Key takeaways
Deepening China–Latin America trade and investment ties are creating opportunities shaped by local supply chains, government negotiations and geopolitical risks.
- “New infrastructure” sectors, including electric vehicles and ICT, now account for over 60% of Chinese deals in the region.
- Negotiating capacity and government planning influence local sourcing, technology transfer and job creation.
- Community trust supports Chinese companies’ expansion, while uncertainty over US national security restrictions creates investment risks.
For decades, China’s engagement with Latin America revolved around commodities and infrastructure. Now the focus is shifting — raising questions about who captures the value.
China’s approach to investment in Latin America has changed markedly in recent years. The focus has shifted – from ports, railways and hydroelectric dams to electric vehicle plants, renewable energy projects and digital infrastructure.
Yet the underlying forces driving China's engagement in the region remain the same. Margaret Myers, Managing Director of the SAIS Institute for America, China and the Future of Global Affairs, identified three mainstays: resource seeking, market seeking and the internationalization of Chinese companies.
For much of the past two decades, resource seeking dominated – China needed commodities, and Latin America had them. Now, market seeking and the drive to internationalize are coming to the fore, altering the investment profile. China’s capital is flowing increasingly toward what Myers classifies as “new infrastructure” – electric vehicles, information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, high-end manufacturing and urban infrastructure – sectors that now account for over 60% of Chinese deals in the region.
Between 2000 and 2025, Chinese companies made 742 foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions across Latin America and the Caribbean totaling USD213 billion. Manufacturing’s share of Chinese outward FDI into the region has risen from under 2% in the early 2000s to nearly 26% since 2020. Greenfield investment – building new capacity rather than acquiring existing assets – now accounts for more than half of Chinese deals, up from around a fifth previously.
The impetus to build manufacturing capacity abroad stems from a confluence of forces including tariff barriers, overcapacity at home, supply-chain resilience, an ambition to ascend the value chain, and the search for new markets.
Underlying these forces is a phenomenon the Chinese call “neijuan” – loosely translated as “involution” – the cut-throat domestic competition that compresses margins and pushes companies to seek markets abroad. Market experts have described this as a transition from product export to system export.
That phrase captures something important about how Chinese companies move. When one sets up a factory overseas, it rarely goes alone. James Choa, CFA, Founder and CEO of Elfoso Holdings, described a pattern he had observed repeatedly: instead of building a single plant in a new market, a Chinese company brings along its suppliers to establish an entire industrial base. “The whole ecosystem goes global,” he said.
Trade ties are deepening too. While the US remains Latin America’s largest trading partner overall, thanks to its deep ties with Mexico and Central America, further south it is China that leads – in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, where commodities dominate the trade mix (see Figure 1). Growth in Latin America’s trade with China is also outpacing that with the US (see Figure 2)
China-LatAm trade: Who captures the value?
Trade and investment flows tell one part of the story. The more contested question is what Chinese engagement in the region delivers to host economies. Chinese manufacturing investment has traditionally been largely vertical – China retains the intellectual property, the components and the profits, while the host country gets the assembly jobs. Myers said that "sometimes technology transfer just seems not to happen."
BYD’s plant in Camaçari, in the northeastern state of Bahia suggests that can change when countries push for more. BYD’s operations there are moving toward 50% local parts sourcing, integrating into local supply chains in ways that earlier Chinese investments rarely did.
Cynthia Sanborn, Director of the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Universidad del Pacifico in Lima, Peru and a long-standing researcher of China-Latin America relations, said the lesson is simple: “Negotiate better.” Chile, she noted, thought it had leverage with its lithium reserves to secure downstream processing, only to see those agreements fall through when prices collapsed.
The Chile case illustrates a broader lesson: the countries best positioned are those with the strategic capacity to negotiate on their own terms. As Meryem Agostini, a researcher at Guinness Global Investors, observed: “A country like Brazil, which is maybe a little bit more developed and can stand on its own even in the global economy politically, has more leverage, more standing, to shape the terms of Chinese investment.”
Countries can also be more proactive in planning to derive the most benefit from Chinese projects. Sanborn pointed to the industrial parks taking shape around Peru’s Chancay port – a USD1.3 billion facility built and operated by China’s COSCO – as a sign of what ancillary economic activity can emerge when governments plan around Chinese infrastructure. “I toured a fruit packaging plant with my students,” she said. “They receive fruit from all over the country, clean it, package it, and send it to the port. They’re creating 500 new and decent jobs for young people from local areas.”
Ultimately, what determines the outcome, said Sanborn, is less the nationality of the investor than the negotiating capacity of host governments. “China has long-term strategic vision. That’s why they have a lot of what we export – they saw it early. We need governments that can think the same way.”
Earning staying power
On the ground, Chinese companies appear to be doing a better job of earning the trust of local communities — and finding that it's not just good citizenship, but good business. Sanborn said the days of firms arriving with no regard for corporate social responsibility were largely over. “There are a lot fewer of them now – and they don’t last very long.”
Mei Bai, CFA, Senior Governance Manager at Tianqi Lithium, drew on her company’s experience in managing overseas assets. She pointed to the importance of “localized operation – going with the community, building a local brand and earning trust.”
Huawei has implemented that approach at scale, establishing ICT academies at 470 universities across Latin America.
DiDi, the ride-hailing platform, has established itself across several Latin American markets by adapting to local conditions in ways its rivals have not. Sanborn noted that DiDi had been able to engage with local taxi driver unions – something Uber had not managed as well. That kind of local embeddedness matters in a region where steady growth in the middle class population — which already stands at 406 million – offers considerable potential for consumer-facing businesses (see Figure 3).
What are the risks?
That potential has not gone unnoticed by investors. Latin American equity markets have attracted growing international interest, with the MSCI EM Latin America index posting returns of 56% in 2025. But investors looking to capitalize on deepening China–Latin America ties need a clear-eyed view of the risks.
The Donroe Doctrine – Washington’s effort to limit Chinese involvement in regional telecoms and digital infrastructure – has unsettled some investments. Yet for Sanborn, significant retrenchment now seems unlikely. “The horse is out of the barn,” she said. Chinese companies – in telecoms, logistics, energy and manufacturing – are embedded across Latin America in ways that cannot easily be unwound.
For Myers, the key question is where US national security concerns end and protectionism begins. Chinese commercial presence, in her view, was not among top US concerns, but rather infrastructure with military use capabilities. “There are certain red lines that the US has in place but has yet to fully define,” she said. “That uncertainty itself is a risk.”
Explore the full series to see how trade flows are shaping investment trends:
How investors are positioning for further growth in trade between developing economies
Shifting trade is redrawing the map of global investment
Weighing the cost of resilient supply chains
Can tokenization open the door to more trade?
You may also be interested in
Want to learn more about Private markets?
Explore our selection of professional learning options, research, and thought leadership designed to help you advance your private markets career with confidence.