 1,265 | 1,102 | 1,112 | 1,152 | 1,286 | 1,372 |
| Long-term Provisions | 25 | 55 | 55 | 38 | 44 | 46 |
| Total Liabilities | 7,044 | 7,930 | 8,464 | 8,180 | 8,922 | 9,198 |
| Shareholders' Equity |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Common Stock - Par Value | 712 | 711 | 688 | 713 | 696 | 671 |
| Additional Paid in Capital | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Retained Earnings | 3,325 | 3,686 | 4,075 | 4,405 | 4,075 | 4,172 |
| Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (Loss) | (32) | 11 | (2) | 47 | 82 | 148 |
| Total Shareholders Equity | 4,005 | 4,409 | 4,764 | 5,167 | 4,856 | 4,994 |
| Minority Interest | - | - | - | 283 | 775 | 796 |
| Total Liabilities \& Shareholders Equity | 11,049 | 12,339 | 13,229 | 13,630 | 14,553 | 14,988 |

## Segmented Disclosure: SSSG and Net Write-off

|  | UNITS | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 5Y Avg | 3Y Avg |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SSSG |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTR | \% | -0.5\% | 1.8\% | -2.6\% | 0.8\% | 1.1\% | 0.3\% | 1.8\% | 2.4\% | 3.2\% | 1.8\% | 2.5\% |
| FGL | \% |  |  |  |  | 2.6\% | 4.9\% | 7.7\% | 6.9\% | 4.4\% | 5.3\% | 6.3\% |
| Mark's | \% | 4.80\% | 0.30\% | -4.70\% | 1.90\% | 2.8\% | 3.7\% | 4.6\% | 3.1\% | -0.5\% | 2.7\% | 2.4\% |
| Petroleum (gasoline vol.) | \% | 2.10\% | -0.60\% | 0.70\% | 1.60\% | 2.1\% | 1.3\% | -2.9\% | -2.7\% | 2.0\% | 0.0\% | -1.2\% |
| CTFS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5Y CAGR | 3Y CAGR |
| Revenue | \$ | 769.1 | 820.4 | 909.9 | 953.7 | 960.4 | 981.9 | 1,025.9 | 1,075.7 | 1,101.2 | 2.9\% | 3.9\% |
| Credit Card Sales Growth | \% | 13.80\% | 6.70\% | 1.80\% | 2.80\% | -0.10\% | 1.20\% | 3.10\% | 3.50\% | 0.90\% |  |  |
| Gross average accounts receivable | \$ | 3,650.4 | 3,913.0 | 3,852.8 | 4,041.2 | 4,035.5 | 4,096.0 | 4,374.3 | 4,684.6 | 4,838.7 | 3.7\% | 5.7\% |
| Avg. num. of accounts with a balance | 000s | 1,854 | 1,819 | 1,794 | 1,721 | 1,717 | 1,724 | 1,772 | 1,837 | 1,840 | 1.3\% | 2.2\% |
| Average account balance | \$ | 1,968 | 2,031 | 2,270 | 2,332 | 2,340 | 2,370 | 2,464 | 2,547 | 2,627 | 2.4\% | 3.5\% |
| Net credit card write-off rate | \% | 5.76\% | 6.34\% | 7.58\% | 7.49\% | 7.32\% | 6.58\% | 5.75\% | 6.05\% | 6.18\% |  |  |

## Ratio Analysis

| Ratio Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| Liquidity Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current Ratio | 2.01 | 1.68 | 1.67 | 1.85 | 1.86 | 2.24 |
| Quick / Acid-test Ratio | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.49 |
| Inventory Turnover (using Retail COGS) | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 4.6 |
| Profitability Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Profit Margin | 4.8\% | 4.5\% | 4.4\% | 4.8\% | 5.1\% | 6.0\% |
| Fixed Asset Turnover | 2.9x | 3.1x | 3.4x | 3.4x | 3.4 x | $3.2 x$ |
| Return on Assets | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 3.9\% | 4.2\% | 4.5\% | 5.0\% |
| Return on Equity | 11.6\% | 11.1\% | 10.9\% | 11.4\% | 12.8\% | 14.9\% |
| Credit Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 4.3x | 4.9x | 5.6x | 4.7x | 5.3x | 6.8x |
| Net Debt \& Deposits / EBITDA | 4.1x | 4.4x | $3.9 x$ | $3.3 x$ | 3.1x | 2.9x |
| Other |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Payout Ratio | 15.4\% | 19.2\% | 19.6\% | 19.6\% | 25.2\% | 28.0\% |

## Historical Net Working Capital

|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net Working Capital Schedule (C\$, millions) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-cash Current Assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade and Other Receivables | 674 | 829 | 751 | 759 | 880 | 915 |
| Income Taxes Recoverable | 99 | - | 48 | 32 | 32 | 42 |
| Merchandise Inventories | 901 | 1,449 | 1,503 | 1,481 | 1,624 | 1,765 |
| Prepaid Expenses and Deposit | 38 | 44 | 39 | 68 | 105 | 96 |
| Total Non-cash Current Assets | 1,712 | 2,322 | 2,341 | 2,339 | 2,640 | 2,818 |
| Non-debt Current Liabilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade and Other Payables | 1,180 | 1,641 | 1,631 | 1,817 | 1,961 | 1,957 |
| Income Taxes Payable | - | 4 | 53 | 58 | 55 | 62 |
| Total Non-debt Current Liabilities | 1,180 | 1,645 | 1,684 | 1,875 | 2,016 | 2,019 |
| Net Working Capital | 532 | 677 | 656 | 464 | 624 | 799 |

## Current Market Multiples (CTC versus Can. Retail)

|  | Market | EPS (2015) |  | P / E (2015) |  | Enterprise Value | EBITDA | Revenue | $\begin{gathered} \text { EV I } \\ \text { EBITDA } \end{gathered}$ | EV I <br> Revenue |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Capitalization | Basic | Diluted | Basic | Diluted |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTC | \$9,827 | \$8.66 | \$8.61 | 14.9x | 15.0x | \$15,856 | \$1,519 | \$12,280 | 10.4x | 1.3 x |


| Name | Market Cap | Ent. Value | EV / EBITDA | $\underline{P / E}$ (Diluted) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. | \$9,827 | \$15,856 | 10.4x | 15.0x |
| Rona Inc. | \$2,520 | \$3,108 | 13.9x | 43.6x |
| Dollarama Inc. | \$9,792 | \$10,509 | 19.0x | 28.3x |
| Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. | \$34,250 | \$36,805 | 14.1x | 24.3x |
| Hudson's Bay Company | \$2,981 | \$7,088 | 13.5x | 26.9x |
| Leon's Furniture Ltd. | \$1,040 | \$1,437 | 9.0x | 15.0x |
| Non-Grocery Retail Median |  |  | 13.7x | 25.6x |
| Metro Inc. | \$10,088 | \$11,747 | 12.3x | 19.8x |
| Empire Company Limited | \$6,971 | \$9,191 | 7.5x | 20.0x |
| Loblaw Companies Limited | \$27,701 | \$38,732 | 11.2x | 37.9x |
| Grocery Retail Median |  |  | 11.2x | 20.0x |
| Global Canadian Retail Median |  |  | 12.3x | 24.3x |

## DCF Summary

```
DCF Summary - Base Case
Implied Enterprise Value
    CTR $3,848
    FGL $1,573
    Mark's $909
    Petroleum
Implied Retail Enterprise Value
2015 Retail EBITDA
        $913
Implied Retail EV / 2015 EBITDA Multiple 7.4x
Implied Retail Enterprise Value $6,781
Less: Total Retail Debt ($1,430)
Less: Pension Obligations
($141)
Implied Retail Equity Value $5,210
```


## DCF Methodology

1. Forecast revenue by banner (CTR, FGL, Mark's, Petroleum) based on historical results, management targets (CTR 3\%+, FGL 9\%+, Mark's 5\%+; 2 million gross or 1.4 mill net square footage at FGL)
2. Approximate gross margin (not available through company filings) using Statistics Canada industry figures (after being tested for variance using historical data)
3. Assume corporate-level margins and financials (such as SG\&A, Change in NWC, Capex, etc.)
4. Allocate corporate-level assumptions to each retail banner through different bases

- D\&A and Capital Expenditures - FTE Headcount
- Change in NWC - Revenue
- SG\&A - Gross Profit

5. Calculate unlevered free cash flow at each retail banner
6. Calculate WACC using betas (using comparable companies) and Retail division specific capital structure
7. Calculate terminal values for each Retail banner
8. Calculate the present value to arrive at enterprise value for each Retail banner
9. Sum Retail banner enterprise values to arrive at Retail division consolidated enterprise value

## DCF - Gross Margin Assumptions

|  | $\underline{2010}$ | $\underline{2011}$ | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Canadian Tire |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue | \$5,676 | \$5,772 | \$5,800 | \$5,916 | \$6,269 | \$6,352 |
| COGS \% | 70.8\% | 71.1\% | 69.9\% | 69.0\% | 68.5\% | 68.5\% |
| COGS | \$4,016 | \$4,102 | \$4,053 | \$4,083 | \$4,297 | \$4,350 |
| Gross Profit | \$1,660 | \$1,670 | \$1,747 | \$1,832 | \$1,972 | \$2,003 |
| FGL Sports |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue |  | \$646 | \$1,550 | \$1,657 | \$1,906 | \$2,029 |
| COGS \% |  | 65.3\% | 64.2\% | 63.3\% | 62.8\% | 62.7\% |
| COGS |  | \$422 | \$995 | \$1,049 | \$1,197 | \$1,273 |
| Gross Profit |  | \$224 | \$556 | \$608 | \$708 | \$756 |
| Mark's |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue | \$873 | \$980 | \$1,017 | \$1,061 | \$1,122 | \$1,093 |
| COGS \% | 57.2\% | 57.5\% | 56.4\% | 55.5\% | 55.0\% | 55.0\% |
| COGS | \$499 | \$564 | \$573 | \$589 | \$617 | \$600 |
| Gross Profit | \$373 | \$416 | \$444 | \$472 | \$504 | \$492 |
| Petroleum |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue | \$1,643 | \$1,981 | \$2,050 | \$2,075 | \$2,079 | \$1,735 |
| COGS | \$1,504 | \$1,836 | \$1,903 | \$1,925 | \$1,917 | \$1,561 |
| Gross Margin (Reported) | \$139 | \$146 | \$147 | \$150 | \$162 | \$174 |
| Inter-segment | \$13 | \$14 | \$35 | \$17 | \$70 | \$133 |
| Retail Sales | \$8,179 | \$9,364 | \$10,381 | \$10,692 | \$11,305 | \$11,075 |
| COGS | \$6,019 | \$6,923 | \$7,524 | \$7,646 | \$8,028 | \$7,784 |
| Gross Margin (Calculated) | \$2,159 | \$2,441 | \$2,858 | \$3,046 | \$3,277 | \$3,291 |
| Gross Margin (Reported) | \$2,163 | \$2,447 | \$2,835 | \$3,012 | \$3,271 | \$3,328 |
| Variance | (3.2) | (5.8) | 22.4 | 33.8 | 5.6 | (36.5) |
| Variance (\%) | -0.1\% | -0.2\% | 0.8\% | 1.1\% | 0.2\% | -1.1\% |

## DCF Detailed (1 of 5)

2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F Terminal

| Financial Model - Base Case |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Canadian Tire Retail |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INCOME STATEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenue from Stores Opened 2015 and Prior | \$6,551 | \$6,752 | \$6,955 | \$7,137 | \$7,300 | \$7,446 |
| Revenue from New Stores ('16E - '20E) | \$10 | \$33 | \$59 | \$85 | \$112 | \$114 |
| Revenue | \$6,562 | \$6,786 | \$7,014 | \$7,222 | \$7,412 | \$7,561 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(\$ 4,493)$ | $(\$ 4,646)$ | $(\$ 4,803)$ | (\$4,950) | $(\$ 5,085)$ | (\$5,191) |
| Gross Margin | \$2,069 | \$2,139 | \$2,211 | \$2,272 | \$2,328 | \$2,369 |
| Selling, General, and Administrative (excl. D\&A) | $(\$ 1,581)$ | $(\$ 1,638)$ | (\$1,687) | (\$1,711) | $(\$ 1,731)$ | $(\$ 1,743)$ |
| Depreciation and Amortization | (\$203) | (\$250) | (\$273) | (\$287) | (\$297) | (\$318) |
| EBIT | \$284 | \$252 | \$251 | \$274 | \$300 | \$308 |
| Taxes | (\$78) | (\$67) | (\$66) | (\$73) | (\$79) | (\$82) |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$206 | \$185 | \$184 | \$202 | \$220 | \$227 |
| EBITDA | \$487 | \$501 | \$524 | \$562 | \$597 | \$626 |
| FREE CASH FLOW SCHEDULE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$206 | \$185 | \$184 | \$202 | \$220 | \$227 |
| Add: Depreciation and Amortization | \$203 | \$250 | \$273 | \$287 | \$297 | \$318 |
| Less: Capital Expenditures | (\$487) | (\$312) | (\$314) | (\$316) | (\$318) | (\$318) |
| Less: Change in Net Working Capital | \$7 | (\$11) | (\$9) | (\$5) | (\$3) | \$1 |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow | (\$71) | \$112 | \$135 | \$168 | \$197 | \$228 |
| Terminal Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terminal Value |  |  |  |  | \$4,628 |  |
| WACC (Diversified Retail) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Present Value Factor (Mid-Year Convention) | 96.7\% | 90.4\% | 84.6\% | 79.1\% | 74.0\% |  |
| PV of Unlevered Free Cash Flow | (\$69) | \$101 | \$114 | \$133 | \$3,569 |  |
| Implied Enterprise Value |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## DCF Detailed (2 of 5)

2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F Terminal
Financial Model - Base Case
Mark's
INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue from Stores Opened 2015 and Prior
Revenue from New Stores ('16E - $20 E)$

## DCF Detailed (3 of 5)

2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F Terminal

| Financial Model - Base Case |
| :--- |
| FGL |
| INCOME STATEMENT |
| Revenue from Stores Opened 2015 and Prior |
| Revenue from New Stores ('16E - $20 E$ ) |
| Revenue |

## DCF Detailed (4 of 5)

2016F
2017F
2018F
2019F
2020F
Terminal
Financial Model - Base Case
Petroleum

| INCOME STATEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | \$1,740 | \$1,884 | \$1,955 | \$1,990 | \$2,030 | \$2,070 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | (\$1,601) | $(\$ 1,733)$ | $(\$ 1,799)$ | (\$1,831) | $(\$ 1,867)$ | $(\$ 1,905)$ |
| Gross Margin | \$139 | \$151 | \$156 | \$159 | \$162 | \$165 |
| Selling, General, and Administrative (excl. D\&A) | (\$106) | (\$115) | (\$119) | (\$120) | (\$121) | (\$121) |
| Depreciation and Amortization | (\$11) | (\$13) | (\$15) | (\$15) | (\$16) | (\$17) |
| EBIT | \$22 | \$22 | \$23 | \$24 | \$26 | \$26 |
| Taxes | (\$6) | (\$6) | (\$6) | (\$6) | (\$7) | (\$7) |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$16 | \$16 | \$17 | \$18 | \$19 | \$19 |
| EBITDA | \$33 | \$35 | \$37 | \$39 | \$42 | \$44 |
| FREE CASH FLOW SCHEDULE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$16 | \$16 | \$17 | \$18 | \$19 | \$19 |
| Add: Depreciation and Amortization | \$11 | \$13 | \$15 | \$15 | \$16 | \$17 |
| Less: Capital Expenditures | (\$17) | (\$17) | (\$17) | (\$17) | (\$17) | (\$17) |
| Less: Change in Net Working Capital | \$2 | (\$3) | (\$2) | (\$1) | (\$1) | \$0 |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow | \$11 | \$10 | \$12 | \$15 | \$17 | \$20 |
| Terminal Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terminal Value |  |  |  |  | \$511 |  |
| WACC (Fuel and Convenience) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Present Value Factor (Mid-Year Convention) | 97.2\% | 91.8\% | 86.7\% | 81.9\% | 77.4\% |  |
| PV of Unlevered Free Cash Flow | \$11 | \$9 | \$10 | \$12 | \$409 |  |
| Implied Enterprise Value |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## DCF Detailed (5 of 5)

2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F Terminal

Financial Model - Base Case
Consolidated (Retail Division)

| INCOME STATEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue from Stores Opened 2015 and Prior | \$11,525 | \$12,002 | \$12,433 | \$12,772 | \$13,071 | \$13,332 |
| Revenue from New Stores ('16E - '20E) | \$31 | \$102 | \$180 | \$258 | \$331 | \$337 |
| Total Revenue | \$11,556 | \$12,104 | \$12,613 | \$13,030 | \$13,401 | \$13,669 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(\$ 8,054)$ | $(\$ 8,454)$ | $(\$ 8,810)$ | $(\$ 9,099)$ | (\$9,359) | (\$9,554) |
| Gross Margin | \$3,503 | \$3,649 | \$3,803 | \$3,931 | \$4,042 | \$4,116 |
| Selling, General, and Administrative (excl. D\&A) | $(\$ 2,677)$ | (\$2,794) | (\$2,901) | (\$2,960) | $(\$ 3,006)$ | (\$3,028) |
| Depreciation and Amortization | (\$399) | (\$490) | (\$537) | (\$564) | (\$583) | (\$624) |
| EBIT | \$426 | \$365 | \$365 | \$408 | \$454 | \$464 |
| Taxes | (\$117) | (\$97) | (\$97) | (\$108) | (\$120) | (\$123) |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$309 | \$269 | \$268 | \$300 | \$333 | \$341 |
| EBITDA | \$825 | \$855 | \$902 | \$972 | \$1,036 | \$1,088 |
| NET WORKING CAPITAL SCHEDULE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade and Other Receivables | \$950 | \$991 | \$1,028 | \$1,057 | \$1,082 | \$1,099 |
| Inventory | \$1,810 | \$1,874 | \$1,927 | \$1,963 | \$1,992 | \$2,006 |
| Prepaid Expenses | \$70 | \$73 | \$76 | \$79 | \$81 | \$83 |
| Trade and Other Payables | (\$2,023) | $(\$ 2,112)$ | $(\$ 2,189)$ | $(\$ 2,249)$ | $(\$ 2,300)$ | $(\$ 2,336)$ |
| Net Working Capital | \$807 | \$826 | \$842 | \$851 | \$855 | \$853 |
| FREE CASH FLOW SCHEDULE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unlevered Net Income | \$309 | \$269 | \$268 | \$300 | \$333 | \$341 |
| Add: Depreciation and Amortization | \$399 | \$490 | \$537 | \$564 | \$583 | \$624 |
| Less: Capital Expenditures | (\$800) | (\$613) | (\$617) | (\$621) | (\$624) | (\$624) |
| Less: Change in Net Working Capital | \$12 | (\$19) | (\$16) | (\$9) | (\$5) | \$3 |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow | (\$80) | \$127 | \$172 | \$234 | \$287 | \$343 |

## DCF Detailed (Common Size and Analysis)

COMMON SIZE INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue from Stores Opened 2015 and Prior
Revenue from New Stores ('16E - '20E)
Total Revenue
Cost of Goods Sold
Gross Margin
Selling, General, and Administrative (excl. D\&A)
Depreciation and Amortization

| $99.7 \%$ | $99.2 \%$ | $98.6 \%$ | $98.0 \%$ | $97.5 \%$ | $97.5 \%$ |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $0.3 \%$ | $0.8 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ |
| $(69.7 \%)$ | $(69.8 \%)$ | $(69.9 \%)$ | $(69.8 \%)$ | $(69.8 \%)$ | $(69.9 \%)$ |
| $\mathbf{3 0 . 3} \%$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 2 \%}$ | $30.1 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 2 \%}$ | $30.2 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 1 \%}$ |
| $(23.2 \%)$ | $(23.1 \%)$ | $(23.0 \%)$ | $(22.7 \%)$ | $(22.4 \%)$ | $(22.2 \%)$ |
| $(3.5 \%)$ | $(4.0 \%)$ | $(4.3 \%)$ | $(4.3 \%)$ | $(4.3 \%)$ | $(4.6 \%)$ |
| $\mathbf{3 . 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 0} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 . 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 1 \%}$ | $3.4 \%$ | $3.4 \%$ |
| $(1.0 \%)$ | $(0.8 \%)$ | $(0.8 \%)$ | $(0.8 \%)$ | $(0.9 \%)$ | $(0.9 \%)$ |
| $\mathbf{2 . 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 3} \%$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 5 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{7 . 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 0 \%}$ |


|  | 2015A | 2016F | 2017F | 2018F | 2019F | 2020F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Financial Analysis \| Retail Division (Base Case) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gross Margin | $30.0 \%$ | $30.3 \%$ | $30.2 \%$ | $30.1 \%$ | $30.2 \%$ | $30.2 \%$ |
| EBITDA Margin | $8.2 \%$ | $7.1 \%$ | $7.1 \%$ | $7.1 \%$ | $7.5 \%$ | $7.7 \%$ |
| Trade and Other Receivables (\% of Sales) | $8.3 \%$ | $8.2 \%$ | $8.2 \%$ | $8.2 \%$ | $8.1 \%$ | $8.1 \%$ |
| Trade Receivables Turnover | 12.3 | 12.4 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| Trade Receivables Days | 30 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
| Inventory (\% of COGS) | $22.8 \%$ | $22.5 \%$ | $22.2 \%$ | $21.9 \%$ | $21.6 \%$ | $21.3 \%$ |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| Inventory Days | 80 | 81 | 80 | 79 | 78 | 77 |
| Trade and Other Payables (\% of COGS) | $25.3 \%$ | $25.1 \%$ | $25.0 \%$ | $24.9 \%$ | $24.7 \%$ | $24.6 \%$ |
| Trade Payables Turnover | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Trade Payables Days | 92 | 90 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle | 17 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 18 |

## Real GDP (by Geography; Over Time)



Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 384-0038)

Real GDP by Geo. (2004)


Real GDP by Geo. (2014)

QC, 19\%

## Real GDP (by Industry, Q3'15)



## Trans-Pacific Partnership Implications

- The elimination of a wide range of tariffs should lead to more choice and lower prices for consumer goods.
- While the Canadian market is already largely open to global imports, including those from TPP markets, under the TPP Agreement, Canada will eliminate all tariffs on industrial goods.
- In addition, the TPP provides for clear rules of origin and origin procedures that reflect Canadian production realities and methods, and minimize administrative burden. The TPP also reflects and supports the integration of Canadian businesses into North American supply chains.
- New workers' rights, including rules on child labour, forced labour and discrimination.


## Canadian Retail Industry Sales Breakdown

| Retail Subsector Sales (C\$ millions) | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 5Y CAGR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gasoline Stations | \$42.1 | \$48.9 | \$57.8 | \$59.3 | \$61.4 | \$64.3 | 8.8\% |
| Motor Vehicle Dealers | \$82.4 | \$89.1 | \$93.1 | \$98.2 | \$104.3 | \$111.9 | 6.3\% |
| Automotive Parts, Accessories and Tire Stores | \$6.1 | \$6.4 | \$7.0 | \$7.0 | \$7.5 | \$7.8 | 5.3\% |
| General Merchandise | \$51.6 | \$53.9 | \$56.0 | \$58.0 | \$60.0 | \$63.7 | 4.3\% |
| Clothing and Clothing Accessories | \$23.2 | \$24.8 | \$25.8 | \$26.4 | \$27.2 | \$28.1 | 3.9\% |
| Health and Personal Care | \$30.6 | \$32.2 | \$33.0 | \$33.5 | \$35.0 | \$36.2 | 3.4\% |
| Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book and Music Stores | \$10.2 | \$10.4 | \$10.6 | \$10.7 | \$10.8 | \$11.5 | 2.3\% |
| Furniture and Home Furnishings | \$14.5 | \$15.0 | \$15.0 | \$15.2 | \$15.3 | \$15.9 | 1.9\% |
| Food and Beverage | \$101.7 | \$104.2 | \$104.9 | \$106.7 | \$107.7 | \$110.8 | 1.7\% |
| Building Material, Garden Equipm't, \& Supplies Dealers | \$27.4 | \$27.6 | \$26.9 | \$27.0 | \$27.5 | \$28.3 | 0.7\% |
| Miscellaneous | \$11.3 | \$10.9 | \$10.9 | \$11.1 | \$11.6 | \$11.6 | 0.5\% |
| Electronics and Appliance Stores | \$14.7 | \$15.4 | \$15.9 | \$15.1 | \$14.7 | \$14.8 | 0.2\% |
| Retail Sales | \$415.7 | \$439.0 | \$456.7 | \$468.1 | \$483.0 | \$505.0 | 4.0\% |

## Economic Indicators (1 of 2)



Population growth rate among highest of G8 countries Unemployment rate among the least volatile of G8 countries

## Economic Indicators (2 of 2)

Net Household Disposable Income Growth


New Housing Starts


Net HDI growth among highest of G8 countries
Stable levels of new housing starts forecasted for next 3 years

## Housing Starts and Retail Subsectors' Sales Relationships


-—Building Material, Garden Equipm't, \& Supplies Dealers Sales

$\simeq$ Housing Starts $\simeq$ General Merchandise Sales

$\simeq$ Housing Starts $\simeq$ Furniture and Home Furnishings Sales

Employment Rate, Household Disposable Income, and Retail Sales


Note: Employment rate is defined as (1 - Unemployment Rate). Source: Statistics Canada (CANSIMs 380-0072, 282-0087, 080-0020)

## Unemployment Statistics (by Geography)

## Unemployment Rate by Geography, Monthly


——Atlantic Can. -West Can. (excl. AB) - AB-QC-ON - - Canada
Unemployment Rate, Monthly (Alberta versus Canada)


## Unemployment Statistics (by Industry, 2015)



## Unemployment Statistics (O\&G Focus; Over Time)



## Population Growth Rate



## Inflation (Historical Data \& Forecasts)



## C\$ to US\$ (Historical Data \& Forecasts)



Source: Scotiabank Foreign Exchange Outlook (Feb. 2016), BMO Canadian Economic Outlook (Feb. 2016), CIBC Monthly FX Outlook (Jan. 2016), RBC Financial Market Forecasts (Feb. 2016), TD Dollars \& Sense (Feb. 2016), Bank of Canada 10-Year Currency Converter

## WTI Price (Historical Data \& Forecasts)

## WTI Price versus USD / CAD



WTI forecasts show the Median forecasts of the default Bloomberg contributor composite.
Source: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg Financial Markets

## S\&P TSX - CAD:USD Correlation



## WTI - S\&P TSX Correlation



## WTI - CAD:USD Correlation



## CTC.A - WTI Correlation



## CTC.A - CAD:USD Correlation



## S\&P TSX - CTC.A Correlation



## 1Y Market Forecast by WTI Regression

| 1Y Market Forecast |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Current WTI Price (as at April 5, 2016) | 36.86 |  |
| 1 Y Target WTI Price (EIA Estimate) | 45.00 |  |
| Implied Return | 22.1\% |  |
| Current TSX Price (as at April 5, 2016 close) | 13,305 | Correl |
| WTI-TSX Beta (1Y Daily) | 0.19 | 0.56 |
| 1Y Target TSX | 13,849 |  |
| Implied Return | 4.1\% |  |
| Current CTC.A (as at April 5, 2016 close) | 134.47 | Correl |
| CTC.A-TSX Beta (1Y Daily) | 0.72 | 0.50 |
| 1 Y Target CTC.A | 138.45 |  |
| Implied Return | 3.0\% |  |

## Associate Dealer Agreement

- Provided a framework for new cooperation between Canadian Tire Corporation, and the Associate Dealers and is unique in the retail industry.
- In CTR's "pull" system, the Associate dealers determine what they want in the store, and corporate does its best to meet the dealers 'requirements, versus in a push system where corporate makes the decisions and pushes inventory into the system.
- The primary benefit of a pull system is that it allows each Dealer to leverage local knowledge and expertise in determining preferred inventory. The offset is that a pull system is inherently inefficient (relative to a push system).


## Dealer Responsibilities

- Each Dealer owns the fixtures, equipment and inventory of, and is responsible for the store staff and operating expenses for, the Canadian Tire store he or she operates.
- Each Dealer agrees to comply with the policies, marketing plans and operating standards prescribed by Canadian Tire, including purchasing merchandise primarily from Canadian Tire and offering merchandise for sale at prices not exceeding those set by Canadian Tire.


## CTR Responsibilities

- Support Associate Dealers with marketing, supply chain management, purchasing, administrative, financial and information services.
- Except in limited circumstances, the premises on which the CTR stores are located are owned or leased by CTC and licensed to individual Associate Dealers.
- Individual Dealer contracts are all in a standard form, each of which generally expires on December 31, 2024.


## Associate Dealer Agreement Benefits

- The ADA is appropriate for Canadian Tire Retail and its strategic corporate objectives. We believe that local store ownership provides for more dynamic and predictive inventory/merchandise stocking. The ADA assists in driving sales volume and efficiency, at a store-specific level. CT Retail has competitively high sales per square foot levels, compared to their retail peers.


## Sales per Square Feet: CTC versus Canadian Retail Subsector Averages



Sales per Square Feet: CTC versus Canadian Retail Subsector Averages


[^9]
## Push vs. Pull Dealer/Franchise Systems

" Canadian Tire operates with a "pull" system of product distribution

## Push Systems

- The product is forced upon the retailer to sell in their respective stores. Corporation makes decision as to what mix of products will be sold.
- Idea is to centralize product mix and unify all store offerings, following broader market trends
- Top-down product placement and product mix diversification
- Can be used to market new, trendy products to potential consumers
- Short-term strategy to target new customers and markets
- Considered relatively antiquated in modern retail industry


## Pull Systems

- Products are requested by dealers based on bottom-up approach and projections.
- Idea is to leverage local dealer's expertise and insight into market dynamics and trends
- Marketing and advertising are generally used to generate attention towards the brand as a whole - Canadian Tire-centric advertising
- Create customer loyalty via a more robust dynamic between supplier and consumer demands
- Rise of e-retail means advertising must be company-wide, which is best performed at a corporate level


## Loyalty Program (Comparison)

|  | CTR | WMT Canada | Loblaw (PC Plus) | Cineplex (Scene w/ Scotiabank) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Method | Credit Card Mobile App. Points Card | Credit Card | Credit Card <br> Debit Card <br> Mobile App <br> Points Card | Credit Card <br> Debit Card <br> Points Card |
| \% Return | CTR: 0.4\% <br> 10x Reward Points at CTC Family of Brands | WMT: 1.25\% <br> Other Purchases: 1\% | Credit at PC stores: 2-3\% <br> Credit Elsewhere: <br> 1\% <br> Debit \& Points Card: $0.5 \%$ | Credit: <br> 1\% <br> Debit: <br> 0.2\% |
| Redemption Values | Redemption via online store for varying values | Redeem in \$5 increments | $\begin{gathered} \text { Redeem in } \$ 10 \\ \text { increments } \\ (10,000 \text { points for } \$ 10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Regular Movie: 1,000 } \\ \text { 3D \& Equiv.: 1,500 } \\ \text { Premium: 2,000 } \end{gathered}$ |

## Canadian Retail Landscape



## Canadian Retail Competitive Landscape (Quantative)




## Canadian Retail Competitive Landscape (Qualitative, 1 of 2)

metro ©Loblaws

Grocery

General Merchandise

A) Troinne

Home
Improvement

## Canadian Retail Competitive Landscape (Qualitative, 2 of 2)



Affordable I
Recreational Sporting
Equipment


Competitive
I Niche
Sporting
Equipment

## Canadian Retail Market Concentration

| Retail Sub-Sectors | Market Concentration Ratios | Top Four Retailers in each sub-sector |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Furniture and Home Furnishing | 35\% | 1. Sears <br> 2. The Brick <br> 3. IKEA <br> 4. Leon's |
| Home Improvement | 75\% | 1. Rona <br> 2. Home Depot <br> 3. Home Hardware <br> 4. Tim-Br Marts |
| Clothing and Accessory | 19\% | 1. TJX Companies <br> 2. Reitman Group <br> 3. Canadian Tire <br> 4. Gap |
| Hobby Store | 35\% | 1. Canadian Tire <br> 2. Indigo Books <br> 3. Toys 'R' Us <br> 4. Golf Town |
| General Merchandise | 86\% | 1. Wal-Mart <br> 2. Costco <br> 3. Canadian Tire <br> 4. NRDC (PE Firm) |

## Omnichannel Retailing - Online Shopping Comparison



## Omnichannel Retailing - Online Shopping Comparison

| Clean <br> Interface | In-Store <br> Pickup | Home <br> Delivery | Stocking <br> Information | Free <br> Shipping |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Computer, |
| :---: |
| Tablet, Mobile |
| Capability |

CAMADIAR TIRE

Walmart凉

(2) \$2

## Canadian E-Commerce (1 of 2)

E-commerce sales by retailers reached $\$ 7.7$ billion in 2012, up from $\$ 6.6$ billion in 2011.
Retail e-commerce sales ( $+16.3 \%$ ) grew at over five times the pace of the overall growth in retail trade ( $+2.9 \%$ ).
Retail e-commerce sales accounted for 1.5\% of total retail sales in 2012.
E-Commerce as a Share of Total Retail (2012)


E-Commerce Sales by Store Type (2012)


## Canadian E-Commerce (2 of 2)

E-Commerce as a \% of Total Retail Sales in Canada


## Website Analytics



## Canadian Tire Corporation National Branding Campaign



[^10]
## Canadian Tire Corporation National Branding Campaign (cont'd)



[^11]
## Canadian Market Penetration Analysis

## 90\% of Canada's population fall within a 15 minute driving distance of a CTR store

## Competitor Analysis Results

|  | 15-min $\%$ | \# Stores* |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| CTR | $89 \%$ | 495 |
| RONA | $84 \%$ | $484^{* *}$ |
| Walmart | $75 \%$ | 395 |
| Home Depot | $56 \%$ | 180 |
| Lowe's | $15 \%$ | 42 |

## Analysis Process

Sources of Data:

- Web scraping for postal code data of all stores for all competitors
- 2011 Canadian census data on population by postal code

Based on a sample of 50 random postal codes, we found that the postal code area defined by the:

- First 2 alphanumerical symbols covers a $\sim 30$ minute driving diameter
- First 3 alphanumerical symbols covers a $\sim 10$ minute driving diameter

| \# Stores in 2-digit <br> Postal Code | Population within Postal <br> Code Included |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | None | Rationale |

[^12]
## Consolidated RONA-Lowe's Footprint

- Using the analysis from the preceding slide, we compared CTR's footprint to the consolidated store-count of RONA and Lowe's in the case the acquisition completes
- Total Stores in Canada:
- RONA Stores - 484
- Lowe's Stores - 42
- Combined Stores - 526
- Notably, the number of RONA stores is exclusive of 2 non-identifiable locations and 23 non-flagship RONA banners, including Dick's Lumber, Marcil's, Contractor First, and TruServ
- These stores are not directly comparable to CTR, since they are specialty stores

|  | 15-min $\%$ | \# Stores* |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| CTR | $89 \%$ | 495 |
| Lowe's + RONA | $88 \%$ | 526 |



[^13]
## CTR Store Network Format

## 385

Smart store format (late 2008) Average retail square footage: 48,000

Next store concept renewal, building off the Concept 20/20 store with a focus on growth and improving productivity through inspiring layouts, refreshed assortments and more environmentally responsible options. Stores range in size from 19,000 to 89,000 square feet. There are currently 103 Smart stores in the network, the first of which opened in November 2008.

25

Small Market store format (mid-2008) Average retail square footage: 16,000

Smaller format launched in July 2008, ranging in size from 14,000 to 19,000 square feet. Small Market stores meet the needs of underserved rural markets and include customized product selection to serve a particular region, easy-tonavigate signage and walkways, prominent heritage departments (e.g.: hockey) and generously sized outdoor areas that "expand" the store in peak periods.
There are currently
12 Small Market stores in the network.

Updated and Expanded store format (1994 to mid-2008) Average retail square footage: 43,000

A combination of our newer format stores, including "Concept 20/20", "Class-of" and "Next Generation" stores. These stores, previously referred to as "standard stores", range in size from 16,000 to 86,000 square feet, and most were opened or converted to these formats between 1994 and mid-2008.
"Updated and expanded" format stores make up approximately 69 per cent of the retail square footage in the CTR network (excluding PartSource).

## 91

PartSource stores (2009 and prior)
Average retail and warehouse square footage: 7,200. Hub stores: 15,000

PartSource is an automotive parts specialty store designed to meet the needs of major purchasers of auto parts, professional automotive installers and serious do-it-yourselfers. Stores carry a tailored product assortment based on local vehicle needs and are easily recognizable with the checkerboard flooring design. Beginning in 2007, new larger warehouse locations (hub stores) were opened to help bring more parts inventory closer to customers at both CTR and PartSource stores.

## CTR Locations by Region (cont'd)



Map based on Longitude (generated) and Latitude (generated). Details are shown for Postal Code 2.

## Store Locations



## Retail Precedent Transaction Screen

- Capital IQ was used to run a screen for transactions to sense-check the valuation of CTR
- The following criteria was used:
- Industry Classifications (Target / Issuer) - Multiline Retail OR Home Improvement Retail
- M\&A Announced Date - January 1, 2011 to February 6, 2016
- Geographic Locations (Target / Issuer) - U.S. OR Canada
- This screen resulted in 178 transactions, further simplifying:
- Of the 178 transactions, unknown transaction values or transaction values too small ( $>\$ 300 \mathrm{M}$, borderline for small-cap equities) were removed resulting in 13 transactions
- Of the 13 transactions, only announced and closed ones were included, resulting in 9 transactions
- Of the 9 transactions, 4 were dollar stores and 3 were fashion-focused retailers, resulting in 2 transactions
- Discussion of 2 remaining transactions:
- Target's acquisition of Zellers in 2011
- Excluded on the basis that Zellers was distressed, in poor retail locations, and the transaction is outdated
- Lowe's acquisition of RONA in 2016
- Include because both Lowe's and RONA are listed as core competitors for CTC


## Precedent Transaction - Lowe's <> RONA

- Notably, RONA was acquired at a high premium; this analysis is as a sense-check for our valuation, and to further justify our analysis and recommendation supporting a strong, fundamental foundation

| Transaction Details |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Total Transaction Value | 3,200.0 |
| Date Announced | Feb 3, 2016 |
| \% Sought | 100.0\% |
| Valuation Summary |  |
| Retail LTM Revenue | 11,359 |
| Transaction Implied TEV / LTM Revenue | 0.8x |
| Implied Retail Enterprise Value | 8,717.4 |
| Retail LTM EBITDA | 889.3 |
| Transaction Implied TEV / LTM EBITDA | 12.7x |
| Implied Retail Enterprise Value | 11,309.1 |
| Selected Enterprise Value for Retail | 10,013.2 |

## Source: Company Filings

Note: Calculated based on LTM Q3 2015 data for RONA and CTR for apples-to-apples comparison; 2015 FY Revenue for CTC Retail was $\$ 11.0 \mathrm{M}$. No data specifically was available for EBITDA for CTR, so entire Retail segment was used as an approximation.

## Recently Announced Acquisition

## O\&G Industry

## USD / CAD

## Lowe's / RONA Acquisition

## Transaction Rationale

Provide Lowe's entry into Quebec, where RONA is headquartered and has major operations
Expand customer reach and serve a new portion of the market through Lowe's expertise and private label capabilities (3) At an opportune time for Lowe's, given (i) relative strength of USD,
and (ii) RONA's weakening financials and depressed share price and (ii) RONA's weakening financials and depressed share price

## RONA: Share Price History



## CTC Debt Covenants

- The Company monitors its capital structure through measuring debt-to-capitalization, debt-to-earnings ratios, and its interest and other fixed charge coverage ratios.
- Key financial covenants under existing debt agreements for Canadian Tire Corporation are as follows:
- "A requirement to maintain, at all times, a specified minimum ratio of consolidated net tangible assets to the outstanding principal amount of all consolidated funded obligations (as defined in the respective debt agreements, which exclude CTB deposits and the assets and liabilities of GCCT and Franchise Trust)"
- "A limit on the amount available for distribution to shareholders whereby the Company is restricted from distributions (including dividends and redemptions or purchases of shares) exceeding, among other things, its accumulated net income over a defined period."
- The Company is required to comply with regulatory requirements for capital associated with the operations of CTB, and other regulatory requirements that have an impact on its business operations and certain financial covenants established under its unsecured revolving credit facility.
- CTB manages its capital under guidelines established by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada ("OSFI").
- The Bank's objectives include:
- Providing sufficient capital to maintain the confidence of investors and depositors.
- Being an appropriately capitalized institution, as measured internally, defined by regulatory authorities and compared with the Bank's peers.


## Price Basket Analysis (CTR; 1 of 3)

Bar Stool Item
Stanley 16oz Hammer
CIL Eggshell Paint
21" Gas Powered Lawn Mower
LED Lightbulb
Duct Tape
Door Knob
Propane Barbecue
1.1 cu ft Microwave
Two Handle Moen Kitchen Faucet
52 " 5 blade Ceiling fan
5 Shelf Bookshelf
Dyson DC66 Upright Vacuum Cleaner
Mens Steel Toe Work Boots
24" Snow Shovel
5L Engine Oil
16 ft Outdoor Extension Cord
20V Leaf Blower
Table Lamp
Black and Decker 20V Cordless Drill

| CTR | WMT | RONA | LOW | HD | AMZN |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\$ 34.99$ | $\$ 34.99$ | $\$ 30.99$ | $\$ 49.00$ | $\$ 59.00$ | $\$ 35.99$ |
| $\$ 29.99$ | $\$ 27.48$ | $\$ 21.99$ | $\$ 27.99$ | $\$ 34.98$ | $\$ 22.79$ |
| $\$ 25.99$ | $\$ 28.97$ | $\$ 31.99$ | $\$ 26.99$ | $\$ 36.97$ | $\$ 27.82$ |
| $\$ 249.99$ | $\$ 196.00$ | $\$ 249.00$ | $\$ 369.00$ | $\$ 249.00$ | $\$ 248.63$ |
| $\$ 14.99$ | $\$ 9.96$ | $\$ 12.95$ | $\$ 10.99$ | $\$ 7.65$ | $\$ 5.99$ |
| $\$ 6.89$ | $\$ 8.17$ | $\$ 6.80$ | $\$ 6.99$ | $\$ 11.47$ | $\$ 9.99$ |
| $\$ 37.99$ | $\$ 29.98$ | $\$ 38.99$ | $\$ 23.99$ | $\$ 29.97$ | $\$ 18.10$ |
| $\$ 139.99$ | $\$ 278.00$ | $\$ 319.00$ | $\$ 249.00$ | $\$ 269.00$ | $\$ 257.45$ |
| $\$ 129.99$ | $\$ 117.00$ | $\$ 106.00$ | $\$ 249.00$ | $\$ 258.00$ | $\$ 125.36$ |
| $\$ 129.00$ | $\$ 76.97$ | $\$ 114.00$ | $\$ 119.20$ | $\$ 119.00$ | $\$ 294.74$ |
| $\$ 239.00$ | $\$ 299.00$ | $\$ 280.00$ | $\$ 291.00$ | $\$ 299.00$ | $\$ 150.00$ |
| $\$ 119.00$ | $\$ 177.00$ | $\$ 109.00$ | $\$ 232.00$ | $\$ 195.00$ | $\$ 73.98$ |
| $\$ 499.00$ | $\$ 599.00$ | $\$ 538.80$ | $\$ 499.00$ | $\$ 498.00$ | $\$ 599.00$ |
| $\$ 149.00$ | $\$ 119.00$ | $\$ 129.00$ | $\$ 139.00$ | $\$ 94.97$ | $\$ 136.76$ |
| $\$ 31.99$ | $\$ 25.00$ | $\$ 29.99$ | $\$ 34.99$ | $\$ 33.98$ | $\$ 34.99$ |
| $\$ 29.99$ | $\$ 27.97$ | $\$ 31.99$ | $\$ 31.61$ | $\$ 27.98$ | $\$ 40.11$ |
| $\$ 19.99$ | $\$ 13.98$ | $\$ 18.59$ | $\$ 15.49$ | $\$ 16.97$ | $\$ 17.10$ |
| $\$ 99.00$ | $\$ 69.96$ | $\$ 136.00$ | $\$ 139.00$ | $\$ 137.00$ | $\$ 137.00$ |
| $\$ 39.99$ | $\$ 22.98$ | $\$ 31.99$ | $\$ 63.74$ | $\$ 69.98$ | $\$ 16.79$ |
| $\$ 89.99$ | $\$ 68.00$ | $\$ 79.99$ | $\$ 87.99$ | $\$ 87.88$ | $\$ 44.99$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\$ 2,116.76$ | $\$ 2,229.41$ | $\$ 2,317.06$ | $\$ 2,665.97$ | $\$ 2,535.80$ | $\$ 2,297.58$ |

## Price Basket Analysis (CTR; 2 of 3)

| Normalized Price | CTR | WMT | RONA | LOW | HD | AMZN |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Bar Stool | 0.857 | 0.857 | 0.759 | 1.200 | 1.445 | 0.882 |
| Stanley 16oz Hammer | 1.089 | 0.998 | 0.799 | 1.016 | 1.270 | 0.828 |
| CIL Eggshell Paint | 0.872 | 0.973 | 1.074 | 0.906 | 1.241 | 0.934 |
| 21" Gas Powered Lawn Mower | 0.961 | 0.753 | 0.957 | 1.418 | 0.957 | 0.955 |
| LED Lightbulb | 1.438 | 0.956 | 1.243 | 1.055 | 0.734 | 0.575 |
| Duct Tape | 0.822 | 0.974 | 0.811 | 0.834 | 1.368 | 1.191 |
| Door Knob | 1.273 | 1.005 | 1.307 | 0.804 | 1.004 | 0.607 |
| Propane Barbecue | 0.555 | 1.103 | 1.266 | 0.988 | 1.067 | 1.021 |
| 1.1 cu ft Microwave | 0.792 | 0.712 | 0.645 | 1.516 | 1.571 | 0.763 |
| Two Handle Moen Kitchen Faucet | 0.907 | 0.541 | 0.802 | 0.839 | 0.837 | 2.073 |
| 52" 5 blade Ceiling fan | 0.920 | 1.151 | 1.078 | 1.121 | 1.151 | 0.578 |
| 5 Shelf Bookshelf | 0.788 | 1.172 | 0.722 | 1.536 | 1.291 | 0.490 |
| Dyson DC66 Upright Vacuum Cleaner | 0.926 | 1.112 | 1.000 | 0.926 | 0.924 | 1.112 |
| Mens Steel Toe Work Boots | 1.164 | 0.930 | 1.008 | 1.086 | 0.742 | 1.069 |
| 24" Snow Shovel | 1.005 | 0.786 | 0.942 | 1.100 | 1.068 | 1.100 |
| 5L Engine Oil | 0.949 | 0.885 | 1.012 | 1.000 | 0.885 | 1.269 |
| 16 ft Outdoor Extension Cord | 1.175 | 0.821 | 1.092 | 0.910 | 0.997 | 1.005 |
| 20V Leaf Blower | 0.827 | 0.585 | 1.137 | 1.162 | 1.145 | 1.145 |
| Table Lamp | 0.977 | 0.562 | 0.782 | 1.558 | 1.711 | 0.410 |
| Black and Decker 20V Cordless Drill | 1.177 | 0.889 | 1.046 | 1.151 | 1.149 | 0.588 |
| Average Normalized Price |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Price Basket Analysis (CTR; 3 of 3)

| Selection | CTR | WMT | RONA | LOW | HD | AMZN |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bar Stool | 22 | 178 | 12 | 363 | 172 | 3112 |
| Stanley 16oz Hammer | 36 | 5 | 33 | 96 | 43 | 5707 |
| CIL Eggshell Paint | 51 | 55 | 358 | 39 | 318 | 1572 |
| 21" Gas Powered Lawn Mower | 11 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 62 | 46 |
| LED Lightbulb | 68 | 83 | 90 | 67 | 216 | 144998 |
| Duct Tape | 18 | 37 | 20 | 27 | 47 | 842 |
| Door Knob | 159 | 52 | 424 | 417 | 1034 | 8196 |
| Propane Barbecue | 27 | 14 | 20 | 67 | 62 | 89 |
| 1.1 cu ft Microwave | 19 | 84 | 1 | 66 | 63 | 389 |
| Two Handle Moen Kitchen Faucet | 66 | 14 | 137 | 456 | 797 | 10769 |
| 52" 5 blade Ceiling fan | 38 | 28 | 46 | 218 | 104 | 578 |
| 5 Shelf Bookshelf | 30 | 37 | 35 | 52 | 115 | 3355 |
| Dyson DC66 Upright Vacuum Cleaner | 53 | 26 | 0 | 17 | 107 | 354 |
| Mens Steel Toe Work Boots | 22 | 19 | 43 | 8 | 88 | 413 |
| 24" Snow Shovel | 37 | 1 | 17 | 51 | 11 | 212 |
| 5L Engine Oil | 191 | 117 | 36 | 0 | 79 | 2595 |
| 16 ft Outdoor Extension Cord | 126 | 64 | 172 | 89 | 53 | 1400 |
| 20V Leaf Blower | 6 | 2 | 10 | 23 | 28 | 52 |
| Table Lamp | 53 | 75 | 57 | 901 | 241 | 12817 |
| Black and Decker 20V Cordless Drill | 90 | 20 | 40 | 127 | 130 | 6031 |

## Sport Chek Profile

- Sport Chek stands as Canada's largest sporting apparel and equipment retailer
- The company boasts over 163 stores across Canada, and is the primary driver behind the growth of FGL Sports
- Value proposition
- Widest selection of sporting apparel and equipment
- High levels of customer service
- State-of-the-art technology
- Competitive price point with price match guarantee
- Strong geographic reach


## Product Offering



[^14]
## FGL Store Breakdown

| Corporate-Owned Retail Banners |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Province or Territory* | Sport Chek | Atmosphere | Pro Hockey Life | National Sports |  |  |
| British Columbia | 32 | 9 | - | - |  |  |
| Alberta | 32 | 9 | 4 | - |  |  |
| Saskatchewan | 10 | 1 | - | - |  |  |
| Manitoba | 8 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
| Ontario | 86 | 5 | 8 | 18 |  |  |
| New Brunswick | 4 | - | - | - |  |  |
| Nova Scotia | 10 | - | 1 | - |  |  |
| Prince Edward Island | 2 | - | - | - |  |  |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | 5 | - | - | - |  |  |
| Total | 189 | 25 | 14 | 18 |  |  |
| * There are no FGL Sports stores in the territories |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Franchise Retail Banners |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Province or Territory* | Sports Experts | Intersport | Atmosphere | Hockey Experts | S3 | Sports Rousseau |
| British Columbia | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Alberta | 2 | 5 | - | - | 1 | - |
| Ontario | 5 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| Quebec | 63 | 33 | 40 | 15 | 7 | 9 |
| New Brunswick | 1 | 3 | - | - | - | - |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | - | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Yukon | 1 |  | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 73 | 44 | 41 | 15 | 8 | 9 |

* There are no franchise locations in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, PEI, NWT, and Nunavut


## Price Basket Analysis (FGL; 1 of 2)

| Item | Sport Chek | Nike | Under Armor | Walmart | Sporting Life | Amazon |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Men's Running Shoes | \$74.97 | \$85.00 | \$89.00 | \$29.94 | \$74.99 | \$64.96 |
| Womens Hoodie | \$64.99 | \$80.00 | \$64.99 | \$16.97 | \$112.50 | \$112.00 |
| Mens Socks | \$13.99 | \$18.00 | \$19.99 | \$7.00 | \$16.00 | \$11.99 |
| Polarized Sport Sunglasses | \$159.99 |  | \$174.99 | \$59.99 | \$124.99 | \$126.00 |
| Regular Size Football | \$15.99 |  |  | \$19.97 |  | \$23.99 |
| Hockey Stick | \$199.00 |  |  | \$31.98 |  | \$49.99 |
| Mouth Guard | \$19.99 |  | \$15.99 | \$16.97 |  | \$9.95 |
| Yoga Mat | \$18.99 |  |  | \$19.97 | \$34.99 | \$21.27 |
| Price of Basket | \$567.91 | \$183.00 | \$364.96 | \$202.79 | \$363.47 | \$420.15 |
| Item | Sport Chek | Nike | Under Armor | Walmart | Sporting Life | Amazon |
| Men's Running Shoes | 1.074 | 1.218 | 1.275 | 0.429 | 1.074 | 0.931 |
| Womens Hoodie | 0.864 | 1.063 | 0.864 | 0.226 | 1.495 | 1.489 |
| Mens Socks | 0.965 | 1.242 | 1.379 | 0.483 | 1.104 | 0.827 |
| Polarized Sport Sunglasses | 1.238 | - | 1.354 | 0.464 | 0.967 | 0.975 |
| Regular Size Football | 0.800 | - | - | 0.999 | - | 1.201 |
| Hockey Stick | 2.125 | - | - | 0.341 | - | 0.534 |
| Mouth Guard | 1.271 | - | 1.017 | 1.079 | - | 0.633 |
| Yoga Mat | 0.798 | - | - | 0.839 | 1.470 | 0.894 |
|  | 1.142 | 1.174 | 1.178 | 0.608 | 1.222 | 0.935 |

## Price Basket Analysis (FGL; 2 of 2)

| Selection | Sport Chek | Nike | Under Armor | Walmart | Sporting Life | Amazon |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Men's Running Shoes | 131 | 65 | 29 | 16 | 264 | 525 |
| Womens Hoodie | 50 | 18 | 46 | 12 | 151 | 218 |
| Mens Socks | 205 | 44 | 21 | 67 | 132 | 235 |
| Polarized Sport Sunglasses | 203 | 0 | 3 | 36 | 185 | 15565 |
| Regular Size Football | 21 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 7377 |
| Hockey Stick | 53 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 1443 |
| Mouth Guard | 77 | 0 | 3 | 19 | 0 | 279 |
| Yoga Mat | 30 | 0 | 0 | 74 | 25 | 897 |

## FGL Sports Digital Era

## FGL's is shifting toward a new in-store digital store model in order to recharge the brick and mortar shopping experience

FGL has defended against e-commerce rivals by transforming its in-store shopping experience. In 2014, FGL opened a flagship digital Sport Chek location at the West Edmonton Mall, which boasts 800 television screens strategically placed throughout the $77,000 \mathrm{sq} \mathrm{ft}$ floor space. The all-encompassing shopping experience these new stores provide is expected to inspire consumers to step away from their computer screens and into Sport Chek stores instead. Sport Chek's West Edmonton Mall location offers a golf zone that allows consumers to sample equipment and goods before purchasing, something that online shoppers would not experience.

Most recently, Sport Chek added 120,000 square feet of digital space in the GTA through the launch of flagship stores at the Square One and Yorkdale shopping centres.

## Square One Location Features

- 75,000 square feet
- 226 Samsung screens
- Event space with two curved LED walls
- 225 employees
- 46 tablets

Yorkdale Location Features

- 45,000 square feet
- 257 Samsung screens
- Digital portal entrance
- Digital art mosaic
- 200 employees
- 46 tablets


## Sport Chek New Technology



## Sporting Goods Industry "Bank For Your Buck"



## FGL Market Share Estimate



## 2011 FGL Acquisition

- CTC acquired FGL Sports Itd. On Aug-18-2011, for C\$736 million, representing roughly C $\$ 26.50$ per common share
- Funded through existing cash reserves. Implied premium of $50.5 \%$ on one-day-prior stock price.
- Implied multiples:
- EV/Revenue 0.6x
- EV/EBITDA 8.0x
- EV/EBIT 16.0x
- P/NTM EPS 17.9x
- Mark's last reported financials:
- Revenue C\$1,451 million
- EBITDA $\$ 107$ million
- Net Income \$34 million
- Diluted EPS \$1.16
- Net Debt $\$ 100$ million
- 534 Stores (321 corporate, 213 franchised), $6.573,336$ retail sq. feet

[^15]
## Potential Acquisition Target - Sporting Life

- Sporting Life Inc. is a sporting goods retailer based in Toronto, Canada, which acts as a competitor to FGL's brands. Sporting Life is 75.0\% owned by Fairfax Financial Holdings, Itd, as acquired in 2011. Company was founded in 1979.
- "Sporting Life continued to grow their business in 2015. Revenue continued to increase but margins were somewhat compressed by the mild winter. Seasonality will always be part of the business over the long term as the Sporting Life brand continues to grow in value, driven by the team's unrelenting customer service focus."
- 6 Stores nationwide, 5 in GTA and 1 in Ottawa
- 2 new locations by end of 2016, 1 in GTA and 1 in Calgary
- 2 new stores planned for 2017, locations TBA
- Sporting Life last reported financials:
- Revenue C $\$ 66.2$ million


## Mark's Diverse Product Offerings



## Mark's Diverse Product Offering

## New Product Innovation

- Well-Max ${ }^{\circledR}$ Bioceramic socks
- WorkPro ${ }^{\circledR}$ high abrasion materials
- Helly Hansen industrial footwear
- T-Max aerofoam ${ }^{\circledR}$ insulation and heat linings in footwear


## Private Labels

- FarWest ${ }^{\circledR}$ outerwear, apparel, winter accessories, and footwear
- Ripzone fashion


## Technological Improvements

- Trantula Antislip ${ }^{\circledR}$ footwear
- driWear ${ }^{T M}$ technology
- Various waterproof membranes, antislip technologies in footwear
- Protective high impact materials in gloves and footwear
- Temperature regulating materials in apparel


## Nationally Branded Products

- Columbia
- Merrell
- Sketchers
- Clark's
- Alfred Sung (sunglasses, jewellery, accessories)
- Helly Hansen (footwear, safety glasses)


## Mark's Strategic Imperatives

- Strengthening the Brand - Mark's is continuing to shift its branding from "Mark's Work Wearhouse" to "Mark's" and, more recently, has introduced select national and exclusively licensed brands, such as Helly Hanson, Merrell and Silver Jeans, to appeal to a younger demographic as a target customer group.
- Enhancing Customer Experience - Mark's has continued its work on enhancing the in-store customer experience through the creation of a "test" store in West Edmonton Mall, Alberta in which store enhancements such as in-store merchandising concepts and navigational signage are being thoroughly tested before being rolled out across the Mark's store network.
- Transitioning to Digital - Mark's recently launched its ecommerce websites, which provide customers with a new bilingual ecommerce shopping experience. Mark's has been testing interactive digital tools within its stores to assist customers with product selection and product information, and plans to roll out a new POS system which will enable it to capture customer data in order to better market to and interact with customers.
- Driving Growth and Productivity
- End-to-end retail and ecommerce infrastructure fortification
- Leveraging the capabilities of INA, to more effectively source and develop products
- Integration of shared services with CTC, i.e. technological and marketing services
- Continue expansion of network coverage in under-developed markets and increase store footprint

[^16]
## Mark's Relationship with INA

- In 2015, approximately 41\% of the value of Mark's inventory purchases was sourced from vendors outside North America, primarily from Asia, either directly or indirectly through INA (INTERSPORT North America).
- Mark's has been transitioning its merchandising activities to INA (as described in section 2.1 entitled "Retail Segment - FGL Sports - FGL Sports Wholesale Operations") to improve margins as well as its sourcing and quality control functions.
- The utilization of INA's sourcing and quality control capabilities also facilitates increased oversight of the business conduct of Mark's vendors.
- INA is a subsidiary of FGL sports, and handle's both banner's international sourcing and merchandising efforts.
- INA is owned by Intersport International Corp. (IIC), which has the worldwide leading position in the sporting goods distribution market.
- 5,200 associated stores in 35 countries.


## Mark's Workwear Square Footage Analysis

| Square Footage per <br> Store | Workwear \% <br> of Store (est.) | Workwear <br> Square Footage |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## 2002 Mark's Acquisition

- CTC acquired Mark's Work Wearhouse Itd. On Feb-04-2002, for C\$116 million, representing roughly C\$4.10 per common share
- Funded through existing cash reserves. Implied premium of $23.1 \%$ on one-day-prior stock price.
- Implied multiples:
- EV/Revenue 0.3x
- EV/EBITDA $3.8 x$
- EV/EBIT 6.1x
- P/NTM EPS 16.9x
- Mark's last reported financials:
- Revenue C\$390 million
- EBITDA $\$ 30$ million
- Net Income $\$ 7.10$ million
- Diluted EPS \$. 26
- Net Debt $\$ 69$ million
- 319 Stores (194 corporate, 115 franchised), 1,449,325 retail sq. feet

[^17]
## Canadian Tire Bank Credit Risk Management

- OSFI's regulatory capital guidelines under Basel III allow for two tiers of capital. Common Equity Tier 1 ("CET1") capital includes common shares, retained earnings and accumulated other comprehensive income, less items risk weighted at 0\% which are deducted from capital. The Bank currently does not hold any additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital instruments.
- The Bank's objectives include:
- Providing sufficient capital to maintain the confidence of investors and depositors.
- Being an appropriately capitalized institution, as measured internally, defined by regulatory authorities and compared with the Bank's peers.
- The Bank uses the standardized approach for credit risk for all on-balance sheet portfolios, the basic indicator approach for all components of operational risk, the standardized approach for market risk, and the current exposure method for foreign exchange derivative contracts. The Bank is not required to hold any capital in relation to market risk as the Bank does not have assets classified as held for trade.
- The Bank uses a roll rate methodology. This methodology employs statistical analysis of historical data and experience of delinquency and default to estimate the amount of loans that will eventually be written off as a result of events occurring before the reporting date.
- Counterparty credit risk will be minimized by:
- Setting minimum acceptable credit ratings for investments.
- Setting maximum group limits for related issuers.
- Limiting investments to higher credit quality fixed income securities with a maximum maturity of five years.
- Diversifying the portfolio so that potential losses on individual securities are minimized
- The Asset Liability Management Policy dictates the following interest rate risk limits for a plus or minus 200 bps parallel shift in interest rates in the Bank:
- Projected net interest income may decline by no more than $6 \%$.
- Net economic value of equity ("EVE") may decline by no more than $12 \%$.
- EVE is defined as the present value of assets less the present value of liabilities.


## Asset-Backed GCCT Debt Covenants

- The series notes, together with certain other permitted obligations of GCCT, are secured by the assets of GCCT. The entitlement of note holders and other parties to such assets is governed by the priority and payment provisions set forth in the GCCT Indenture and the related series supplements under which these series of notes were issued.
- Principal repayments may commence earlier than these scheduled commencement dates if certain events occur including:
- The Bank failing to make required distributions to GCCT or failing to meet covenant or other contractual terms
- The performance of the receivables failing to achieve set criteria
- Insufficient receivables in the pool.


## CTFS Business Developments

- Focus on credit card growth through:
- Increasing account balances
- Acquiring new accounts
- Expanding in-store financing programs
- Commenced issuing CT Options World Mastercard and Sport Chek Mastercard
- Re-launced a new My Canadian Tire ‘Money’ program, and introduced the new Canadian Tire Pay\&Play mobile wallet


## CTFS Credit Card Offerings

## Canadian Tire Options MasterCard



- Collect 10X e-Canadian Tire 'Money' at Canadian Tire stores, including on automotive service, Sport Chek, Mark's, and PartSource
- Collect e-Canadian Tire 'Money' at participating Canadian Tire gas bars
- Collect 2X e-Canadian Tire 'Money’ everywhere else you shop


## Gas Advantage MasterCard

- Save up to 10\$ per litre
- No annual fee


## Cash Advantage MasterCard

- Earn up to $1.5 \%$ cash back
- Earn up to 3\% cash back at Canadian Tire stores, Canadian Tire gas bars and Mark's Work Wearhouse/L'Équipeur stores
- No annual fee


## Company Profile: Riocan REIT (TSX:REI.UN)



## Company Profile: Choice Properties REIT (TSX:CHP.UN)

Geographic Profile (\# of Properties)
Gross Leasable Area (sq. ft. millions)


## Key Financial Data

96.8\% Retail (2014)


## Additional Details

- Loblaws represents $88.4 \%$ of occupancy by GLA ( $91.4 \%$ by rental revenue)
- Loblaw is the controlling shareholder with an effective 82.2\% controlling interest as at December 31, 2014
- Loblaw's controlling shareholder, GWL, held an approximate 46\% ownership in Loblaw's outstanding common shares and a 5.4\% direct interest in Choice Properties REIT

See 2014 Annual Report, Note 23 and page 22 for support of the "Additional Details"

## Company Profile: Crombie REIT (TSX:CRR.UN)

Gross Leasable Area (sq. ft. millions)
83.4\% Retail (2014)


## Top 10 Largest Tenants

| Sobeys | $50.3 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Shoppers Drug Mart | $5.9 \%$ |
| Cineplex | $1.5 \%$ |
| Province of Nova Scotia | $1.3 \%$ |
| CIBC | $1.2 \%$ |
| Lawtons/Sobeys Pharmacy | $1.1 \%$ |
| GoodLife Fitness | $1.1 \%$ |
| Best Buy Canada Ltd. | $1.0 \%$ |
| Bank of Nova Scotia | $0.9 \%$ |
| Dollarama | $0.9 \%$ |

\% of Rental Revenue 65.2\%

## Company Profile: Smart REIT (TSX:SRU.UN)



## CT REIT Covenants

- Key financial covenants are as follows:
a requirement to maintain, at all times:
- a specified maximum ratio of total indebtedness of CT REIT (plus the aggregate par value of the Class C LP Units) to gross book value of assets
- a specified maximum ratio of total secured indebtedness of CT REIT (plus the aggregate par value of the Class C LP Units) to gross book value of assets
- a minimum Unitholders' equity
- a ratio of unencumbered assets to unconsolidated unsecured indebtedness
- a specified minimum debt service coverage ratio defined as earnings before interest and taxes as
- a percentage of interest expense, which for greater clarity includes payments on the Class C LP Units

As at December 31, 2015, CT REIT was in compliance with all of its financial covenants. Under these financial covenants, CT REIT has sufficient flexibility to fund business growth and maintain or amend distribution rates within its existing distribution policy.

## CT REIT Covenants (detailed)

- Debt Service Coverage Ratio - the Trust will maintain at all times a ratio of Consolidated EBITDA to Debt Service of not less than 1.50 to 1.00
- Restrictions on Additional Indebtedness - The Trust will not incur, or permit any Subsidiary to incur, any Indebtedness, other than Permitted Indebtedness, unless certain conditions are met
- Maintenance of Unencumbered Aggregate Adjusted Assets - The Trust will maintain at all times a ratio of Unencumbered Aggregate Adjusted Assets (excluding construction assets and other non-income producing assets) to Consolidated Unsecured Indebtedness (excluding Subordinated Indebtedness) of not less than 1.50:1.00
- Restrictions on Consolidations and Mergers - Neither the Trust nor any Subsidiary may consolidate with, amalgamate or merge with or into or sell, assign, transfer or lease all or substantially all of its properties and assets (other than pursuant to a reorganization of the Trust pursuant to a conversion to an open-end trust or otherwise) unless certain conditions are met


## CT REIT Capital Structure (\$ millions)

As at December 31, 2015 (\$ millions)
Liabilities
Class C LP Units \$1,687.0

| Mortgages Payable | $\$ 60.1$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Debentures Payable | $\$ 347.9$ |
| Bank Credit Facility | - |
| Equity (Book Value) |  |
| Unitholders | $\$ 1,037.2$ |
| Non-controlling | $\$ 1,176.2$ |
| Total | $\$ 4, \mathbf{3 0 8 . 4}$ |

## CT REIT's Role in Optimizing Capital Structure

1. Flexibility - Management can choose between CTC and CT REIT to issue debt
2. Recent Events - Through inaugural debt issuance, management is choosing to issue debt through CT REIT versus CTC and redeem intercompany debt
3. Securitization - Debt at CT REIT can be securitized by its real estate assets (majority of CTC's real estate portfolio is owned by CT REIT); CT REIT's standalone filings offer greater transparency (than previously available at CTC for its real estate portfolio)



## CT REIT Tenant Profile

As at December 31, 2015
Annualized Base

| Tenant Type | GLA |  |  | Minimum Rent |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| CTR Stores | $87.0 \%$ |  | $89.0 \%$ |  |  |
| CTC DCs | $8.6 \%$ |  | $3.9 \%$ |  |  |
| CTC Office | $0.7 \%$ |  | $1.2 \%$ |  |  |
| Other CTC Banners | $1.7 \%$ |  | $2.6 \%$ |  |  |
| Total CTC | $\mathbf{9 8 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 6 . 7 \%}$ |  |  |  |
| Third Party | $\mathbf{2 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 3 \%}$ |  |  |  |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ |  |  |  |


| Region | Annualized Base <br> Minimum Rent |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Ontario | GLA |  |  |
| Quebec | $42.5 \%$ |  | $39.7 \%$ |
| Western Canada | $22.8 \%$ | $27.4 \%$ |  |
| Atlantic Canada | $27.1 \%$ | $23.8 \%$ |  |
| Total | $7.6 \%$ | $9.1 \%$ |  |
| Alberta | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ |  |
|  | $9.8 \%$ | n.a. |  |

## US vs. Canadian REIT Structure

|  | US | Canada |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Enacted Year | 1960 | 2007 |
| Mandatory Public Listing | None | Mandatory listing if over 80\% are Canadian assets |
| Asset Restriction | 75\% of book assets must be real estate | 90\% of FMV assets must be real estate |
| Financial Restriction | $75 \%$ of gross income must come from rental property <br> $95 \%$ of gross income must be passive income | $90 \%$ of gross REIT revenue from eligible resale properties <br> 75\% of gross REIT revenue from capital properties |
| Leverage | No limitation | No limitation |
| Mandatory Distribution for Tax-free Income | 90\% of taxable income | Up to 100\% of taxable income |

## Glossary of General Merchandise Terms

| Name | Description |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Same-store sales | The same-store sales metric is used by Management and is common throughout the retail industry. This metric identifies sales growth generated by the existing store network and removes the effect of opening and closing stores. The calculation excludes stores that have been retrofitted, replaced or expanded where the percentage change in square footage exceeds $25 \%$ of the original store size. For Canadian Tire, same-store sales include sales from all stores that have been open for a minimum of one year and one week. For Mark's and FGL Sports, same-store sales include sales from all stores that have been open since at least the beginning of the comparative period in the prior year. |  |
| Sales per square foot | Sales per square foot is a metric used by Management to evaluate the effective utilization of its assets. The metric is calculated using sales on a rolling 52- week basis in each year (Mark's and FGL Sports use a rolling 12-month basis) for those stores that have been open for a minimum of one fiscal year as at the end of the current quarter. The calculation excludes stores that have been retrofitted, replaced or expanded where the percentage change in square footage exceeds $25 \%$ of the original store size. |  |
| Name | Description* | Examples |
| General Merchandise Stores | This subsector comprises establishments primarily engaged in retailing a general line of merchandise that may, or may not, include a general line of grocery items. <br> Exclusions include establishments primarily engaged in: retailing a general line of building and home improvement materials (44411, Home Centres) retailing a general line of grocery items (44511, Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience | - Costco Wholesale Canada <br> - Sears |

## SWOT Analysis

This SWOT analysis was created to establish a better understanding of CTC's competitive positon within the Canadian retail industry. It is structured around a series of categories within in each SWOT section, and are ranked according to their likely impact on CTC. The points system (out of 30 each) was used to analyze the overall position of Canadian Tire, as summarized by the below graphs.

## Strengths



Total Threats

## Opportunities

Expansion
Prospects


[^18]
## Porter's 5 Forces

Power of Buyers - LOW: Given their wide-ranging product base, it is difficult to identify a typical "buyer" of CTC products. As CTC's "buyers" are retail consumers, their relative bargaining power over CTC possesses two notable traits: (1) CTC buyers are price-takers, with no control over the retail price CTC charges for its goods, and (2) CTC buyers are free to switch retailers with low penalties.

Power of Suppliers - INSIGNIFICANT: The bargaining power of CTC's suppliers is insignificant, given both the scale of the company and the appeal of obtaining a supply contract. Approximately $43 \%$ of CTR's inventory purchases having been sourced from outside North America, primarily Asia-Pacific ( $\sim 50 \%$ for Mark's and 7\% for FGL, 2014 AIF).
Threat of Substitutes - SIGNIFICANT: Consumers are free to switch retailers in pursuit of better product quality, online shopping and delivery, more convenient retail locations, better relationships with other staff members, etc.
Threat of New Entrants - LOW: Required capital expenditure to obtain the operational scale of CTC is substantial. Canadian Tire's operating capital expenditures amounted to $\$ 432.9 \mathrm{~mm}$ and $\$ 476.0 \mathrm{~mm}$ in 2013 and 2014, respectively.
Existing Rivalry - MODERATE: CTC has no direct rival across the entirety of its business segments, however it faces significant rivalry with CTR and Mark's segments. No other retailer in Canada is as diversified as Canadian Tire Corporation, both in terms of brand offerings and proximity to Canadian consumers.


[^19]
## Value of Voting Rights (Control)

- "The value of controlling a firm derives from the fact that you believe that you or someone else would operate the firm differently from the way it is operated currently...
- In other words, the value of a business will be much lower if we assume that it is run by incompetent managers rather than by competent ones...
- When valuing an existing company, private or public, where there is already a management in place, we are faced with a choice. We can value the company run by the incumbent managers and derive what we can call a status quo value. We can also revalue the company with a hypothetical "optimal" management team and estimate an optimal value...
- The difference between the optimal and the status quo values can be considered the value of controlling the business."


## Voting vs. Non-voting Shares - Academic Research

- Method of raising important equity capital without sacrificing voting control of company's operations crucial for companies entering the growth state of the corporate life-cycle.
- Proponents of this type of share structure contend that it is a voluntary arrangement between outside shareholders and a controlling shareholder who seeks a control position without fear of takeover.
- Opponents argue that controlling shareholders take advantage of their disproportionate voting versus cash flow rights to the detriment of outside shareholders.
- "We find that dual-class firms face lower short-term market pressure than single-class firms. In particular, they have less transient or short-term institutional holdings, a lower probability of being taken over, and lower analyst coverage. Dual-class firms also tend to have more growth opportunities (higher sales growth and R\&D intensity) than single-class firms." Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim, and Mark H. Liu
- Canadian Tire spokesman Duncan Fulton says since the two classes of shares have exactly the same economic rights (such as claims on dividends), "structurally, they should be trading at par." However, he notes, there has been a price difference between the two classes for decades, and that difference has varied over time. ([My] research indicates there was a 100 per cent premium in early 2006, as well.) There's no economic reason for this to be happening. So whoever is bidding up the voting shares must believe that some sort of transaction is afoot.

[^20]
## Voting vs. Non-voting Shares - Academic Research

Exhibit 2
Percentage (Number) of Dual-class Firms Listed on TSX


Exhibit 1
Most Frequently Cited Reasons by Dual-class Companies for Unification

| Reasons | Frequency |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| 1. | Increase Liquidity and Marketability | 9 |
| 2. | Increase Investor Appeal and Attract Institutional Investors | 6 |
| 3. | Retirement Plan for Founder | 4 |
| 4. | Reorganization of Company | 4 |
| 5. | Corporate Governance Concerns | 4 |
| 6. | Introduction of Shareholder Rights Plan | 3 |
| 7. | Alignment of Interests | 2 |
| 8. | Facilitate Sales of Control Block | 2 |
| 9. | Others | 8 |

## Voting Rights Premium: Common versus Class A


_Common to Non-voting Share Premium - 5 Y Avg - 4 Y Avg - 3 Y Avg _ 2 Y Avg _ 1 Y Avg
Currently, the 5Y Average is used.
Using the 4Y Average, the Target Price is unchanged.
Using the 3Y Average, the Target Price decreases by $\$ 1$.
Using the 2Y Average, the Target price decreases by $\$ 2$.
Using the 1Y Average, the Target price decreases by $\$ 2$.

## CTC Share Price Performance (10Y)



## CTC Share Price Performance (5Y)



## CTC Share Price Performance (1Y)




[^0]:    Business
    Foundation
    Growth
    Profitability
    Valuation
    Investment
    Conclusion
    Overview

[^1]:    Source: Company Website

[^2]:    Source: Company filings

[^3]:    Source: Company Website, LinkedIn

[^4]:    Source: Company Website

[^5]:    Source: Company Website

[^6]:    Source: Company websites, company filings

[^7]:    Source: Company filings

[^8]:    Source: Company filings

[^9]:    Source $■$ CTR $■$ General Merch. $■$ Auto Parts \& Tire $■$ Bldg Mat., Garden Equipm't \& Supplies $■$ Furniture, Home Furn.

[^10]:    Source: YouTube, Web Scraping Analytics

[^11]:    Source: Twitter

[^12]:    * represents number of stores for which data was available per company websites.
    ** number of RONA stores is exclusive of 2 non-identifiable locations and 23 non-flagship RONA banners, including Dick's Lumber, Marcil's, Contractor First, and TruServ

[^13]:    * represents number of stores for which data was available per company websites.

[^14]:    Source: Company website, company filings

[^15]:    Source: Company Filings, CapitallQ

[^16]:    Source: 2015 Annual Information Form

[^17]:    Source: Company Filings, CapitalIQ

[^18]:    Source: Team Analysis

[^19]:    Source: Team Analysis

[^20]:    Sources: Magna Intl. Proposal Statement, The Globe and Mail, InvestmentReview.com

